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Does school accountability pressure improve school quality? 
Barbara Hanisch-Cerda 
 
This dissertation evaluates the impact of accountability pressure on a context where there is 
school choice. The Chilean context provides a unique opportunity for this purpose since it 
constitutes a system with school choice since the 1980s and since 2008 there is a policy that 
introduces a means-tested voucher that introduces incentives to schools to improve their 
performance. Under this policy, schools are classified based on students’ test scores and other 
school factors (such as teacher evaluations, approval rates, retention rates), and are linked to 
punishments and rewards. I assess the impact of accountability pressure on outcomes that have 
consequences attached (high-stakes outcomes), and other outcomes that may reflect the quality 
of the school but do not have direct consequences attached (low-stakes outcomes). I use a fuzzy 
regression discontinuity to estimate the effect of receiving different school classifications on 
high-stakes test scores, low-stakes test scores, school behavioral responses, and student and 
teacher body composition. Estimates of the effects on 4th and 8th grade math, language and 
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Does school accountability pressure improve school quality? 
 
 Chapter 1 - Introduction 
It is believed that school accountability improves the quality of education.  This belief underlies 
policies of school accountability, like “No Child Left Behind” in the U.S., which requires that 
states adopt single, statewide accountability systems. Like this, school accountability policies are 
flourishing throughout the world. But there is still a lot to learn about the impact of these types of 
policies. 
The basic notion of school accountability policies is that attaching consequences (explicit or 
implicit, positive or negative) to students’ performance will act as an incentive to school 
personnel and teachers to adopt actions that will improve students’ performance.  
Empirical evidence on the impact of school accountability has accumulated in the U.S. and 
England. There is a growing body of evidence that suggests school accountability improves 
students’ achievement (Carnoy & Loeb, 2002; Hanushek & Raymond, 2005). Specifically, most 
of the studies that assess specific accountability programs focus on the impact of school 
accountability on performance measures associated with the incentive (high-stakes outcomes). 
Since the performance measures are just part of the educational goals of schools, other studies 
focus on the impact of the accountability policies on performance measures not associated with 
the incentive (low-stakes outcomes). The evidence shows that school accountability policies 
have a positive, but modest, impact on high-stakes outcomes (Jacob, 2005; Neal & 
Schanzenbach, 2010; Chiang, 2009; Rockoff & Turner, 2008; Figlio & Rouse, 2006). The 
evidence of the impact on low-stakes outcomes is mixed (Chiang, 2009; Jacob, 2005). The 
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evidence of the impact on long-run outcomes is too scant to draw conclusions (Deming, 
Cohodes, Jennings & Jencks, 2013).  
The mechanisms through which school accountability operates to increase high-stakes tests 
scores can depend on (i) the behavioral response of the school, (ii) student body composition, 
and (iii) teacher body composition. The behavioral response of the school to increase high-stakes 
test scores can be both desirable and undesirable. Desired mechanisms are those that improve the 
educational goal1 as well as the performance measure. Less desired mechanisms are behaviors 
that improve the performance measure at the expense of the educational goal. Among the desired 
mechanisms, there is evidence that schools increased instructional expenditures (Chiang, 2009; 
Craig, Imberman & Purdue, 2013; Rouse, Hannaway, Goldhaber & Figlio, 2013). Among the 
undesirable mechanisms, there is evidence that schools focus on marginal students at the expense 
of other students (Neal & Schanzenbach, 2010; Deming et al., 2013), schools narrow the 
curriculum (Jacob, 2005); shift instruction towards tested material (Jacob, 2007), manipulate the 
pool of test takers (Cullen & Reback, 2006; Jacob, 2005), increase special education placements 
(Jacob, 2005), and increase student retention in grades prior to the high-stakes grades (Jacob, 
2005). Studies about the impact of accountability measures on distribution of students and 
teachers across schools are few. So far the evidence shows school accountability impacts student 
sorting among schools (Hart & Figlio, 2015) and affects the dynamics of the teacher labor 
market (Clotfelter, Ladd, Vigdor & Aliaga Diaz, 2004; Feng, Figlio & Sass, 2010). 
                                                 
1 This assumes there is some sort of reasonable unanimous goal of schooling.  However, attributing just one goal to 
schooling is quite reductionist. Schools serve several constituencies (e.g., parents, employees, state, teachers, 
students) all of which have their own set of goals; goals that may conflict with each other. In most instances, 
however, the goals of schooling are assumed to be the achievement of skills in subjects such as math, language and 
science measured by some standardized test (Levin, 1974).    
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In this dissertation I examine the first attempt of school accountability in Chile where schools 
are accountable to the government for their academic results, the law of adjusted vouchers, or 
SEP law (for its acronym in Spanish Ley de Subvencion Escolar Preferencial).This law offers 
extra funding for schools enrolling socioeconomically disadvantaged students, with the 
allocation of those extra funds conditional on schools’ academic performance. Schools are 
classified into three performance categories (“in recovery”, “emergent”, and “autonomous”). 
This classification allows identifying schools that require more support to improve their quality. 
And, since Chilean parents are free to choose schools, this classification provides information for 
parents to choose the school for their offspring. 
In accordance with the international literature, the empirical evidence on the impact of the 
introduction of the SEP law shows a positive but moderate impact on high-stakes outcomes, 
ranging between 0.08 and 0.2 standard deviations on a national standardized test (MINEDUC, 
2012; Correa et al., 2013; Villarroel, 2012; Mizala & Torche, 2013; Neilson, 2013; Navarro-
Palau, 2015). However, these studies have not disentangled the effect of the extra resources 
provided to schools from the effect of the school accountability component. There are no studies 
in Chile about the impact of the SEP law on either low-stakes outcomes or on long-run 
outcomes. 
In contrast with current research of the SEP law, I do not limit my study to the impact of the 
introduction of the law as a black box on high-stakes outcomes. I try to study what incentives 
within this law affect the educational outcomes of the students. I specifically study the impact of 
accountability pressure on high- and low-stakes outcomes. Specifically I explore three questions 
about the ways in which school accountability affects students’ educational outcomes: 
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(1) What is the impact of accountability pressure on high-stakes outcomes?  
(2) What is the impact of accountability pressure on low-stakes outcomes?  
(3) If school accountability increases incentivized or non-incentivized outcomes, what 
mechanisms drive those improvements?  
I use a fuzzy regression discontinuity design that exploits the discontinuous structure of 
school classification in the Chilean accountability system. The key finding is that there is no 
consistent evidence that schools receiving different classifications affect high- or low- stakes 
outcomes of the students the year of the classification or a year after. Point estimates are often 
close to zero, however, never statistically different from zero. I perform relevant specification 
tests, and find that the lack of evidence of an impact holds throughout specification and 
robustness checks. I discuss several explanations of the findings. 
This study contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First, school accountability 
policies have become very popular worldwide; however, there is little evidence on their impacts 
outside the U.S. and England.  This dissertation provides evidence from Latin America. Second, 
this dissertation provides empirical evidence on the impact of school accountability on an 
educational system where there is school choice (Hart & Figlio, 2015; Mizala & Torche, 2013; 
Neilson, 2013). This paper also contributes specifically to the Chilean evidence about the impact 
of the SEP law in three ways. First, this study assesses the impact of accountability pressure on 
schools. Second, this study assesses the impact of accountability pressure on both high- and low-
stakes outcomes. Third, this study assesses potential mechanisms that could drive the impact of 
accountability pressure on educational outcomes. 
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The reminder of the dissertation is structured as follows. In chapter 2 I provide a review of 
the literature of school accountability. In chapter 3 I review the Chilean accountability system 
and the empirical evidence accumulated so far. Chapter 4 presents the method for estimating the 
effects of school classification on educational outcomes and the data. In chapter 5 I present the 




 Chapter 2 - School accountability literature 
So far I have referred to ‘incentives’ and ‘accountability’ in a very loosely way. In order to move 
forward in the study of incentives and accountability I will stop for a moment to define these 
terms and their relationship. Then I review the theory behind school accountability and the 
empirical evidence accumulated so far. 
2.1. Defining incentives and accountability 
Incentives are rewards or benefits that promote certain actions or greater effort. In psychological 
literature, incentives are often mentioned along with the term ‘motivation’. One simple approach 
to relate both concepts is that motivation represents the reasons for people’s behavior or 
organizations’ actions (Ryan & Deci, 1999). These reasons can be intrinsic to the activity, such 
as pleasure, feeling of accomplishment, etc. The reasons can also be extrinsic to the activity, i.e., 
that engagement in certain behavior is to obtain an outcome that is separable from the activity 
itself and therefore could also be obtained by doing other activities/behaviors. Extrinsic reasons 
can be rewards or sanctions if the behavior is or is not displayed, or the performance is or is not 
achieved satisfactorily. These extrinsic reasons, which can be explicit or implicit, are also called 
incentives. 
In education, performance incentives can be described as: 
“(…) rewards and punishments related to the achievement of specific 
outcomes. Incentives may be promised in advance, such as those written in teacher 
contracts, or given spontaneously, such as giving teacher a choice classroom 
assignment after a successful year. Incentives may also be monetary (such as year-
end bonuses for bringing all students in a class up to grade level in reading) or 
implicit (such as the praise a teacher gets from colleagues for doing a particularly 
good job)” (Hanushek et al., 1994, p. xx-xxi). 
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The way of understanding accountability policies is quite broad in terms of to whom they affect 
and what devices are set in place. For example, tests can have direct consequences for students 
serving as a powerful incentive for students to put greater effort into learning (OECD, 2013). Or 
students’ assessments can have consequences for teachers’ payments (Podgursky & Springer, 
2007). Also students’ assessments can be used by schools to allocate resources or to provide 
additional support for low performing schools. Some authors consider as an accountability policy 
any reporting of school performance by an external organization such as the government (Figlio 
& Ladd, 2015; Figlio & Loeb, 2011; Figlio & Ladd, 2008). Some others consider as 
accountability policies those measures that provide clear outcome thresholds the individuals or 
organizations are expected to meet with explicit consequences if those thresholds are met or not 
(National Research Council, 2011). Accountability policies can also include school choice 
policies, where the consequences are enacted by parents as they choose particular schools for 
their children and not others (Gronberg & Jansen, 2006; Ladd, 1996). Most authors do not 
explicitly favor one approach over another.  
The common meaning seems to be that accountability policies are institutional devices that 
attach consequences (explicit or implicit, positive or negative) to measured student performance 
(academic outcomes). The purpose is to use performance information to increase students’ 
outcomes. Such performance information is meant to act as an incentive for individuals and 
organizations to increase performance. 
In summary, external incentives are the extrinsic reasons that drive behavior, and 
accountability and are the institutional devices that attach consequences to outcomes through the 
provision of information. The presumption is that such information will act as an incentive for 
individuals or organizations to improve those outcomes. Accountability provisions in education 
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constitute the policies that have been popular in the last decade. Incentives are the rationale 
behind such policies. 
Accountability devices have been designed in several different ways. The common element that 
accountability policies in education promote is that their goal is to increase students’ 
performance. There are features that shape them (O’Day, 2004). These features are: 
Who is accountable? The target of reward or sanctions may differ between different audiences. 
For example, the target can be schools or private firms as organizations, or individuals such as 
school personnel, parents, or students. Who is accountable can also be found in a voluntary or 
mandatory situation. In a voluntary scheme, the constituency that is accountable gets into the 
relationship voluntarily searching for recognition or profits. In a mandatory scheme, schools or 
the constituency that is accountable is compelled to obey the accountability requirements in 
order to operate in the system. 
To whom are they accountable? The constituency to which the target group of the reward or 
punishment is accountable also varies. It could be parents in the cases where parents choose the 
schools for their offspring. It can also be any sort of public organization that holds schools or 
teachers accountable for the results of their students. 
For what are they accountable? The target group whose performance is affected can vary. It can 
be either all students of the school, a subgroup of students in the school, or a subgroup of the 
population regardless of what school they attend. Also the specific performance goal may differ. 
It can refer to increasing students’ performance in reference to a baseline period, or to reach a 
basic standard. It can refer to specific subjects like math, reading, etc. There can also be specific 
goals for specific populations. 
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With what consequences? The rewards and sanctions also vary. It can be a monetary reward, or 
recognition or any other type of reward. The reward can be either explicit or implicit. Usually 
there is a combination of rewards, explicit and implicit. For example, there can be a monetary 
reward for a school for increasing the performance of their students, but there is also the reward 
of recognition in front of the community. Sanctions can also be explicit or implicit, and can be 
monetary or non-monetary. 
There are several accountability devices with differing features that have been attempted over 
the years. There are devices where schools, teachers and students are accountable to either 
parents or public organizations.  For example, schools are accountable to parents in a system of 
‘school choice’, accountable to public organizations in ‘performance-contracting’, ‘school 
accountability’ and ‘social impact bonds’. 
Incentives and corresponding accountability devices are appealing as (i) they direct behavior 
towards specific goals, at least those goals that count towards receiving the rewards or avoiding 
the sanctions (Hannaway, 1996); (ii) they have the potential to align the behaviors of teachers 
and principals within public schools and districts with policy makers’ and parents’ broader goals 
(O’Day, 2004; Figlio & Loeb, 2011); (iii) they do not attempt to dictate which teaching methods 
will work, but encourage individuals to decide for themselves which route towards the goal is 
most appropriate for their specific circumstances (Hanushek et al., 1994; Hanushek, 1996); (iv) 
they reward teachers, schools or firms only for successful teaching (Garfinkel & Gramlich, 
1973). In the long run incentives could lead to even more fundamental changes in existing 
educational systems. Those schools, teachers or firms that were successful in teaching would 
flourish and expand; those that failed would abandon teaching. Public organizations and parents 
would be given a chance to choose from competing sources of supply, choosing schools on the 
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basis of their outputs –the pupils who succeed- instead of inputs –the number of students, room 
space, and the like (Gramlich & Koshel, 1975).  
The challenges with applying incentives to the management of education is (i) defining what 
are the goals that schools should seek; (ii) finding reliable measures of valuable schooling 
outcomes (not only short-run high-stakes measures, but long-run measures); (iii) isolating the 
impact of teachers and schools on student outcomes; (iv) defining what sort of incentives will 
work most effectively without also having undesirable side effects (Hanushek et al., 1994) like 
narrowing of the curricula, suffocating creativity, undermining student engagement 
(Woessmann, Ludemann, Schutz, & West, 2007), misbehavior, discouraging the pool of test-
takers, unintended targeting of subgroup of students, and so on. 
2.2. School accountability 
There are two broad types of accountability systems that have the school as the unit of 
analysis2: school choice and school accountability (Hanushek et al., 1994; Gronberg & Jansen, 
2006; Figlio & Loeb, 2011; Figlio & Ladd, 2008; Figlio & Ladd, 2015).  The first type of 
accountability system operates by altering the structure of the school system (Hanushek et al., 
1994) and without having the national or state governments prescribe what a school of quality is 
(although information systems may identify ‘quality’ dimensions). Schools are accountable to 
parents and students through a system of school choice usually with voucher-type programs or 
charter schools. Parental demand will supposedly indicate which schools are of high- and low-
                                                 
2 Levin (1974) describes four different ways of understanding what educational accountability is: as performance 
reporting, as a technical process, as a political process and as an institutional process. The way I approach what 
school accountability is on this dissertation is as a technical process. That is, I understand school accountability as a 
technical approach for evaluating the operations of the schools and improving the achievement of the goals of the 
schools. This approach assumes there is some unanimity on the goals of schooling. 
 11 
 
quality, and their choice will reward high quality schools and punish lower quality schools 
expelling them from the market or making them less profitable. This type of accountability 
system is known as school choice (or ‘voucher programs’ or ‘charter programs’). 
The second one, which is the one I focus on, requires setting performance standards schools 
have to meet. Supposedly these standards will reflect the expected outcomes of a school of 
quality. The main task is defining performance standards, defining appropriate performance 
measurement, identifying the desirable performance levels, and establishing an appropriate 
incentive scheme to reach those standards (Gronberg & Jansen, 2006; Figlio & Loeb, 2011; 
Figlio & Ladd, 2008; Hanushek, 1996). Good and bad performance of schools has explicit 
consequences, and those are evaluated and rewarded or sanctioned by the government or other 
public organizations. This accountability system is centralized in government agencies and 
operates within the structure of schools (Hanushek et al., 1994). This type of accountability 
system is known as school accountability (also known as ‘new school accountability’, ‘test-
based accountability’, ‘standards-based accountability’, ‘outcome-based accountability’, ‘check-
up approach’, ‘consequential accountability’, ‘performance management systems’). Among this 
type of accountability are policies such as No Child Left Behind (NCLB)3. 
                                                 
3 For the most part, school accountability mechanisms are mandatory for schools. However, there are two variations 
where school accountability is not mandatory. One is performance-contracting where standards and performance 
thresholds are also required in order to enact contractual consequences. However, it differs from school 
accountability schemes as they are commonly known in that school accountability is usually mandatory for all 
schools operating in the system, whereas performance-contracting operates when there is a school or private firm 
voluntarily engaging in such contractual relationship. Such schools or private firms usually seek profits from such 
relationship (Peterson, 1974). A similar and more current type of financing mechanism associated with performance 
is social impact bond (also called ‘pay-for-success bond’, ‘social benefit bond’, ‘development impact bond’). This is 
an outcome based contract where the public sector pays a proven service provider for the outcomes delivered. 
Private investors or donors fund the intervention. The total payment that returns to the investor is on the basis of 
improved long-run outcomes. If outcomes do not improve, then investors do not recover the investment (Social 
Finance, 2011).  Investors also act as another constituency to which the service providers (which in the case of 
education could be schools) are accountable to. Social impact bonds differ from performance-contracting, in that 




Researchers have approached the study of school accountability from a variety of theoretical 
perspectives. The organizational learning and adaptation literature highlights the role of 
information on complex systems, and how information travels, interacts and is used to improve 
school quality (e.g., O’Day, 2004). Other experts have approached the issue from the educational 
change literature, emphasizing that educational policies should promote accountability devices 
that promote trust and collective responsibility rather than competition and control in order to 
improve educational performance (e.g., Sahlberg, 2010). The principal-agent perspective has 
focused on the need to reduce opportunistic behavior of the schools (e.g., Dixit, 2002; Ferris, 
1992; Baker, 2002). I review the theory behind school accountability based mainly on the 
principal-agent perspective4. I do so using the example of a school district being the principal 
and schools being the agencies. 
Whenever a firm hires an employee or a school district hires a school, a contractual 
relationship is stablished. The written contracts, however, are almost always incomplete, because 
it cannot specify all possible contingencies (in an ideal world, if it did specify all possible 
contingencies, then the contract would be prohibitively expensive).The firm has some set of 
goals and expectations about the behavior or outcomes from the employee that will help the firm 
attain those goals. The employee has other set of goals, and also has knowledge about what he or 
she can do for the firm. The firm, however, does not have complete knowledge about the 
personal goals of the employee, the skills of the employee, the effort he or she may put into the 
                                                 
4 A ‘principal’, in the principal-agent relationship is mainly a ‘boss’ (a property owner if ownership is private, or the 
government agency if the ownership is public). I refer to ‘principal’ as this boss. If I need to refer to a school 
principal, I will refer to it as ‘school principal’. 
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work and what he or she can attain in the future. There is a problem of asymmetric information 
and incomplete contracts.  
The principal-agent framework focuses on how organizations build incentives into contracts 
given the goals of the organization, the limited information about the future effort workers will 
put into their work, the uncertain technology, the uncertainty about all possible situations and 
challenges the workers may face in the future, and the willingness of the worker of bearing risks 
of the uncertain outcomes (Driver, 2003). The principal-agent framework describes the 
relationship between a theoretical ‘principal’ (e.g., boss) and a theoretical ‘agent’ (e.g., 
employee), where the principal contracts an agent to act on his behalf (Ferris, 1992).  In the 
educational system there are a series of principal-agent relationships; for example, when parents 
contract (with their votes) a school district to educate their children, or when school districts 
contract schools to educate the citizens (Ferris, 1992), or when ‘school principals’ hire teachers 
(Levin, 1980), or when superintendents hire ‘school principals’5 (Driver, 2003). This relationship 
between a principal and an agent, or specifically between the state or local governments and the 
schools, provides a rational for school accountability (Figlio & Loeb, 2011; Figlio & Ladd, 2008; 
Figlio & Ladd, 2015; Woessmann, et al., 2007). 
Problems appear in the relationship between the principal (e.g. school district) and the agent 
(e.g. schools) when (i) the agent and the principal have different objectives and (ii) the principal 
has imperfect information to assess the behavior or performance of the agent (Ferris, 1992; 
Levin, 1980; Driver, 2003). Divergent objectives may appear if schools and school districts have 
                                                 
5 To my knowledge, Driver’s (2003) study of the relationship between ‘school principal’ superiors and ‘school 
principals’, is the only study that attempts to check whether the principal-agent theory in fact can be applied to the 
educational field. All other studies that make references to the principal-agent theory in the field of education seem 
to refer to the conceptual elements of the theory and not so much on how it is grounded in reality. 
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a different conception of educational performance, or if schools also consider other objectives 
that compete with educational performance such as caring about the employment conditions of 
the staff, offering music and athletics activities for students or using innovative pedagogical 
approaches (Ferris, 1992).  Asymmetry of information (the agent having more information than 
the principal) may appear as school behavior and performance is hard and costly to monitor. 
Under these conditions three main types of problems appear: adverse selection problem6, 
outcome verification problem7, and moral hazard problem.  I focus on the latter. 
A moral hazard problem arises once the contract has been agreed and there is asymmetry of 
information between the agent and the principal. The agent, realizing the principal’s lack of 
information, pursues the agent’s objectives at the expense of the principal’s (Ferris, 1992; 
Fernandez, 2009). For example, if school districts have difficulty monitoring the behavior of 
schools, then schools (‘school principals’ or teachers) might behave in a manner contrary to the 
interests of the school district, that is, they may not put the necessary effort in the assigned task 
(Levin, 1980; Driver, 2003).  
Moral hazard problems can be addressed using performance-based contracts to ensure the 
accountability of the agent (Ferris, 1992) 8. By monitoring the behavior or performance of the 
                                                 
6 Adverse selection arises when the principal lacks information about the skills of the agents, which may lead to 
inappropriate decisions about whether or not a certain agent should be hired (Ferris, 1992). This problem appears 
before there is a contractual relationship between a principal and an agent (Dixit, 2002). 
7 The outcome verification problem arises when the agent can observe some outcome better than the principal 
(Dixit, 2002). 
8 The feasibility of performance-based contracts as a solution for a moral hazard problem depends on: (i) the cost of 
monitoring the behavior or performance of the agent, (ii) the correlation between the processes of production and the 
performance of the agent, and (iii) how much risk the agents are willing to undertake (Ferris, 1992). If the cost of 
monitoring the performance of the agent is less costly than the value of producing the expected outcomes, then the 
principal may just monitor the performance of the agent himself (Ferris, 1992; Fernandez, 2009; Holmstrom & 
Milgrom, 1994). Indeed, monitoring expenses can be considerable and they may outweigh any benefits derived from 
monitoring (Fernandez, 2009). If the cost of monitoring the performance of the agent and the correlation between 
the production processes (behavior) and the performance is high, then the principal may just monitor the behavior of 
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agent, the principal can detect opportunistic behavior. By attaching positive consequences to 
strong performance and negative consequences to weak performance, the principal provides 
incentives for the agent to align the agent’s behavior with his own goals9. A performance-based 
contract in education could be a contract that determines school funding conditional on school 
performance, perhaps not tying all the budget of the school to performance, but part of it. 
Another possibility is that the school district removes decentralized-decision making power if 
schools do not improve their academic performance; or offers the relaxation of some regulations 
if the schools improve their academic performance (Ferris, 1992).  More effective monitoring of 
educators could result in improved student outcomes (Figlio & Loeb, 2011; Figlio & Ladd, 2008; 
Woessmann et al., 2007). 
Assumptions. The theory of action behind accountability policies posits that the threat of 
sanctions and possibilities of rewards will incentivize schools to align their behaviors with 
stakeholder’s expectations, and in turn, this alignment will improve students’ achievement 
                                                 
the agent and not the performance. If the correlation between the production processes and the performance is low, 
then the principal will be interested in monitoring the performance of the agent and not the processes of production. 
This is particularly relevant in education as the educational performance of students depends on what happens in the 
school as well as on what happens at home. Now, if the agent is risk-averse he may not be willing to accept a 
contract where there is low correlation between the processes of production and the outcomes, since the agent is the 
one who assumes all the risks of the contract. 
9There is some sort of consensus that punishments and rewards are differently valued by subjects. Negative 
outcomes have larger value than positive outcomes (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer & Vohs, 2001). 
Individuals are more upset when they lose ‘x’ money than more happy to win ‘x’ money (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1984). There is also consensus that punishments and rewards have an effect on behavior; however, whether 
punishment and rewards generate qualitatively different behavioral effects is still a matter of study. Thorndike’s 
(1927) perspective was that rewards increase behavior frequency, whereas punishment decreased behavior 
frequency by the same magnitude it was increased by the reward. In this perspective, the fear of losing a reward is 
equivalent to being punished. Others view rewards and punishments as qualitatively distinct (Yechiam & Hochman, 
2013). Current studies suggest rewards and punishments are qualitatively different. Kubanek, Snyder and Abrams 
(2015) performed a simple experiment were they varied the magnitude for the reward or penalty after individuals 
made a choice. As expected, they found a reward led the individual to repeat the choice of the previous trial, and a 
punishment led the individual to avoid the choice of the previous trial. As they varied the magnitude of rewards and 
punishments, the authors found that as the magnitude of the reward increased, so did the repetition rate of the prior 
trial. However, regardless of the magnitude of the punishment, the avoidance rate of the prior trial was flat. This 
suggests rewards and punishments are different factors affecting behavior.  
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(O’Day, 2004; Figlio & Loeb, 2011). This theory of action has several underlying assumptions. 
These assumptions are that (Driver, 2003; Fuhrman, 2004; Baker & Linn, 2004): 
1. Performance, or student achievement, is the key value or goal of schooling, and constructing 
accountability around performance focuses attention on it10. 
2. Performance is accurately and authentically measured by the assessment instruments in use. 
This also means that the results reported are accurate and reliable. 
3. States correctly interpret information about students’ achievement and know how to use that 
information to improve achievement. E.g. to implement sanctions and rewards or to offer 
technical assistance to schools. 
4. School personnel correctly interpret information about students’ achievement and know how 
to use that information to improve achievement. 
5. Consequences, or stakes, motivate school personnel, i.e., school personnel and teachers see 
sanctions as a threat and rewards as desirable. 
6. School personnel know alternative actions to improve the situation11. Cognizant individuals 
and team members possess the requisite knowledge to apply alternative methods. The 
selected action is adequately implemented. 
7. The action selected will improve instruction and higher levels of performance will result. 
8. Parents also correctly interpret information about students’ achievement and know how to 
use that information to improve achievement. E.g. for voicing dissatisfaction or voting, or if 
                                                 
10 Of course, this key value or goal will almost always be an incomplete measure of output, especially in a multi-
product firm. 
11 Assumption 6 brings about immediately assumption 9. The assumption that school personnel know alternative 
actions supposes they are desirable actions that aim to improve learning and not only test scores. Opportunistic 
behavior that may increase test scores and not learning, such as teaching the test, are among those “unfortunate 
unintended consequences” supposed to be minimal (mentioned in assumption 9). 
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the context is a system of school choice, then parents would use the information to choose 
schools. 
9. Unfortunate unintended consequences are minimal. 
These assumptions could be tested, as in the exploratory analysis of Driver (2003). 
Moderators. The solution above suggests accountability, by aligning the agents’ behavior with 
the goals of the principal, should have a positive effect on the performance of the agency. Such 
relationship as depicted above is quite simplistic. The impact of accountability may be 
moderated by other factors that influence the performance of the agent (Fernandez, 2009) 
complicating monitoring. Some of these factors are: (i) the amount of tasks undertaken by the 
agent, and whether those tasks are complementary or substitutes (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1994; 
Fernandez, 2009; Driver, 2003; Dixit, 2002; Laffont & Martimort, 2002; Baker, 2002), (ii) the 
uncertainty or complexity of the tasks undertaken by the agent (Levin, 1980; Hannaway, 1996; 
Dixit, 2002; National Research Council, 2011; Neal & Schanzenbach, 2010) and whether the 
relationship develops over a period of time or one time only (Kane & Staiger, 2002), (iii) 
whether there is one or multiple principals (Driver, 2003; Dixit, 2002), (iv) whether the agent is a 
profit or nonprofit organization (Gramlich & Koshel, 1975; Peterson, 1974; Fernandez, 2009), 
and (v) whether there is competition among agents (Carpenter-Hoffman, Hall & Sumner, 1975; 
Dixit, 2002). 
Design of the accountability scheme. The impact that accountability could have on performance 
of the schools not only depends on the assumptions of the theory of action and the moderators 
depicted above, but also depends on the minutiae of the design of the accountability scheme (or 
specifically of the performance-based contracts). The performance-based contracts may or may 
not provide an incentive for the schools to improve performance depending on how the contracts 
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are designed (National Research Council, 2011). It is not the purpose of this paper to delve into 
these issues (for that see Figlio & Loeb, 2011), but some design issues that experience has shown 
to be important in the educational context are: (i) how close is the performance measure to the 
intended goal (Ferris, 1992; Baker, 2002; Kane & Staiger, 2002; Richards & Sheu, 1992; 
National Research Council, 2011), (ii) what performance indicators are being used and whether 
they are means or proficiency levels (National Research Council, 2011; Figlio & Ladd, 2015), 
and whether it is one measure or multiple measures (Bush, Hough & Kirst, 2017), (iii) what time 
span is used to measure performance and whether it is a static measure or a measure of growth 
(Linn, 2004; Kane & Staiger, 2002; Figlio & Ladd, 2015; Figlio & Ladd, 2008; Figlio & Loeb, 
2011; National Research Council, 2011), (iv) who is in the tested group (Figlio & Ladd, 2008; 
Figlio & Loeb, 2011; National Research Council, 2011; Figlio & Ladd, 2015), and (v) how 
performance relates to the rewards or sanctions (Dixit, 2002). 
2.4. Empirical evidence 
The main challenges of assessing the impact of school accountability are three. First, usually 
school accountability is part of a set of standards-based reforms. Disentangling the effect can be 
rather convoluted. Second, school accountability policies are usually set in place for the whole 
system making it hard to find appropriate control groups to identify what would have happened 
if no accountability policies were enacted (Figlio & Ladd, 2011). Third, school accountability 
systems may have impact on students’ achievement, not necessarily by the improvement of 
schools’ and teachers’ practices, but through opportunistic behavior of schools (e.g., cheating, 
narrowing of the curriculum, and reclassification of students into non-tested groups). 
Understanding which mechanism is in place is relevant to inform policy. 
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Impact evaluations of school accountability can be broadly grouped into two categories 
(Figlio & Loeb, 2011; Lee, 2008). The first group is all those studies that compare different 
school accountability systems such as cross-national studies or cross-state studies (e.g., Carnoy 
& Loeb, 2002; Hanushek & Raymond, 2005). These studies usually have the states or nations as 
the primary unit of analysis. They use the variation across nations or states to assess the impact 
of the policy (Figlio & Ladd, 2011; Lee, 2008; Woessmann et al., 2007). These studies use 
independent international or national low-stakes tests to compare the results across nations or 
states.  The advantage of these studies is that their conclusions are not too idiosyncratic and are 
generalizable to school accountability policies in a broad sense (Figlio & Loeb, 2011; Figlio & 
Ladd, 2008; Figlio & Ladd, 2015). Such studies allow responding to the question of whether 
school accountability systems have an impact on students’ achievement. The disadvantage is that 
the conclusions do not refer to any specific type of policy design (Figlio & Loeb, 2011; Figlio & 
Ladd, 2008; Lee, 2008). Another disadvantage is that usually school accountability is part of a 
bundle of other policies (e.g. increased funding for schools), and if the effects of a single policy 
in a state is not disentangled from the effect of the other policy adopted at the same time, then the 
effects may be biased. Most of the studies on this group use a purely empirical approach without 
trying to understand the mechanisms through which accountability might have affected student 
outcomes (Lee, 2008).  
The second group is all the evaluations that refer to a specific school accountability system, 
that includes nation-, district- or state-specific systems (e.g., Jacob 2005; Neal & Schanzenbach, 
2010). The units of analysis of these studies are the schools or students within the system. These 
studies use the variation (i) across groups of students, (ii) timing of the policies or (iii) diverse 
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intensity (pressure) of the accountability policies on some schools12 to assess the impact of the 
policy. The advantage of this type of study is that they may offer more clues about how is it that 
school accountability affects student’s achievement. However, the disadvantage of these 
evaluations is that conclusions may not be generalizable to school accountability systems that 
have other types of design.  
My interest is in studies from the second category, those evaluations of a specific system, as I 
am interested in contrasting this evidence with a well-defined accountability policy set in place 
in Chile.  
Studies to determine the impact of district or state specific school accountability systems 
have focused on its impact on high-stakes outcomes (i.e., those performance measures that are 
attached to the incentive) and low-stakes outcomes. Fewer studies have focused on long-run 
outcomes. Studies that try to identify the actual mechanisms through which school accountability 
operates have focused mainly on the behavioral response of the schools. However, there are 
other potential mechanisms in place that can affect the impact of school accountability, such as 
the movement of students and teachers across schools. Fewer studies have focused on these 
mechanisms. 
What effects do school accountability programs have on high-stakes outcomes? 
                                                 
12 Studies of the effect of accountability pressure address the notion of ‘pressure’ in two different ways. Some 
studies consider the expected school classification as the treatment (e.g., Craig, Imberman & Purdue, 2013; Deming 
et al., 2015). This expectation is predicted given the rules of school classification. Other studies consider the actual 
school classification as the treatment (e.g., Figlio & Rouse, 2006; Rockoff & Turner, 2008). The first group of 
studies offers an overall measure of whether the pressure of that particular aspect of the policy is good or not. The 
second group of studies only assesses the impact on the treated. 
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Studying the impact on high-stakes tests is relevant for school accountability policies as it 
reflects whether schools are responsive to the policy. It may not be the best way of assessing the 
overall impact of school accountability, because of score inflation (Koretz, 2005; Jacob, 2007; 
National Research Council, 2011). Nonetheless, it is a relevant starting point.  The findings of 
the impact of school accountability on students’ high-stakes test scores are overall positive, but 
modest (see Table 1).  
Studying test trends after the implementation of an accountability system in South Carolina, 
Richards and Sheu (1992) found modest improvements in student achievement, with larger 
achievements in low socioeconomic (SES) schools. Comparing pre-post test scores in Texas, 
Klein and colleagues (2000) found large changes in scores. This seemingly miraculous 
improvement was referred to, by some, as ‘the Texas miracle’ (Klein, Hamilton, McCaffrey & 
Stecher, 2000). However, none of these studies allow us to make causal inferences of the impact 
of school accountability on educational outcomes. It is not clear whether those trends could 
reflect other policies at the same time of the school accountability program or any other 
unobserved time-varying factors at the state or national level, including teaching to the test. 
Studies that attempt to account for unobserved time-varying factors use differences-in 
differences to estimate the impact of the introduction of a school accountability policy or 
changes in the policy. Jacob (2005) studied the impact of the introduction of an accountability 
system in Chicago in 1996. Compared with other large urban districts, he found math and 
reading increased after the introduction of the policy.  This finding is consistent with the findings 
of Neal and Schanzenbach (2010) also for the accountability system in Chicago. The latter 
authors went even further, and instead of focusing only on the average change in scores, these 
authors focused on the impact on different deciles of the prior achievement distribution. They 
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found that the increase in reading and math could be explained by increases in achievement of 
students in the middle of the achievement distribution. These same findings appear to be 
attributable to the introduction of the accountability NCLB policy introduced into Chicago and 
the Nation in 2002. This uneven distribution of changes in achievement implies accountability 
policies may only be beneficial for students within reach of the goal of proficiency, not those 
above or below.  
Another group of research studies exploits the diverse intensity (pressure) of the 
accountability policies on some schools to assess the causal impact of the policy. These studies 
are more limited in scope as they do not estimate the systemic effect of the accountability 
system, but the effect of the pressure of facing the consequences of receiving a certain evaluation 
grade or classification. Studying the impact of such pressure on Florida, Figlio and Rouse (2006) 
found that schools graded with the lowest possible grade (‘F’) slightly increased their results in 
comparison to those schools that received any other grade, a similar finding to  Chiang (2009). 
However, Chiang also found that the results do not seem to persist. Allen and Burgess (2012) 
performed a similar study in the English inspectorate system13. They found that schools that just 
failed the inspection improved their test scores, similar to Hussain’s (2015) findings. However, 
contrary to Chiang’s findings, Allen and Burgess found schools increased their outcomes as 
years passed, up to four years after the school failed the inspection. Rockoff and Turner (2008) 
studied the impact of schools receiving different grades on academic outcomes of elementary 
and middle schools in New York City. They found that receiving a low grade increased slightly 
math and reading achievement, and no evidence that receiving a higher grade impacted 
                                                 
13 The English inspectorate system differs from the pure test-based accountability in that schools are not only 




educational outcomes. Deming et al. (2013) studied the Texas accountability system. They used 
school fixed effects to compare students within the same school but across cohorts that face 
different degrees of accountability pressure. This allowed them to account for differences across 
schools in unobserved factors. They found that high schools that face the pressure of being rated 
low performing increased student achievement on high-stakes tests. The impact was larger on 
low achieving students. 
When the achievement distribution of the students is accounted for, the impact of school 
accountability on systems based on proficiency seems to be higher on the middle of the 
achievement distribution at the expense of the left tail of the distribution. Neal and Schanzenbach 
(2010) found school accountability in Chicago increased the achievement of students in the 
middle of the achievement distribution. The authors did not find evidence suggesting that 
students in the extreme of the distribution benefited by the introduction of the accountability 
program. Consistent with this evidence, Deming et al. (2013) found in Texas that high schools 
that face the threat of being rated as low-performing schools increased students' achievement on 
high stakes exams especially for students who failed the year prior to the test. Furthermore, the 
authors found some evidence that schools that expected to be ranked as high performing showed 
negative effects on students who failed the exam the previous year. A similar story to the one 
found in Texas was found in the English inspectorate system. The evidence shows that low-
ability students are the ones that benefit the most from a failing inspection (Hussain, 2015). The 
author suggests it is the role of the inspectors that makes the difference with purely test-based 
accountability.  
The effect of school accountability not only seems heterogeneous for students with different 
prior achievement, but also for schools with different levels of quality. According to Jacob 
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(2005), students in low performing schools seem to have fared considerably better in high-stakes 
tests under the policy than comparable peers in higher-performing schools. This evidence is 
consistent with the one found in Texas by Deming et al. (2013), where schools graded as low-
performing seemed to be more responsive to the incentives as they increased the number of 
students passing their high-stakes tests on time. 
The effect of school accountability pressure seems to be stronger in a context where there is a 
big share of high-performing schools in contrast to a context where there are few high-
performing schools.  A recent study of Weiner, Donaldson and Dougherty (2016) focuses on the 
impact of accountability pressure on schools that just missed the high-performance classification 
benchmark in Rhode Island. The authors found that schools that just missed the high-performing 
benchmark, and are among several schools classified as high-performing, increase the academic 
outcomes of the students. This did not happen if the school was not surrounded by high-
performing schools. 
In sum, overall the findings show positive but mild effects of school accountability on high-
stakes tests. Effect sizes of the impact on average scores range from 0.04 to 0.33. The evidence 
also supports there are differential effects on students in different positions in the achievement 
distribution, differential impact on schools of different quality, and different impact on schools 
with different levels of competition. 
What effects do school accountability programs have on low-stakes outcomes? 
A way to study whether the school accountability policy has affected educational goals beyond 
the performance measure attached to the incentive is to assess the impact on tests or grades for 
which there are no consequences attached in the incentive scheme (low-stakes test scores, or 
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low-stakes grades). This is the recommendation of the National Research Council (2011). The 
findings show mixed results (see Table 2).  
Studying test score trends before and after the introduction of an accountability system in 
Texas, Klein and colleagues (2000) found a small increase in low-stakes test scores and an 
increasing racial gap. Also in Texas, Deming and colleagues (2013) found that the threat of 
being classified as low performing positively impacted graduation rates and math credits taken in 
high school; however the possibility of being recognized for good performance had a negative 
impact on high school graduation rates. Figlio and Rouse (2006) found that school accountability 
pressure on low-performing schools in Florida impacted their low-stakes results positively and 
statistically significant, but considerably less than for high-stakes tests. Also in Florida, Chiang 
(2009) found that the impact of sanction threats on low-stakes tests was negligible for both math 
and reading. Jacob (2005) found the introduction of the accountability system in Chicago had a 
positive, but mild effect, on 8th graders, a negative effect on 3th graders and no effect on 6th 
graders.   
What effects do school accountability programs have on long-run outcomes? 
The purpose of school accountability is to increase the educational achievement on the premise 
that such gains will lead to long-run improvements in educational attainment and earnings. There 
is very little evidence about this impact (see Table 3). 
Deming et al. (2013) assessed the impact of accountability pressure in Texas high schools on 
long-term outcomes such as postsecondary attainment and earnings. Using school fixed effects 
the authors compared students within the same school, but across cohorts that faced different 
degrees of accountability pressure. The authors found that high schools respond to the 
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probability of being rated as low performing schools by increasing students’ achievement on 
high-stakes exams. This effect appeared also on college attendance, completion of four-year 
degree programs, and 25 year olds’ earnings. These effects were higher for low achieving 
students in low performing schools. The authors found there was no overall impact on high 
performing schools (those receiving higher accountability rating). Low achieving students in 
high performing schools were found to have even negative long term effects. 
This evidence supports the idea that some of the responses of schools are reflected in real 
learning, and not only on the performance measures. 
What mechanisms seem to drive the impact of school accountability on educational 
outcomes? 
Studies about the mechanisms of policies may help us interpret the results of policy evaluations 
(Ludwig, Kling & Mullainathan, 2011). The mechanisms through which school accountability 
seems to operate to increase high-stakes tests scores depend on (i) the school behavioral 
response, (ii) the student body composition, and (iii) the teacher body composition. 
School behavioral response.  School behavior to increase high-stakes test scores can be both 
desired and not desired. Desired mechanisms are those that improve the underlying educational 
goal as well as the performance measure. These could be due to positive behaviors of principals, 
teachers, parents and students. Less desired mechanisms are opportunistic behaviors that 
improve the performance measure at the expense of the educational goal. To my knowledge 
there are no studies that assess the impact of the changes in the school practices due to the 
accountability policies on students’ achievement, although the study of Rouse and colleagues 
(2013) is a first approximation. The existent studies mainly focus on the impact of the school 
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accountability policies on changes in the school practices (see Table 4). Their results provide 
some clues about the potential mechanisms that drive the impact of school accountability on 
educational outcomes.  
Among desired mechanisms, there is evidence that schools had increased instructional 
expenditures14 (Chiang, 2009; Craig, Imberman & Purdue, 2013; Rouse et al., 2013), and 
decreased principal control (Rouse et al., 2013). However, it is not clear that budgetary 
augmentation remained years after the schools suffered the shock of being evaluated as worse 
than expected (Craig, Imberman & Purdue, 2013).  
Among the none desired mechanisms, there is evidence that schools focused on marginal 
students at the expense of students in the tails of the achievement distribution (Neal & 
Schanzenbach, 2010; Deming et al., 2013), schools narrowed the curriculum (Jacob, 2005), 
schools focused on the skills tested and testing formats (Jacob, 2007); manipulated the pool of 
test takers (Cullen & Reback, 2006; Jacob, 2005), increased special education placements (Jacob, 
2005), and increased student retention in grades prior to the high-stakes grades (Jacob, 2005). 
In sum, the evidence suggests the schools are responsive to the incentives as they do take 
action to increase high-stakes results. The way this is accomplished seems to range through a 
large set of mechanisms, both desired and not desired. Unfortunately, none of the studies that 
found positive effects on low-stakes tests studied potential mechanisms that may explain the 
                                                 
14 A study by Jackson, Johnson and Persico (2015) presents evidence that expected increases in school spending due 
to school financial reforms has effects on long term outcomes such as increased years of schooling, higher wages, 
and a lower percentage of adult poverty. 
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effect. Therefore, we cannot tell whether any of the mechanisms that were found affecting high-
stakes test may also affect low-stakes results. 
Student body composition. The student body composition can also alter the educational 
outcomes of the school. Evidence about the impact of school accountability on student sorting 
between schools is scant (see Table 5). The information about the quality of schools may affect 
the way parents choose the schools for their children. For instance, high achieving students in 
low achieving schools may decide to migrate to high achieving schools. Or low achieving 
students in high achieving schools may somehow be pushed away from their school. Or perhaps 
low achieving schools could make more efforts to attract high achieving students. There are 
several possible ways in which the movement from one school to the other could occur. The 
sorting may be related not only to the prior achievement of schools and students, but to the 
access to information of school quality. Parents from high SES may have more information 
about the quality of schools, and therefore be responsive to the information. Low SES parents 
may not have much access. Or perhaps low SES parents are more responsive to the extra 
information provided about school quality (high SES parents may already have had information 
about the quality of schools).  
Hart and Figlio (2015) studied whether the introduction of the accountability system in 
Florida was associated with changes in the composition of students across schools that received 
different grades. The evidence suggests more educated mothers responded to the extra provision 
of information to make a decision when choosing the school of their children. The effect was 
stronger when there were alternative schools nearby, and especially if the alternative schools 
received low grades. 
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The limited amount of existing evidence suggests school accountability impacts students 
sorting between schools, favoring high SES students (Hart & Figlio, 2015).  This evidence 
suggests that school accountability could be enhancing stratification rather than reducing it. 
More research is needed in this area. 
Teacher body composition. The teacher body composition can also affect the educational results 
of the schools after an accountability system has been introduced (see Table 6). Schools labeled 
as low performing may find it challenging to retain and hire teachers of good quality. High 
quality teachers in low performing schools may migrate into high performing schools as these 
may require putting less effort for teaching, and may provide benefits from more autonomy and 
affiliation with a successful school. Some schools may have more capacity to replace low 
performing teachers through high competition for each place. Although increased movement is 
not wrong per se, it can be bad if the least effective teachers end up in low performing schools.  
Clotfelter et al. (2004) studied how the introduction of the ABC accountability program in 
North Carolina affected the rate at which teachers left low performing elementary schools. 
Looking at two cohorts of teachers (pre- and post- program) and comparing teachers in low 
performing schools with all the other schools, the authors found that teachers in low performing 
schools had a higher probability of departure. Feng, Figlio and Sass (2010) studied the effect of a 
change in the grading system in Florida’s accountability system in 2002 on teacher’s decision to 
stay or leave a school. The evidence suggests teachers were more likely to leave schools that had 
received lower grades than they had before, especially if the new grade was the lowest in the 
grading scale. Teachers in schools that were upwardly graded were less likely to leave their 
schools. The authors also assessed the quality of the teachers leaving and staying in the schools. 
They found that schools experiencing precipitous declines in rating had high quality teachers 
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leaving schools, and that the quality of teachers staying in these schools improved after the 
accountability policy was set in place. Teacher quality was measured as the value added of 
students’ test scores. This sets some uncertainty in evaluating the findings, as we know from the 
literature that students’ test scores, in an accountability setting, can be improved by undesirable 
mechanisms, and this issue is not addressed. In this study, a cheating teacher can easily be 
confused with a good teacher, as both appear to improve the performance measures of the 
students. 
Overall, the evidence suggests there is increased attrition in low performing schools 
(Clotfelter, et al., 2004; Feng, Figlio & Sass, 2010). In addition, there is evidence that teachers 
tend to leave from schools with high poverty rates (Clotfelter, Ladd, Vigdor & Wheeler, 2006). 
Put together, this evidence could suggest low performing schools with high-poverty rates may be 
in a series disadvantage when it comes to attracting good teachers. 
2.5.  Conclusion 
The school accountability programs help focusing attention on students’ outcomes. Monitoring 
has provided information about the students’ outcomes. This information can be useful in 
identifying students and schools that are most in need, and provide them with assistance.  
The empirical evidence of school accountability programs shows students’ outcomes have 
mildly increased high-stakes outcomes. Effect sizes range from 0.04 to 0.33. The effects on high-
stakes outcomes seem to be heterogeneous for the different levels of prior achievement of the 
students, with the ones in the middle of the achievement distribution being the most benefited. 
The effect in high-stakes outcomes is also heterogeneous for the level of achievement of the 
school, with the schools that perform worst being the ones that most improve their results, most 
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likely because they are the ones that fear the largest sanctions. The empirical evidence on the 
impact of school accountability on low-stakes outcomes is not conclusive. These suggest school 
accountability may not be impacting true learning15.  
Several experts have assessed the mechanisms that drive the effect on high-stakes outcomes. 
Most of the mechanisms studied refer to changes in the behavioral response of the school. The 
evidence so far shows that increases in high-stakes outcomes may be due to such non desirable 
behavior of the schools as narrowing of the curriculum, manipulation of the pool of test-takers, 
increased student retention, increase number of special education placements, and focus on 
marginal students. Only two studies found schools increased instructional expenditures. Fewer 
studies have studied teacher and student mobility between schools as an effect of the school 
accountability programs. 
Research is still required to address, at least, five main concerns about school accountability. 
First, what is the impact of school accountability on long-run outcomes? Some research has been 
done, but the accumulated evidence is not enough to yield generalizable conclusions. Second, 
how have accountability policies impacted student sorting? We cannot be promoting 
accountability policies as improving the quality of education without knowing if this is achieved 
at the expense of the less advantaged students. Third, what design is best to improve educational 
outcomes? It seems that school accountability policies are here to stay. We need to know what 
are the lessons learned about their design. Fourth, how much do the school accountability 
                                                 
15 Similar research questions have driven research on performance-based contracts on higher education. The 
essential conclusion is similar to what is found on K-12 systems: It is not clear performance-based funding policies 
have improved college performance (Hillman, 2016). 
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programs cost in comparison to the acquired benefits. Are the benefits worth the costs? Fifth, 
does the effect of school accountability policies vary in contexts where there is school choice?  
In the next chapter I describe a new school accountability policy in Chile and explain some 




 Chapter 3 - School accountability in Chile 
3.1. Historical overview 
In 1980 Chile adopted a reform that transformed the system into a marketplace where there is 
freedom for parents to choose schools for their children, and where there is freedom for 
stablishing schools allowing any entity to create a school if complying with basic rules. The 
assumptions of the reform were that (i) competition between schools increases overall 
productivity, (ii) parental choice (with a demand-side subsidy) allows social mobility and 
ensures universal compulsory schooling, and (iii) private schools can be more efficient than 
public schools. The main transformations comprised financing and schools management. From 
1980 until 2008 parents received a flat voucher, adjusted for school level, which allowed them to 
exercise their freedom to choose a school for their offspring. This reform also embraced a 
decentralized system, where public schools were no longer managed by the Ministry of 
education (MINEDUC), but by each one of the 238 municipalities.  
This two-pronged reform led to changes in both the supply and demand side of schooling 
with intended and unintended consequences. It was expected that market forces will align the 
incentives of school administrators and teachers with parental demand, thus improving quality. 
The entrance of private enterprises in the competition for students was supposed to improve the 
efficiency of resources. The possibility of low income students choosing better schools than the 
ones near their homes was supposed to increase equity. However, some of the features that 
characterized the Chilean educational system by the year 2000 were parental freedom to choose, 
but with high levels of segregation, unequal distribution of expenditures per pupil and high 
outcome inequality. It seems the “market” was not enough to provide sufficient accountability 
among providers. As Deming and Figlio (2016) point out, in the education industry consumers 
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have limited power to ensure the quality of the services demanded. This limitation comes from 
geographical jurisdiction constraints, public provision of education is widespread, and the fact 
that the entry or exit of schools to the market is limited. 
Since the 1990s, several programs have been established that attempt to improve the quality 
of the schools, new programs targeting low performing schools, providing parents with more 
information, or providing schools with incentives to improve. An example of a very well-known 
school intervention in Chile was the program called P900 which provided support for the lowest 
performing schools (Peirano & Vargas, 2005). An example of a policy that provided information 
to parents was implemented in 2010. Parents were provided with a map with schools colored 
according to their academic outcomes as in a traffic light. The academic outcomes reported were 
raw test scores without any adjustment per background or enrollment rates of the school. This 
intervention did not last long due to strong opposition of educational practitioners (Allende, 
2012). Another example is the SNED program, which is a program of collective incentives for 
teachers if the school where they work achieves good results in comparison to schools with 
similar geographical and socioeconomic background (Mizala & Urquiola, 2013). It is in this 
context full of attempts of interventions to improve the quality of the schools that the SEP law is 
introduced. 
3.2. SEP law 
In 2008, a law of adjusted vouchers and accountability policy has been set in place: SEP law 
(Law 20,248)16.  This law explicitly attempts to “improve quality of education of subsidized 
                                                 
16 The SEP law (20,248) was enacted on January 25th of 2008. This law was regulated with the decree 235 from 
April 2008. This decree was later adjusted by the decree 293 from August 2009. The SEP law was later adjusted by 
the law 20,501 from February 2011, and by the law 20,550 from August 2011.  I will explain these adjustments as I 
explain the different features of the law. 
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schools”. For that purpose, the law mandates two lines of action. First, it adjusts school vouchers 
increasing its value for students from economically disadvantaged families (called ‘priority 
students’) up to 60% of the original value and adding a subsidy per concentration of priority 
students in a school. Second, it commit schools to improve school quality making all sources of 
public funding conditional on academic improvement (4 year span) and conditioning the 
management of the resources of the adjusted voucher to the academic results of the school. 
This law is very relevant for Chile as it not only offers extra resources to schools, but it is the 
first time vouchers are given conditional on academic outcomes. Before the SEP Law, 
consequences from deficient outcomes were expected to be reflected in a lowered demand from 
parents. The SEP Law is the first regulation that attaches outcomes to consequences from the 
central government in Chile. 
This law offers several incentives to schools. First, there is the incentive for subsidized 
schools to enroll more students from disadvantaged backgrounds. This is expected to increase 
social mobility and decrease inequalities, as students from low socioeconomic backgrounds now 
have more options to choose schools that in the past they could not pay for with additional fees. 
Second, there is the incentive for schools to improve their services. All schools that adopt the law 
are provided with significantly more resources. Such resources are intended for specific 
educational processes, such as improvement of curriculum, school climate, leadership and 
management of educational resources. This is expected to increase the educational outcomes of 
the schools. Third, schools classified as low performing have an incentive to perform better. Low 
performing schools face the threat of sanctions, and if they improve their performance they have 
possibilities of more autonomy to allocate the resources provided by the adjusted voucher. 
 36 
 
With more detail, the features of the policy are: 
Adjusted voucher. Until 2008, the per capita funding in Chilean schools was through a flat 
voucher (base voucher), differentiated by school level, regardless of the profile of the students. 
The SEP law increases vertical equity by giving an extra per-student subsidy for priority students 
who are enrolled in public or private voucher schools, and a subsidy per concentration of priority 
students. These students are identified by MINEDUC every year17. The group of priority 
students covers up to 40% of the poorest students from primary and secondary18 education. The 
value of the adjusted voucher varies per grade level (see Figure 1). It adds up to 60% on top of 
the base voucher19. The value per concentration of priority student adds up to 10.5%20.  
Schools can allocate the resources of the adjusted voucher in four different areas: (i) 
curriculum management (improvement of pedagogical skills, extra help for students with special 
needs, class size reduction, more teachers and assistants, field trips, etc.); (ii) leadership (training 
for school management team, strengthening of teacher council, school participation of people 
from the cultural, scientific and local or national governance spheres, strengthening of the 
school-community relationship, etc.); (iii) school climate (support for students and families with 
                                                 
17 To identify priority students, MINEDUC uses four criteria: (i) whether the family is in the program Chile 
Solidario: (ii) if not in Chile Solidario, families from the lowest third of socioeconomic background as defined by 
the characterization instrument in place; (ii) if not in any of the above, families in the range A of the Fondo 
Nacional de Salud; (iv) if not in any of the above, families can be selected by their level of income, schooling of 
mother (or father), rurality of the family, and degree of poverty of the municipality where the student lives, 
according to the regulation in place. 
18 Secondary education was incorporated to the law in year 2011 (Law 20,550). 
19 The law 20,248 from 2008 mandates an adjusted voucher that is up to 49% above the base value of the voucher. 
The law 20,550 from 2011 amends the value of the adjusted voucher increasing it up to a 58.7% above the base 
value of the voucher (PK-4th grade: 58.74%; 5th-6th grade: 39.02%; 7th -8th grade: 19.66%; and 9th-12th grade: 
16.52%). 
20 The law 20,248 from 2008 mandates a voucher per concentration of priority students that is up to 8.7% above the 
base value of the voucher. The law 20,501 from 2011 amends the value of the voucher per concentration, increasing 
it up to 10.5% above the base value of the voucher. 
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psychologists and social workers, strengthening of school council, school climate improvement, 
etc.); and (iv) resource management (teacher training, student evaluations, teachers and 
management team incentives for performance, improvement of school library, etc.). Schools 
need to report to MINEDUC how they are allocating the extra resources provided.  However, the 
extra resources need not be allocated exclusively to priority students. Also, the schools have no 
restriction in having the new SEP funds substitute for other funds that would have been spent on 
the educational areas the SEP law wants to improve (with the exception of teacher salaries, 
management costs, or infrastructure)21. Schools that want to receive the adjusted voucher and the 
voucher per concentration of priority students cannot charge extra fees to priority students22. 
School accountability. This adjusted voucher is tied to an accountability mechanism in which 
schools are annually classified by their performance into “autonomous”, “emerging” and “in 
recovery” categories23. “Autonomous” schools are those that have shown systemically good 
results of their students. “Emergent” schools are those that have not shown systematically good 
results. “In recovery” schools are schools that have shown systematically deficient results. 
Schools with different classifications receive different support for their improvement. 
Schools classified as “autonomous” are required to present a school improvement plan (PME)24 
                                                 
21 The decree DFL 2 from August 20th of 1998 rules the base vouchers of subsidized schools. This decree rules base 
vouchers can be spent on teacher salaries, salaries of other school personnel, school management costs, costs of 
infrastructure, infrastructure management costs, acquisition of services and materials for the educational 
management (pedagogical resources), investment in financial assets as long as the interests are invested on the 
school, investment on non-financial assets as long as they are required for educational purposes, mortgage payment 
of the school building, costs with direct relation to the improvement of the school quality, costs with direct relation 
to the educational plan of the school. 
22 Non-priority students can be charged up to 196 USD; however, schools on average charge 24 USD (Anand, 
Mizala & Repetto, 2009). 
23 The law indicates no schools can be classified as “in recovery” the first two years the law is implemented. 
24 School improvement plan (PME for its acronym in Spanish for Plan de Mejoramiento Educativo) is a document 
where the school specifies: (i) descriptive of the school, (ii) diagnostic evaluation of the school, (iii) set educational 
goals, (iv) defined actions to achieve those goals. The goals and actions should consider four areas: curriculum, 
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which the school communities construct on their own. PME from “autonomous” schools do not 
need to present a diagnostic evaluation of the school. PME from “autonomous” schools only 
need to be presented, and not approved by the Ministry.  “Emergent” schools need to present 
such PME25, but in its construction the principal and school board receive support from the 
Ministry. Schools “in recovery” have to build the PME with help from the Ministry and a third 
party technical assistance. The PME of “emergent” and “in recovery” schools has to contain a 
complete diagnostic evaluation of the school, including an analysis of the latest SIMCE scores, 
measures of reading speed and reading comprehension in certain grades, an evaluation of 
organizational management and leadership, and pre-tests on the subjects the school is interested 
in improving (Elacqua, Mosqueira & Santos, 2009). This PME has to be approved by the 
Ministry26. 
Schools are offered incentives to increase their quality, both rewards and punishments.  
Rewards are offered to high performing schools, where the incentive is more autonomy to 
allocate the extra resources the higher the level of performance of the school. Thus, schools 
classified as “autonomous” are free to allocate the resources provided by the adjusted voucher. 
Schools classified as “in recovery” have to allocate 100% of the resources into actions 
committed by the PME. Schools classified as “emergent” have to allocate 50% of the resources 
into actions committed in the PME, and the remaining 50% they are free to allocate. Schools 
                                                 
leadership, school climate and resource management. Although the Ministry checks whether schools comply or not 
with the set goals, the law does not specify what happens if the school does not achieve those goals. 
25 Schools categorized as “emergent” will downgrade to the category of “in recovery” if having adopted the law, 
they do not present the PME after a year. 
26 Because the PME for “emergent” and “in recovery” schools has to be approved by the Ministry of education, 
schools report investing a lot of efforts in the elaboration of a proper diagnostic evaluation of the school with help 
from technical assistance (Barra, 2013).  
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classified “in recovery” are also subject to sanctions. If such schools do not reach the required 
standards after four years, the schools get their official recognition revoked, meaning they are no 
longer eligible for any public funding27. Other sanctions include disabling temporarily or 
perpetually from their functions to the school manager (“sostenedor”), ‘school principal’ or 
school managers28. 
Schools are classified according to their academic results starting the first year in which they 
receive the adjusted voucher. The classification scores of the schools depend on their test scores 
on the national standardized test SIMCE29 and other quality indicators like retention rates, 
teachers’ evaluations, and integration of the educational community into the educational project 
of the school.  
How schools are classified is specified in Decree 293 and a Technical Report of Proceso de 
Clasificacion SEP. The latter is a report of restricted access provided by MINEDUC through the 
Ley de Transparencia. These documents indicate different sets of rules for the different 
classifications30: 
                                                 
27 The rule of the 4 year span was postponed by the law 20,529 that creates the Quality Agency of Education (from 
August 2011). This law indicates the Quality Agency of Education will evaluate schools (starting 2016), and if 
schools are systematically underperforming for 4 years, then they will get their official recognition revoked. 
Therefore, no schools should be closed due to their performance before year 2020.  
28 Disabling of “sostenedores” and ‘school principals’ was also postponed until the Quality Agency of Education 
starts working. 
29 SIMCE is the national standardized assessment conducted by MINEDUC since 1988.  The test assesses math, 
language and social and natural sciences based on the national curriculum. Assessments are performed in 4th, 8th and 
10th grade. The scores of SIMCE are standardized on a scale with a mean of 250 points and a standard deviation of 
50. This scale was defined in 1999 for 4th grade scores, in 1998 for 10th grade scores and in 2000 for 8th grade 
scores. This standardization allows analyzing the variation of scores of students over time since 1998, 1999 and 
2000 for 10th, 4th and 8th grade respectively. 
30 Appendix A presents the details of the classification rules according to Decree 293 and Technical Report of 
Proceso de Clasificacion SEP. 
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Schools are classified as “autonomous” if: 
A. Rules i to iii should happen simultaneously in at least 2 out of 3 prior SIMCE 
assessments. 
i. The average school score on SIMCE31 is above the median of the group of 
schools with similar SES32. 
ii. The proportion of students scoring above 250 points is above the median 
of the group of schools with similar SES. 
iii. The proportion of students scoring above 300 points is above the median 
of the group of schools with similar SES. 
B. The Education Quality Index (ICE index) is above the median of the group of 
schools with similar SES. The ICE index is constructed by the average SIMCE 
scores in the last 3 years and other quality indices of the year previous to the 
classification of the school (see Table 7). 
Schools are classified as “in recovery” if: 
A. Rules i and ii should happen simultaneously in at least 2 out of 3 prior SIMCE 
assessments. 
i. The average school score is less than 220 points in SIMCE. 
                                                 
31 4th grade SIMCE scores that average math, language and science test scores. 
32 The Quality Agency of Education groups all schools into 4 different groups according to the socioeconomic 
composition of the students in 4th grade. School’s scores are compared to the scores of the schools in their same 
SES group. The schools’ SES level is a measure constructed from four variables: educational level of the mother, 
educational level of the father, monthly household income and schools’ vulnerability index. The three first measures 
are obtained from a parental questionnaire as part of the SIMCE testing. The fourth measure is a government 
vulnerability index. This index is constructed by JUNAEB (Junta Nacional de Auxilio Escolar y Becas) to allocate 
lunch- and health-subsidies to students. 
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ii. The proportion of students scoring above 250 points in SIMCE is less than 
20 percent. 
B. The ICE index is in the lowest 10 percentile33.  
Schools that adopted the SEP law, and do not satisfy the above classification rules are classified 
as “emergent”34 35. 
The ways schools are classified have advantages and disadvantages. One of the advantages is 
that the classification looks beyond simple test scores considering also working conditions at the 
school (SNED improvement score), new initiatives (SNED initiative score), access opportunities 
(approval and retention rates), integration of teachers and parents in the construction of the 
school community (SNED integration score), and teacher performance (teacher evaluations). 
Another advantage is that, the way the evaluation considers test scores is done addressing several 
drawbacks from ranking schools by simply using raw annual test scores. First, the classification 
formulae consider several years of performance data. This is a useful way of classifying schools 
avoiding the confounding influence of mean reversion (Kane & Staiger, 2002; Chay, McEwan & 
Urquiola, 2005). Second, schools are not classified based on absolute test scores but on reference 
to homogeneous groups in terms of SES. In Chile there is a strong correlation between schools’ 
                                                 
33 Schools are ranked according to the ICE score. Those schools that are in the 10 percent lowest ICE do not satisfy 
this criterion. 
34 The classifications of some schools do not follow the formulae explained above. Some of these are: (i) schools 
with less than 20 students taking the SIMCE test in 4th grade; (ii) multiple-grade schools, geographically isolated 
schools, and schools with three teachers or less; (iii) schools with less than two standardized national evaluations in 
previous years (e.g., all new schools); (iv) schools that do not have 4th grade.  
35 Schools that do not have 4th grade are classified as “emergent” regardless of their academic results. This situation 
was not explained in the law on 2009. Such law mandates the gradual introduction of different grades. It starts in 
2008 with PK to 4th grade, and then each following year it introduces a new grade. Supposedly this meant that as 
soon as 8th and 11th grade were participating in the law, the SIMCE scores of those grades will become high stakes 
(that was explicitly mentioned in one version of the law for the case of 8th grade). That did not happen. Only 4th 
grade test scores are high stakes. 8th and 11th grade test scores will become high stakes once the Quality Agency of 
Education starts classifying schools in 2016. 
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test scores and schools’ SES (Mizala, Romaguera & Urquiola, 2007). If the classification was 
done using raw scores, then the classification would simply resemble the SES level of the 
schools. Classifying schools in reference to similar schools avoids a full correspondence between 
classification and the SES of the school.  
One disadvantage is that the formulae are quite complex in terms of how all the indicators are 
related, and it may not be easy for schools, teachers and parents to understand why a school was 
classified the way it was. Furthermore, the formulae are quite recursive using the same scores 
dressed up with different clothes. For example, SIMCE scores are used as an average, separately 
it is considered the proportion of students scoring above 250 and 300 on SIMCE scores, and 
SIMCE scores are also the main component of the ICE index. Another disadvantage of the 
performance measure available is that SIMCE scores do not allow tracking students over time, 
and, therefore, it is not possible to construct proper value-added measures.  
The information about the classifications of schools is given by MINEDUC to the school 
owner (“sostenedor”) and they inform the ‘school principals’ and managers. They also have to 
inform parents about the school classification. MINEDUC also publishes the school 
classifications on its website. 
Implementation rules.  Adoption of the SEP law is voluntary. To have access to the extra 
resources the school signs an agreement of equality of opportunities and academic excellence 
(CIOEE) where they commit not to select students by prior academic achievement (until 6th 
grade), improve school results, retain students, not charge priority students any top-up fee, and 
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design and implement a PME36. This agreement lasts for four year. It can be renewed if schools 
want to.  
The law mandates implementation from the first year from PK to 4th grade, and then every 
year after a new grade is introduced. Thus, in 2008 Pk-4th grade will be embraced by the law, in 
2009 it will add 5th grade, the next year 6th grade, and so forth. In 2016 the implementation of the 
law is complete as it incorporates 12th grade. 
3.3. Implementation 
School adoption to the law was gradual. The first year, in which the SEP law was in place, 
96.75% of public schools that offer elementary education adopted it, whereas only 42.30% of 
private voucher schools did. By 2010, 99% of public schools had adopted it, and 54.6% of 
private voucher schools (see Table 8).  The different rates in which schools adopted the law is a 
clear response to fact that public schools have a much higher proportion of priority students than 
private voucher schools37.  
                                                 
36 This agreement also requires the schools to [Art. 7]: (i) Present an annual report about the use of resources 
acquired by the adjusted voucher –all resources received must be reported; (ii) Accredit the school board, teachers’ 
board, and parental board; (iii) Credit the existence of teacher’s time to pedagogical advisement and planning in the 
school and teacher’s academic time to non-lecture activities such as class planning; (iv) Present an Improvement 
plan of the school (PME), elaborated with the school community (this plan should consider areas of curriculum, 
leadership, school climate, and management of school’s resources [Art 8]); (v) Define and meet goals of academic 
achievement of their students, especially priority students. These goals should be defined using the national 
standardized testing system (SIMCE); (vi) Indicate in the agreement the total amount of public resources received.  
This data should be presented annually; (vii) Make public for parents and students this agreement, especially what 
refers to the academic goals of the school; (viii) Safeguard that all teachers present the academic annual plan to the 
school’s principal during the first 15 days of school; (ix) Include in the academic planning cultural, artistic and sport 
activities. 
37 In 2008, 35.58% percent of students enrolled in public schools where priority students (eligible for the adjusted 
voucher), in contrast to 17.24% in private voucher schools. In 2010, 58.91% of public school students were eligible; 
whereas in private voucher schools it was only the 36.06% (see Table 9). 
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The classification schools received was gradual. During the first four years schools were only 
classified as “autonomous” and “emergent”. Supposedly by 2010 schools should have also been 
classified as “in recovery”; however, that did not happen.  Schools started being classified as “in 
recovery” only by 2012. According to staff from MINEDUC, there is no memorandum or record 
of why this delay happened. By 2012, 7,459 schools received a classification. However, most of 
them received a classification of “emergent” because they either had less than two SIMCE 
measures or because the schools have had 20 students or less taking the tests (average of the 
three tests in the last three measures).  Thus, only 39% was classified using the classification 
formulas; percentage that has slightly decreased with the years (see Table 10). 
Table 11 shows the distribution of schools in the different categories for the first four rounds 
of complete school classification, for all schools classified using the formulas. The greatest 
variation across years is in the lowest classification, where there is a steady decrease in the 
number of schools classified as “in recovery”. The variation of schools classified between 
“autonomous” and “emergent” is not quite large on average. This is something to be expected 
considering the classification rules are relative to the median test scores of the SES groups. In 
Table 12, I disaggregate such broad number in the number of schools that change from one 
category to another in the following years. The way to interpret this table is as follow. For 
example, from all schools that were classified as “autonomous” on year 2012, 809 were 
classified as “autonomous” on 2013, and 243 were classified as “emergent”. From all schools 
classified as “autonomous” on 2013, 848 were classified as “autonomous” on 2014 and 209 were 
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classified as “emergent”.  And so forth.  Overall, the table shows there is variation across years 
in the number of schools that fall into each classification38. 
Information about how schools are classified is not easily available. Although the criteria 
used to classified schools is reported in the Decree 293, how exactly these criteria are calculated 
and which are the threshold used are not fully reported there. Such information is contained in 
the Technical Report of Proceso de Clasificacion SEP which can only be obtained by filing a 
document request under the Ley de Transparencia. This suggests that schools are not likely to 
game the system, unless they had asked for and reviewed this report. 
Information about the classifications the schools get is published in on MINEDUC’s website 
(www.mime.mineduc.cl). In this website parents can find several indicators of all schools. 
Information about school classification in the SEP scheme is hidden under the ‘Cost Indicators’ 
section. However, what each classification means is not explained, and it does not say the 
classification refers to school quality. From the context, each classification could be interpreted 
as some indicator of ‘costs management’ or alike. There is also no data regarding how schools 
inform parents about the classification the school gets. 
The use of resources has been a matter of public discussion. Reports from the government 
entity dedicated to the monitoring and control of public administration expenses have uncovered 
thatthis information of all the funds received by schools in 2011, 37% were not appropriately 
accounted for (Contraloria General de la Republica, 2014). 29.4% of incoming resources were 
                                                 
38 Note that in the table the vertical sum of one category does not necessarily match the horizontal sum of the 
category the year after. This happens because not all schools participate in the SEP law every year (some schools did 
not renew their CIOEE after 4 years of participation), and because some schools were classified according to the 
formulas some years but some other were not. 
 46 
 
used for things not approved by the law, and 7.4% of incoming resources were missing. It would 
not be a surprise if the situation was somehow similar for other years. 
3.4. Empirical evidence of the SEP law 
If the SEP law had a positive impact on student achievement, we would expect SIMCE scores to 
increase starting in 2008. Figure 2 shows standardized math and reading achievement scores in 
Chile from year 2006 to 2013. The figure shows the academic results of 4th grade students in 
math and language have a steep growth in the period 2008 to 2012, after years of stagnation. 
However, we cannot causally attribute this increase in scores to the introduction of the SEP law. 
There could be other time-varying factors influencing the results.  
In the last couple of years several studies have assessed the causal impact of the introduction 
of the SEP law on educational quality (see Table 13). Overall the findings indicate that the SEP 
law has mildly increased schools’ high-stakes test scores (MINEDUC, 2012; Villarroel, 2012; 
Correa et al., 2013; Mizala & Torche, 2013; Neilson, 2013; Navarro-Palau, 2015), and 
particularly those of vulnerable students (Neilson, 2013; Navarro-Palau, 2015). However, no 
studies have assessed the impact of the SEP law on other academic outcomes (e.g. low-stakes 
tests, retention rates), nor it is clear whether the effect is due to the extra resources schools are 
receiving or due to the school accountability mechanisms set in place (i.e., more government 
control over school performance). 
In order to assess whether the SEP law increases school quality, recent studies take 
advantage of the fact that the adoption of the law is voluntary and private voucher schools have 
adopted it gradually (MINEDUC, 2012; Correa et al, 2013; Villarroel, 2012; Mizala & Torche, 
2013). The comparisons of academic outcomes between schools that adopted the law and those 
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that did not, offer an interesting counterfactual. Unfortunately this type of analysis is only 
possible to do with private voucher schools and not with public schools because almost all of the 
latter adopted the law during the first year of the implementation of the law; therefore, it was not 
possible to compare those public schools that adopted the law versus those that did not. In the 
case of private voucher schools, however, only 45% of the schools adopted the law by 2012. 
This meant 55% of private voucher schools that did not adopt the law, and could serve as a 
control group. All the studies that used this criterion to gain identification (MINEDUC, 2012; 
Correa et al., 2013; Villarroel, 2012; Mizala & Torche, 2013) used panel data from 2006 to 2011 
aggregated at a school level; the outcomes assessed were math and language 4th grade test scores. 
Villarroel (2012) studied the impact of the SEP law on academic outcomes of 4th graders. He 
compared private voucher schools that had and had not adopted the law in 2010. To control for 
selection bias of some voucher schools adopting the law, the author used propensity score 
matching to control for the probability of selection into the SEP law. He then used a difference-
in-differences method with two time periods to estimate the impact of the policy (2007 and 
2010). He found a positive impact on language and math scores, with effect sizes ranging 
between 0.11 and 0.18 in math and 0.07 and 0.11 in language. The impact was larger for schools 
with a higher proportion of priority students and for schools that had implemented improvement 
plans for a longer time. 
In 2012, the Center of Studies of MINEDUC and the Department of Studies of the Ministry 
of Finance released an impact evaluation after four years of the beginning of the implementation 
of the SEP Law. The study used a difference-in-differences approach to estimate the effect of 
adoption of the law among private voucher schools.  Different from Villarroel (2012), this paper 
used more than two time periods; the study used a panel of data from 2006 to 2011. The authors 
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found the SEP law had a positive and significant effect on academic achievement of fourth 
graders of private voucher schools, with effect sizes ranging from 0.08 to 0.11 in math and 0.05 
to 0.07 in language39. Each extra year participating in the SEP law increased the achievement by 
0.03 in math and 0.02 in language40 41.   
The study by Mizala and Torche (2013) analyzed the effect on academic achievement of 
schools’ participation on the SEP Law, the impact of participation over time, and heterogeneous 
effects on schools according to schools' socioeconomic background. The authors used the sample 
of private voucher schools because there is variation in the timing when these schools adopted 
the law. The authors used a fixed effects model where they use a fixed effect per school and per 
year. This strategy allowed them to identify the within school difference due to changes in the 
status of treatment. They also controlled for changes in the socioeconomic composition of 
schools. The authors found that private voucher schools increased their test scores once they 
adopted the SEP Law. The effect sizes in math ranged from 0.08 to 0.1 and from 0.07 to 0.08 in 
language42. Each extra year of participation in the SEP law impacted positively on the outcomes. 
This suggests schools require time to adjust their resources, pedagogical strategies and teaching 
plans. The authors also analyzed the effects by the average socioeconomic level of the families 
of students enrolled in schools. The authors found schools from lower quintiles had a higher 
increase of their test scores than schools from higher quintiles. Schools from higher quintiles had 
                                                 
39 Effect sizes calculated dividing the reported coefficients by the standard deviation of SIMCE (50). 
40 This study adds years in the models as a continuous variable and not as fixed effects. This assumes that the effect 
of each year is the same on students’ outcomes. This assumption is relaxed by the study of Mizala and Torche 
(2013). 
41 There is a more extended version of this study by Correa, Inostroza, Parro, Reyes and Ugarte (2013). 
42 Effect size calculated dividing the reported coefficients by the standard deviation of SIMCE (50). 
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an effect that was negligible. This suggests the effects are aligned with the objectives of the 
policy as it expects to impact the least advantage population of students. 
The advantages of the fixed effects models for school and time used by Mizala and Torche 
(2013) is that such strategy allows them to control for unobservable variables that vary across 
schools but not over time (school fixed effect) and vary over time but not across schools (time 
fixed effect). There are two limitations of these strategies that may bias the findings. One of the 
limitations refers to the omission of those variables that change within units over time. Schools 
could change their activities to accommodate the extra resources and to accommodate priority 
students. Also students may sort between schools. Such a situation could happen if the 
compositions of schools change as they adopted the law (as they move from being in the control 
to the treatment group). Changes in observable characteristics of the composition of schools are 
controlled for as characteristics of the student group are added into the models, e.g., average SES 
of the students in the school, average parental education, etc. Changes in unobservable 
characteristics, however, are not addressed. Some unobservable characteristics that modify the 
composition of the schools could appear if parental choice is determined by the fact that schools 
adopted the SEP law. It is possible that parents that have certain special motivations or interests 
choose schools that adopted the SEP law. If this is the case, then it is possible the findings are 
biased upwards. The second limitation is that the fixed effects model only estimates the impact 
of the law on schools that exist before and after the law. Therefore, variations offered by schools 
that leave or join the market are not accounted for. The law could have impacted the number of 
schools by (i) attracting new schools to join the market, as now there is more money to run the 
schools, or (ii) somehow pushing away schools (although it is hard to think about this possibility 
as schools that do not want to join the law can do so). The direction of the bias could be both 
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ways. It could be upward biased if new schools start with low academic achievement as they get 
everything up and running. Or it could be downward biased if the law somehow pushed away 
from the market low performing schools. 
One of the latest studies assessing the impact of the SEP law takes a slightly different 
approach and assessed the impact of the law on students of both public schools and private 
voucher schools. Neilson (2013) used a difference-in-differences approach comparing the impact 
of the law on poor and non-poor students across the years (intent-to-treat). He used panel data 
from 2004 to 2011 at a student level; test scores used are those of math and language for 4th 
grade students. He found that the targeted vouchers raised poor student test scores by 0.2 
standard deviations. He also found that the targeted vouchers close the gap between the 40% 
poorest population of students and the rest of the students by one third. The author simulated a 
demand and supply model to decompose the effects of the policy, specifically to identify whether 
the increase in test scores was driven by an increase in the quality of the schools or by sorting of 
students. He found the supply reaction accounts for two thirds of the effect, whereas the demand 
reaction accounts for one third of the effect. The author attributes the increase of school quality 
as a reaction of schools to increased competition for vulnerable students.  
The latest study of the introduction of the SEP law on high-stakes outcomes is from Navarro-
Palau (2015). She uses a novel regression discontinuity with difference-in-differences design to 
estimate the impact of increased school choice due to the introduction of the law on 4th grade 
SIMCE scores. Overall she finds there is no evidence the increased school choice improved test 
scores. However, when a maternal education moderator is considered, she finds children of less 
educated mothers (those who tended to stay in public schools) had an increase in average test 
scores of 0.08 standard deviations. There is no evidence of impact on children of more educated 
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mothers (those who tended to switch to private voucher schools due to the introduction of the 
law). 
None of the studies mentioned above considers explicitly that the SEP law has an 
accountability component, a component that could have triggered the impacts on high-stakes 
outcomes. Therefore, there is an important question that still remains unanswered, whether the 
impact of the SEP law would have been the same if the accountability component had not been 
in place. 
3.5.  Conclusion 
The Chilean educational system has a mix of market policies, where there is a marketplace of 
schools with vouchers per enrolled student and vouchers per vulnerable student that are 
conditional on schools’ performance. The latter vouchers were introduced by the SEP law as a 
solution for the unintended consequences of having a system of flat vouchers per enrolled 
student. Whether they have increased the quality of schooling received by priority students is the 
topic of this study. 
The studies that assess whether the SEP law has impacted on school quality conclude it has 
had positive effects on schools’ high-stakes test scores. On average, schools participating in the 
SEP law have been estimated to increase mathematics test scores by 0.1 standard deviations and 
language test results by 0.08 standard deviation (Villarroel, 2012; MINEDUC, 2012; Correa et 
al., 2013; Mizala & Torche, 2013). Student level data indicates that the SEP law raised test 
scores of the poorest 40% of students on average by 0.2 standard deviations (Neilson, 2013). 
All the current studies analyze the effect of the SEP law as a whole, as a black box. None of 
them tries to separate the effect of the adjusted vouchers (i.e., extra resources) from the effect of 
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the accountability component of the law (i.e., classification of schools and resource allocation 
autonomy conditional on performance, and more information that can affect parental school 
choice). Although Neilson (2013) looks at the supply and demand responses to the policy, he 
suggests the quality of schools may have been altered only by having schools compete for more 
resources. It will be interesting to know how much of the increase in quality is due to 
competition and how much is due to the accountability component of the law. Disentangling the 
effects of the law is crucial for informing educational policy. Would the impact of the law have 
been the same if only extra resources for vulnerable students were provided43? Or if the 
accountability component was the only aspect of the law set in place? Had there been any effects 
if only more information about school performance was provided44? Or were the explicit 
consequences of resource management what drove schools to improve their academic results? 
Furthermore, how the introduction of the law affects the school processes may indicate how the 
law is affecting the academic outcomes of the students on high-stakes tests. These evaluations 
are important as they inform policymakers not only about the impact of the SEP law, but about 
the mechanism in place. 
                                                 
43 Evidence of the impact of differentiated vouchers for disadvantaged students on the Netherlands has shown 
negative and significant effects on students test scores of the whole student population (Leuven, Lindahl, Oosterbeek 
& Webbink, 2007). However, other studies addressing the causal effect of extra resources on students’ outcomes 
have shown positive impacts on test scores (Lafortune, Rothstein & Schanzenbach, 2016) and on long term 
outcomes (Jackson, Johnson & Persico, 2015), specially for low-income districts. 
44 As it is found in other studies of the impact of school accountability, that address the impact of providing extra 
information (without consequences enacted by the government) (Andrabi, Das, & Khwaja, 2014; Witte, Wolf, 
Cowen, Carlson & Fleming, 2014). For example, Witte and colleagues (2014) study the impact of an accountability 
system on the Milwaukee voucher system. This accountability system only provides extra information for parents 
and schools. In fact, this is the first time parents are informed about individual schools outcomes. The state’s central 
educational agency had statutorily prohibited from sanctioning or rewarding schools based on their results. 
However, new information could trigger consequences in the choices parents make. The authors found a positive 
and significant impact one year after the implementation of the accountability system.  
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All the impact evaluations of the SEP law have focused on the academic measures of 
students in the high-stakes test SIMCE, particularly in 4th grade math and language scores. To 
my knowledge, there are no evaluations of the impact of the SEP law on low-stakes tests nor on 
long-run outcomes. Low-stakes test and long-run outcomes may reflect other aspects of the 
desired outcomes of the law, which is to improve school quality. Using non-incentivized 
performance measures to evaluate the impact of an accountability policy is relevant as impact on 
high-stakes tests can be simply a reflection of score inflation (Koretz, 2005; Jacob, 2007; 
National Research Council, 2011; Lee, 2008; Chiang, 2009).  
Furthermore, it is important to assess whether the incentives result in a sufficient increase in 
the desired output to justify the costs of running the incentives system (National Research 
Council, 2011).  
To my knowledge there are no evaluations of the impact on academic outcomes of 
accountability pressure, for high-stakes, low-stakes or long-run outcomes. As far as I am aware, 
there is only one evaluation of the impact of the law on educational processes from Elacqua and 
colleagues (2015), and it specifically assessed the impact of accountability pressure on low-
performing schools. They found low-performing schools decrease teacher training, decrease 
crossed-observation of classes among colleagues, increase after school tutoring, and hire teachers 
with increased teacher’s test scores from their undergraduate exit exams (Elacqua, Martinez, 
Santos & Urbina, 2015). 
In sum, the evidence suggests the SEP law has a positive but modest impact on high-stakes 
tests. No studies have assessed the impact of the law on low-stakes tests. Nor have any studies 
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attempted to disentangle the effect of the extra resources provided by the law and the effect of 
the school accountability mechanism. 
In the next chapter I present the methodology and data used to assess the impact of 
accountability pressure on academic outcomes and potential mechanisms of the SEP law.  
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 Chapter 4 - Methodology 
4.1. Research questions and hypotheses 
The purpose of this dissertation is to assess the impact of school accountability in Chile. I do not 
attempt to estimate the systemic impact of the accountability system, i.e., the introduction of 
school accountability in Chile. Rather, I wish to try to separate out estimates of the impact of 
accountability pressure, i.e., the pressure schools face as they receive different classifications. 
I explore three questions about the ways in which school accountability affects students’ 
educational outcomes: 
(1) What is the impact of accountability pressure on high-stakes outcomes? The basic 
prediction of the incentive theory is that schools threatened by a punishment or by losing a 
reward will improve their performance in the subjects and grades in incentivized outcomes.  
(2) What is the impact of accountability pressure on low-stakes outcomes? The theory of 
incentives predicts that multitasking agencies will focus their attention on the rewarded outcomes 
(high-stakes outcomes) and not in other outcomes (low-stakes outcomes) if they are not 
complementary to the rewarded outcomes (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991). Given that 
consequences are attached to the performance of the school in some grades, one could expect 
that schools shift their resources and efforts towards those grades included in the school 
classification rules (high-stake outcomes in high-stakes grades), instead of the outcomes in other 
grades (low-stakes grades).  
(3) If school accountability increases incentivized or non-incentivized outcomes, what 
mechanisms drive those improvements? Understanding the potential mechanisms that drive the 
policy impact (or the null impact) could have extensive policy value (Ludwig, Kling & 
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Mullainathan, 2011). It can help us understand what aspects of the policy (or the context in 
which it is implemented) may moderate its impact. 
As mentioned earlier, the mechanisms through which school accountability seems to operate 
to increase performance measures depend on (i) the behavioral response of the school, (ii) the 
student body composition, and (iii) the teacher body composition. In terms of school’s behavior, 
the accountability pressure may generate both desirable and undesirable school behaviors. If the 
adopted behavior increases the performance measure at the expense of the educational goal, then 
the behavior is undesired. However, if the behavior improves the performance measure as well as 
the educational goal, then the behavior is desired. In terms of student mobility between schools, 
information about the quality of schools may affect the way parents choose schools for their 
children, or it may affect the way schools select their students, or both. Schools classified as low 
performing may be less attractive for parents, and/or these schools may intentionally select more 
prepared students to improve their results. Furthermore, schools may have an incentive to 
increase their prices, or to increase the number of students from low SES background as the 
school will get more money but risking lowering school results. In terms of teacher mobility, 
schools classified as low performing may find it challenging to retain and hire teachers of good 
quality. 
4.2. Empirical strategy 
The empirical method I use follows the work of those who study the impact of accountability 
pressure (e.g., Figlio & Rouse, 2006; Rockoff & Turner, 2008; Chiang, 2009; Deming, et al., 
2013; Mizala & Urquiola, 2013; Clotfelter et al., 2004; Hart & Figlio, 2015; Elacqua, et al., 
2015), and those who have used regression discontinuities when there are multiple rating scores 
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(e.g., Reardon & Robinson, 2012; Papay, Willet & Murnane, 2011; Robinson, 2008; Cohodes & 
Goodman, 2014; Papay, Murnane & Willett, 2014; Elacqua et al., 2015).  
The causal effect of the classification of the school on the school outcomes could be done 
comparing the outcomes of schools that received a classification of “autonomous” with those 
that received the classification of “emergent” only if schools assigned to each category were 
done randomly. But this is not the case. If we compare the outcomes of “autonomous” schools 
and “emergent” schools we would confound the impact of the school categorization with the fact 
that “autonomous” schools perform better than “emergent” schools initially. In order to account 
for such omitted variable bias I use a regression discontinuity design (RD hereafter). An RD 
allows me to compare the outcomes of schools just above and below the school classification 
threshold, as schools should be similar except for receiving one classification or the other.  
The RD design exploits natural discontinuities in the rules used to assign individuals to the 
treatment to compare the outcomes of the individuals assigned and not assigned to treatment. 
Using the potential outcomes framework (Holland, 1986) this can be phrased as follows. Let 
there be a rule that indicates that above certain score (𝑐) of a rating variable (𝑋) individuals will 
receive a treatment (𝐷 = 0), and if they score below such score individuals will receive 
treatment (𝐷 = 1). Each individual has two potential outcomes: one that results from the 
individual being assigned to treatment (0), (𝑌𝑖(0)), and a second one from being assigned to 
treatment (1), (𝑌𝑖(1)). What we want to know is 𝐸[𝑌(1)|𝑋 = 𝑐] − 𝐸[𝑌(0)|𝑋 = 𝑐].  However, 
we do not observe 𝑌(0) on 𝑋 = 𝑐. Under the assumption that 𝐸[𝑌(0)|𝑋 = 𝑥] and 
𝐸[𝑌(1)|𝑋 = 𝑥] are continuous in (𝑥 = 𝑐), we can consider the average treatment effect of 
treatment (1) relative to (0) being 
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𝐸[𝑌(1) − 𝑌(0)|𝑋 = 𝑐] = lim
𝑥↑𝑐
𝐸[𝑌|𝑋 = 𝑥] − lim
𝑥↓𝑐
𝐸[𝑌|𝑋 = 𝑥] (1) 
which is interpreted as the average causal effect of the treatment at the discontinuity point 
(Imbens & Lemieux, 2008). 
The estimate of this difference can be obtained using a parametric regression model45, 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝑓(𝑥𝑖) + 𝜌 𝐷𝑖 +  𝑍𝑖𝜑 +  𝜀𝑖 , (2) 
Where 𝑥𝑖 is centered at the cutoff score, 𝑓 is a continuous function at 𝑥 = 0, and 𝐷 is a 
dummy variable indicating whether 𝑥 > 𝑐 or not. 𝜌 is our coefficient of interest. 𝑍 is a vector of 
covariates. The later should not radically change the estimates (Imbens & Lemieux, 2008). The 
main purpose of including covariates is to increase precision. 
In this study, the treatment status is not determined only by one rating score, but several 
rating scores. For example, schools are classified according to their SIMCE scores, proportion of 
students achieving above 250 points and 300 points in SIMCE, etc. For this reason I use a 
variation of the RD for multiple rating scores. 
Furthermore, in this study, there are not only multiple rating scores, but there are two 
separate sets of administrative rules that each determine two treatment statuses. As mentioned 
earlier, in the SEP law, schools with scores above or below multiple thresholds are classified into 
three different categories: “autonomous”, “emergent” or “in recovery”. The classification rules to 
define which schools are “autonomous” versus “emergent” differ from the rules to determine 
which schools are “emergent” versus “in recovery”. The rules to determine if a school is 
                                                 
45 Another possibility is to use a non-parametric approach by taking the difference between the average of 
individuals’ outcomes right above and below the cutoff. A third possibility is a semi-parametric approach by 




“autonomous” are relative to schools that have a student population of similar socioeconomic 
background. For example, a school with a student population of SES level A will be compared to 
the median scores obtained by schools of SES level A. However, the rules to determine if a 
school is “in recovery” are relative to absolute thresholds. For example, a school will be 
compared to a threshold of 220 points in a test score, regardless of the SES level of the school. 
“Emergent” school will be all those that are not “autonomous” nor “in recovery”. 
Given there are two separate sets of rules to classify schools, I analyze the effect of the 
categorization of schools separately. First I analyze the impact of receiving a category of 
“autonomous” versus the other categories. Then I analyze the impact of receiving the 
classification of “in recovery” versus the other categories.  
In this study I use a fuzzy regression discontinuity, which combines regression 
discontinuity and instrumental variables (IV) approaches. The IV approach is needed because 
achieving all cutoff scores does not perfectly predict the school classification. This happens for 
two reasons. First, because it is not each cutoff score that matters, but some of them need to be 
achieved simultaneously in at least two years, and others need to be achieved in just one year. 
Second, the way the rules are defined is not straightforward, but there are several ways of 
interpreting the rules46.  
                                                 
46 To illustrate this point, in Appendix C, in Table C.1, I show the level of coincidence between the classifications as 
MINEDUC publishes them and the classifications as I calculate them according to my interpretation of the rules 
specified in the law, decree and technical documentation (Appendix A shows the details of such interpretation of 
rules). Overall, the level of coincidence varies between 83 and 100 percent in the different classification categories 
and years. Some of the issues of the rules that are subject to interpretation are: a) how is the median of the SIMCE, 
proportion of students scoring above 250 and 300 points, and ICE scores of the school by SES calculated, either 
using all schools or only classifiable schools; b) how are complementary indicators standardized, either using all 
schools or only classifiable schools; c) how many students must take the exam in order for the results of the school 
to count as classifiable, 20 or more, or more than 20; d) whether the SIMCE scores and proportion of students 
scoring highly must be attained in at least two years, either all the rules at least two years or any rule at least two 
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Estimation of the effect of receiving the classification of “autonomous” 
I estimate the model using as an IV the score that determines more strongly the classification of 
schools. To find which one is the binding score on the classification of “autonomous” schools on 
2012 I run several models where the outcome is whether the school is “autonomous” or not, and 
using each rule of the classification as the determinant. 
In Table 14, I present such models. Independent variables called “above threshold” are 
dummy variables where 1 indicates whether the school scores are above the median of the SES 
group in the specific rule mentioned in the top of the columns. The variable called “running 
variable” is the rule mentioned in the heading of the column centered at the SES group median. 
The models are estimated using linear probability models and they all include covariates such as 
the type of school, whether the school is urban, socioeconomic level of the school and 4th grade 
enrollment rates.  
The models indicate that the score that determines most strongly whether the school receives 
the classification of “autonomous” is the ICE score the school got the year prior to the 
classification. The strength of the relationship is measured by the coefficient of the dummy 
variable that indicates whether the school scored above the threshold, and by the F-test of the 
model. The coefficient of the dummy variable of the model of column (10) indicates that being 
above the SES group’s threshold explains about 53 percent of the classification the schools get. 
This coefficient of the ICE index is up to two times larger than the coefficients of the other 
scores that determine the classification the school gets. The F-test of the model in column (10) 
                                                 
years. Despite trying the classification of the schools with all these combinations of rules, I never achieved total 
match between the classification I can predict and the one MINEDUC publishes. 
 61 
 
indicates this model fits best the population of schools than the others that use other scores as 
determinants of the classification of schools. 
To estimate the causal effect of the school classification of “autonomous”, I use as a first 
stage a linear probability model to predict the classification schools receive (𝑄) whether it is 
“autonomous” (𝑄 = 1) or not (𝑄 = 0).  
𝑄𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑠(𝑡−1) + 𝛼2𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑠(𝑡−1) + 𝛼3𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑠(𝑡−1) ∗ 𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑠(𝑡−1) + 𝑋𝛼4 + 𝜇𝑠𝑡 (5) 
𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑠(𝑡−1) is the instrumental variable, where 𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑉𝐸 = 1 if the school has a ICE index 
above the median of the SES group (𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑠(𝑡−1) ≥ 0), and 𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑉𝐸 = 0 otherwise (𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑠(𝑡−1) < 0). 
𝑋 is a vector of school characteristics (i.e., type of school, SES of the school, rural/urban, 
enrollment rates). 
Then, I use the predicted value of 𝑄 (i.e.,?̂?) estimated from the equation 5 to predict the 
school outcomes on the following years to the classification (𝑡 + 𝑘). 
𝑌𝑠(𝑡+𝑘) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑄𝑠?̂? + 𝛽2𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑠(𝑡−1) + 𝛽3𝐴𝐵𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑠(𝑡−1) ∗ 𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑠(𝑡−1) + 𝑋𝛽4 + 𝜀𝑠(𝑡+𝑘) (6) 
Thus, 𝛽1 is the unbiased estimate of the local average treatment effect of being classified as 
“autonomous” 47 48. This local effect is only estimated for schools that comply with the rule of the 
                                                 
47 Given the binary nature of the treatment, a probit in the first stage could have been appropriate. However, 
plugging the predicted value of such first stage onto the second stage would be estimating what Angrist and Pischke 
(2009) called the “forbidden regression”. This regression refers to the direct application of 2SLS to a nonlinear 
model. The problem is that only OLS estimation of the endogenous variable is guaranteed to produce first-stage 
residuals that are uncorrelated with fitted values and covariates. In cases like this, Wooldridge (2002) suggests 
adding an extra step where we run an OLS of 𝑄 on the predicted value of the probit (?̂? ) and all the other covariates. 
The estimated values of this OLS (𝑄 ) are plugged into the second stage (equation 6). However, the disadvantage 
of this proceeding is that it uses the predicted classification status rather than the actual autonomous status as the 
endogenous second stage predictor.    
48 Both continuous and dichotomous outcomes are calculated using OLS. 
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score that is binding (the instrumental variable restriction to generalizations). This estimand is 
valid only for schools that are close to the passing threshold (the regression discontinuity 
restriction to generalizations). 
Estimation of the effect of receiving the classification of “in recovery”  
To estimate the impact of schools being classified as “in recovery” I follow the same rationale 
used to identify the impact of the “autonomous” classification. I identify the binding score for the 
“in recovery” classification, and then use such binding score as IV to estimate the impact of the 
classification on the outcomes of the schools. There are two small differences with the model 
described for the “autonomous” classification. First, because there are too few schools classified 
as “in recovery” (Table 11), I use two rounds of classifications pooled together, the rounds of 
year 2012 and 2013. I add a fixed effect per year to avoid any confounding impact of time 
varying unobservable variables. Second, instead of defining the IV as “above”, I use a “below” 
IV because the classification of “in recovery” is for those schools that score below the different 
cutoffs.  
In Table 15 I present the resulting models in the search for the binding score of the “in 
recovery” classification. Independent variables called “below threshold” are dummy variables 
where 1 indicates whether the school scores are below the cutoff in the specific rule mentioned in 
the top of the columns, zero otherwise. The variable called “running variable” is the rule 
mentioned in the top of the column, centered at the cutoff score. The models are estimated using 
linear probability models, they all include covariates (type of school, whether the school is 




The estimated coefficients indicate that the score that more strongly determines whether a 
school is classified as “in recovery” is the ICE score the school received the year prior to the 
classification (Table 15, column 7). Again the strength of the relationship is measured by the 
coefficient of “below threshold” and by the F-statistic of the model, both considerably larger 
than the coefficient and the F-statistic of the models in the other columns. The coefficient of the 
“below threshold” dummy indicates that being below the cut score explains about 97% of the 
classification the school gets. This is twice as much as the coefficients of the other models. 
 To estimate the causal effect of the school classification of “in recovery”, I use as a first 
stage a linear probability model to predict the classification schools receive, whether it is “in 
recovery” (𝑅 = 1) or not (𝑅 = 0). 
𝑅𝑠𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1 𝐵𝐸𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑠(𝑡−1) + 𝛾2𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑠(𝑡−1) + 𝛾3𝐵𝐸𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑠(𝑡−1) ∗ 𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑠(𝑡−1) + 𝑋𝛾4 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜇𝑠𝑡 (7) 
𝐵𝐸𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑠(𝑡−1) is the instrumental variable, where 𝐵𝐸𝐿𝑂𝑊 = 1 if the school has an ICE index 
below the 10th percentile cut score (𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑠(𝑡−1) < 0), and 𝐵𝐸𝐿𝑂𝑊 = 0 otherwise (𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑠(𝑡−1) ≥ 0). 
𝑋 is a vector of school characteristics (i.e., type of school, SES of the school, rural/urban, 
enrollment rates). 𝛿𝑡 is a year fixed effect. 
Then, I use the predicted value of 𝑅 (i.e., ?̂?) to estimate the impact on the outcomes of the 
following years to the classification (𝑡 + 𝑘). 
𝑂𝑠(𝑡+𝑘) = 𝜗0 + 𝜗1𝑄𝑠?̂? + 𝜗2𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑠(𝑡−1) + 𝜗3𝐵𝐸𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑠(𝑡−1) ∗ 𝐼𝐶𝐸𝑠(𝑡−1) + 𝑋𝜗4 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑠(𝑡+𝑘) (8) 
Here, 𝑂𝑠(𝑡+𝑘) is an outcome measure of the school 𝑠 on year (𝑡 + 𝑘).  The identifying 
assumption of this equation is that any relative increase/decrease in school outcomes of those 
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schools that where classified as “in recovery” induced by missing the cut score of the ICE score 
is attributable to the accountability classification itself. If the identifying assumption is correct, 
𝜗1 is the local average treatment effect of being classified as “in recovery”. The effect is valid 
only for schools close to the threshold. 
4.3. Data 
Sources of data 
To conduct the analyses I use school level data from three different sources: administrative data 
and school classification scores from the Ministry of Education (MINEDUC), standardized test 
scores from the Quality Agency of Education (in Spanish Agencia de Calidad de la 
Educacion)49, and administrative data from the Chilean Internal Revenue Service (in Spanish 
Servicio de Impuestos Internos). 
Administrative data from all schools is publicly available on the MINEDUC website. The 
administrative dataset of MINEDUC provides data on the characteristics of the school, the 
number of enrolled students per grade, number of students with special needs, number of priority 
students (i.e., students eligible for the adjusted voucher), number of beneficiary students (i.e., 
students eligible for the adjusted voucher who are enrolled in a grade and school that has adopted 
the SEP law), students’ fees (reported by schools).  Data from the internal revenue service 
provides information about which schools are for-profit and which ones are not50. 
                                                 
49 This study used data from Agencia de Calidad de la Educacion. The author is thankful to Agencia de Calidad de 
la Educacion for allowing access to the data. All the results of the study are responsibility of the author and not the 
Agencia de Calidad de la Educacion. 
50 Schools are said to be “potentially for profit”, which does not necessarily mean they make profits. There is no data 
available about how much profit they make, if any. This data is not available for year 2012. It is available for 2013. 
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Data on the SEP classification of schools comes from the Department of National 
Coordination of School Subsidies from the Ministry of Education51. The data about the SEP 
classification of schools contains data on schools that have joined the SEP law from 2012 to 
2015. Data is available for each one of the rating scores the school gets and the final 
classification of the school. The data also allows identification of which schools were classified 
due to their quality measures and which ones were classified due to administrative criteria (e.g., 
not presenting the PME after a year of joining the SEP law).  
Data on the educational outcomes of schools and the socioeconomic background for their 
students comes from the Quality Agency of Education. The data on educational outcomes of the 
schools are the 4th and 8th grade test scores of SIMCE (see footnote 28 for more details)52. 
Accompanying the scores is the assessment of parents, teachers and students from a survey. 
These surveys provide information about the socioeconomic characteristics of the students 
among other measures. 
Sample 
The universe of schools consists of SEP schools that provide elementary education53. There is 
data for 7,459 schools on 2012 and 7,967 schools on 2013.  From all those schools, around 62 
percent are excluded from the sample because they either have less than 20 students or have less 
than two measures of academic outcomes, and therefore are not classified using the classification 
                                                 
51 I am grateful for the help provided by Ignacio Monge from the Department of National Coordination of School 
Subsidies from the Ministry of Education to have access to the data. 
52 Recently in 2012 the Ministry started evaluating 2nd and 6th grade students as well. I have omitted those 
evaluations from my research because these assessments are still in their early stages. The calendar of evaluations is 
in Appendix B. 
53 Schools that do not provide 4th grade courses are not subject to classification rules, but are classified as 




formula (see Table 10). I also exclude 24 schools because their identification codes and 
verification codes for identification are inconsistent throughout the years, and therefore it is 
impossible to match their outcome data. I also exclude five schools that in 2011 were classified 
as “emergent” and in 2012 comply with all the rules to be classified as “emergent” but where 
classified as “in recovery”. I suspect these schools were classified as “in recovery” not due to the 
use of the classification formula, but because they did not present the PME (this could be the 
cases for which I have missing data –as seen in Table 10). The potential sample is composed of 
2,901 schools that in 2012 are classified using the classification formula (39% of all schools; see 
Table 10), and 2,867 in 2013. 
I use two analytical samples: one for the analysis of the impact of the “autonomous” 
classification, and one for the analysis of the impact of the “in recovery” classification. 
For the analysis of the impact of the “autonomous” classification I use cross-sectional data 
for the 2012 round of classification. My analytical sample uses a bandwidth of 0.706, reducing 
the sample to 2,212 schools. Descriptive statistics of the schools in the sample are presented in 
Table 16. The table presents the average characteristics for schools above and below the cutoff. 
The distribution of schools above and below the cutoff differs across urban and rural schools and 
across municipal and private voucher schools.  Global enrollment rates also differ, where they 
are noticeably lower in schools below the cutoff. The influence of unbalanced variables does not 
seem to matter unless there is a jump at the threshold (which later in Table 24 I will show there is 
not). Nevertheless, unbalanced covariates will be included as covariates in the estimations to 
control their influence. The inclusion of covariates should not affect the estimates, but only 
increase precision.  The lower section of Table 16 presents the classification rules, i.e., average 
scores or average proportion of students scoring above a certain score. As expected, schools 
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above the cutoff score higher in all the classification criteria. Differences between SIMCE scores 
above and below the threshold vary about a third of a standard deviation.  
For the analysis of the impact of “in recovery” classification I use two rounds of schools’ 
classification pooled together because the number of schools classified in this category is quite 
small. I use the classification rounds of 2012 and 2013. My analytical sample uses a bandwidth 
of 0.467, which reduces the sample from 5,768 observations (2,885 schools) to 1,063 
observations (684 schools). Descriptive statistics of the observations is presented in Table 17.  
Outcomes 
I explore how the school classification affects the following sets of school level outcomes: 
High stakes outcomes. High stakes outcomes are performance measures that have consequences 
attached. The SEP law uses the average math, language and science SIMCE scores on 4th grade 
students to classify schools. I assess the impact of the school classification on SIMCE average 
scores on math, language and science. Math and language tests are similarly based on the 
curriculum every year these test are passed. Science, however, alternates one year based on the 
social sciences curriculum and one year based on the natural sciences curriculum. In year 2012 
the science SIMCE tested social sciences, whereas in 2013 it tested natural sciences.  
 I assess the impact on high-stakes outcomes the year the school received the classification 
and the year after. If there is any impact the first year, then it is important to assess whether those 
impacts are persistent through time. If there is no impact on the first year, then it is worth 
assessing whether there is impact the following years, as it is possible schools need time to adjust 
their practices to improve their results. 
Average of several outcomes above and below the ICE index threshold for the “autonomous” 
classification are presented in Table 18. As expected, high-stakes outcomes on 2012 and 2013 
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SIMCE scores in math, language and science are higher if the school is above the threshold. The 
gap in SIMCE scores ranges between 10 and 14 points (between a fifth and a fourth of a standard 
deviation). 
Average high-stakes outcomes above and below the ICE cutoff for the classification of “in 
recovery” classification are on panel A of Table 19. Both 2012 and 2013 rounds are pooled 
together for the outcomes on year t. Outcomes of year t+1 are only reported for the 2012 round. 
The gap in SIMCE scores is much smaller than for the threshold of “autonomous” schools, 
ranging between 4 and 7 points. 
Low stakes outcomes. Following Figlio and Rouse (2006), I consider low-stakes outcomes those 
outcomes achieved by students on a grade that does not affect the classification status. These are 
SIMCE scores for grades other than 4th grade. The available data contains test scores for math, 
language and science for 8th graders. There is no data for year 2012 because 8th grade students 
were only tested every other year before 2013. After 2013, 8th grade students are tested every 
year. 
Average of low-stakes outcomes above and below the ICE index threshold for the 
“autonomous” classification are presented in panel B of Table 18. Academic outcomes of a low-
stakes grade are also higher above the cutoff, with SIMCE scores gaps of 11 and 12 points (a 
fifth of a standard deviation). 
The averages of low-stakes outcomes for the “in recovery” cutoff are presented in panel B of 
Table 19. Because of the peculiarities of the evaluation calendar for 8th grade, there is only data 
on 8th grade test scores on 2013. Thus, when the average outcome is reported for a subject on 
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year t, it only considers the round of 2013; and when the reported average above and below the 
cutoff is for a subject on year t+1, then it only considers round 2012.  
The third set of outcomes considers several potential mechanisms through which the 
incentive impacts the high-stakes outcomes: 
School behavioral response. I assess the impact of accountability pressure on the number of 
students taking the tests, which is measured by the number of tests in the three tests they take in 
4th grade. I also assess the impact on the number of students identified as having special needs. 
For this I created a composite measure of students with special needs which is the sum of the 
students with special needs enrolled in a differential group in the whole school and the number of 
students with special needs integrated into regular programs in the whole school.  
I also assess the impact on the number of students retained in 3th grade (the grade prior to the 
grade when the high-stakes test is passed), the number of students that switch schools in 3th 
grade, and the number of students that approve 3th grade. 
I consider as potential mechanisms all the criteria used in the formulas to classify schools 
the years following the classification. Thus I assess the impact on the proportion of students 
scoring above 250 and 300 SIMCE scores, school improvements assessed with the ICE index, 
and all its subscales: approval rates, retention rates54, teacher evaluations, SNED improvement, 
                                                 
54 School approval rates and school retention rates are for the whole school and not for 3th grade only as I assessed 
earlier as a potential mechanism to improve the classification the following years. The models to test approval rates 
and retention rates for the whole school do not include as a covariate the of 4th grade enrollment because it is also 
part of the denominator of the outcome which is total enrollment of the school. 
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SNED integration and SNED initiative (see Table 7 for descriptions). The last three indices are 
on a scale from 0 to 100.  
The teacher evaluation index is only available for public schools, as teachers from private 
voucher schools are not subject to the national evaluation system of teachers. The construction of 
the index of teacher evaluation is constructed by the Ministry (details in Table 7). The index goes 
from -1 to 1, where -1 would be the score that a school gets if all the assessed teachers are 
classified as incompetent, 1 would be the score a school gets if all its teachers are competent or 
excellent, and zero represents a balance between competent or excellent teachers and 
incompetent teachers.  
Panel A of Table 20 present the average of all of these outcomes above and below the 
“autonomous” cutoff. The impact of all the outcomes mentioned above is assessed for the year 
following the classification and the year after.  
In Panel A of Table 21 I present the average of the outcomes for the “in recovery” cutoff. In 
the evaluation of this cutoff I assess the impact of the “in recovery” classification on school 
behavior, student and teacher body composition only on outcomes on year t. I do not assess the 
impact on outcomes on t+1 because those are available only for the 2012 round of classifications 
and the number of observations is very small. 
Student body composition. I assess the impact of school classification in the enrollment of 
students across schools, tuition fees and student composition. To evaluate the impact on 
enrollment I use three measures. One considers the overall measure of enrollment in the school. 
The other measures are the specific enrollment rates in grades 1st and 7th. I focus on these grades 
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because they are the grades in which we see great movement between elementary schools in 
Chile. 
I assess the impact of school classification on students’ enrollment- and monthly-fees for 
private voucher schools. Private voucher schools are allowed to charge fees on top of the 
voucher for students since 1993. However, there is a restriction for priority students. If the school 
adopted the SEP law, then schools cannot charge tuition to these students. The enrollment- and 
monthly-fees are categorical variables, where 0 means the school is free, 1 means the school 
charges between 0 and 15 USD, 2 means the school charges between 15 and 37 USD, 3 means 
the school charges between 37 and 75 USD, 4 means the school charges between 75 and 150 
USD, 5 means schools charges above 150 USD (although none of the schools of the sample 
charged this much). I treat this outcome as continuous. This data is reported by the school. Data 
is not available for 2012, but it is for the year after. 
I also assess whether the classification of the school may have affected the socioeconomic 
composition of the school the following years, specifically, students’ socioeconomic level in 4th 
grade. The SES level of the school is a government constructed measure that classifies schools 
on four categories (low SES, mid low SES, mid SES, mid high and high SES). These categories 
are constructed from four variables: educational level of the mother, educational level of the 
father, monthly household income and schools’ vulnerability index. The three first measures are 
obtained from a parental questionnaire that is passed along with the SIMCE test. The fourth 
measure is a government vulnerability index55. Contrary to previous measures of SES levels of 
the schools in Chile, this measure is calculated every year with annually collected data. I 
                                                 
55 This index is the IVE-SINAE, calculated by JUNAEB (Junta Nacional de Auxilio Escolar y Becas). 
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transformed the categorical measure into a measure of change of SES category so that it 
represents changes in the SES group between the SES level used to classify the school and the 
SES level the years after. The variable could range from +3 if the school was a Low SES school 
on year t-1 and Mid- or High-SES level on year t, to -3 if it happened the other way around. A 
zero value would mean the school did not change its SES reference group. 
I also assess the impact on the number of beneficiary students. The number of beneficiary 
students in the school is a measure of socioeconomic composition of the school because only 
students from among the 40% poorest students are considered as such (a detailed description of 
who is considered a priority student can be found on footnote 17). 
Panel B of Table 20 present the average of all of these outcomes above and below the cutoff 
of “autonomous” category, and on Panel B of Table 21 for the “in recovery” cutoff. 
Teacher body composition.  To explore the impact of school classification on the situation of 
teacher I use two measures. The first measure is the number of teachers teaching in the school. 
The second measure is the number of hours teachers are hired to teach in the school. The means 
of these outcomes above and below the ICE threshold for “autonomous” classification are 
presented on Panel C of Table 20, and on Panel C of Table 21 for the “in recovery” cutoff. 
Data limitations 
One of the main concerns when using school level data is the confounding influence of mean 
reversion (or regression to the mean). Mean reversion means that if a variable was measured 
substantially above or below the mean on a first measurement, it is likely that in the second 
measurement it will score closer to the mean. Particularly sensitive to mean reversion are small 
schools. All else equal, smaller schools have mean scores with higher sampling variation and 
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thus are more likely to have a lucky year or a very poor year (Kane & Staiger, 2002; Chay, 
McEwan & Urquiola, 2005).  In order to address mean reversion, I take two precautions. First, I 
control for enrollment rates in all the models. Second, the models include the ICE index which in 
part is built from historical school performance (with scores up to 4 years prior to the 
classification the school receives on 2012).  
Another limitation is that to explore potential mechanism of the law, I use administrative 
data. The advantage of these data is that it is readily available for almost every school. However, 
it is for the most part a crude measure of some indicators, and there are several interesting 
indicators missing. For example, I do not have access to specific data on the number of students 
with special needs in 4th grade. I have the number of students with special needs in all the school, 
but not specific to 4th grade students. So the potential mechanism of the school of identifying 
students as having special needs (and therefore leaving their results out of the school average) to 
improve the school average will be tested only with an aggregate measure for the whole school. 
Another example of how the administrative data can be limited is that data available on the 
percentage of achievement of school improvement plans (that contain the percentage of 
completion of actions on curriculum management, school leadership, school climate and 
educational resource management) is not clear on what it reports and how it was collected56. This 
                                                 
56 For the first four years of the policy (2008-2011), the degree to which the actions of the school improvement plan 
were met was evaluated by a policy inspector, who then reported to the Ministry the percentage of accomplishment 
of the school improvement plan.  The data for 2012 is not clear how it was collected. Different staff from the 
Ministry would provide different responses on what is assessed and how was the data collected. For 2013, the 
Ministry does not provide any data on the level of achievement of the actions of the PME. From 2014 onwards, the 
Ministry adopted a different approach in the creation, implementation and evaluation of the PME in the realm of a 
greater school reform in Chile. 
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will not allow me to assess whether there is an impact of the classification on such school 
processes. 
There is also a specific limitation with the data available for 2012. There is no data about 
which schools are for-profit. Private voucher schools that are for-profit may behave in a different 
way than those that are not-for-profit. However, this data is available for year 2013. I perform a 
robustness check with data from 2013. I test this hypothesis using data for the for-profit 
distinction for the following year on the premise that there is not likely to be instability from year 
–to-year.  
In the next Chapter I present the results for the estimations of receiving the classification of 
“autonomous” and “in recovery” separately. For each I present the arguments and tests for a 





 Chapter 5 – Results 
5.1. Impact of receiving the classification of “autonomous”  
Specification choice and assumption check 
The fuzzy regression discontinuity relies on the assumptions of both the instrumental variables 
approach and the regression discontinuity approach.  The IV design generates unbiased estimates 
of the effect of school classification if the instrument is said to be “relevant”, i.e., there is a non-
zero association between instrument and treatment variable. Table 22 shows how predictive is 
the ICE index on whether the school is classified as “autonomous” on 2012. The table shows the 
first stage estimates from equation (5). Column (1) presents the estimates without covariates. The 
estimates in this column shows there is a significant and positive difference in the receipt of a 
classification of “autonomous” above and below the threshold.  All the regressors are jointly 
statistically significant (F=2885.91, p=0.000). Column (2) adds school characteristics as 
covariates (i.e., type of school, SES of the school, rural/urban and enrollment rates) 57. The 
addition of covariates does not affect much the estimated coefficients. This is not surprising 
considering the controls do not significantly change at the cutoff (explanation follows). Again, 
all the regressors are jointly statistically significant as well (F=2528.86; p=0.000).  The 
estimates of columns (1) and (2) show there is a jump and a kink in the relationship above and 
below the threshold. The jump indicates that receiving an ICE index equal or above zero –the 
centered threshold score in schools’ respective SES group- increases the probability of being 
classified as “autonomous” by 29 percent. The kink is represented by the coefficient of the 
interaction term that is positive and significant58. The jump and kink indicate that as schools have 
                                                 
57 This model is similar to the one in Table 14, column (10), but it has the addition of the interaction term. 
58 The coefficient of the kink is not quite interpretable in this linear probability model as the coefficient exceeds the 
zero-one range of the outcome. 
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higher ICE indices, the probability of the school receiving a classification of “autonomous” 
increases. Similar estimates appear when I analyze the 2013 round of school classification and 
for rounds 2012 and 2013 pooled together (see Table C.2.).   
Figure 3 shows the proportion of schools classified as “autonomous” on 2012 by the ICE 
index centered at the median of each SES group. The proportion of schools classified as 
“autonomous” is continuous near the cutoff on both sides, but discontinuous at the threshold. 
Note that on the left side of the graph the classification of schools as “autonomous” below the 
cutoff is zero; whereas above the cutoff the proportion of schools classified as “autonomous” 
increases as the ICE index of the school gets further away from the median of the school’s SES 
reference group. This may be a result of the classification formula as schools getting high ICE 
indices are also more likely to comply with the other classification rules (as they refer to SIMCE 
scores which is the main component of the ICE index). 
Another assumption of an IV is that potential outcomes are independent from the instrument, 
i.e., the instrument is exogenous. Whenever there is only one IV, this assumption is not testable. 
However, the models have more than one instrument (consider the interaction term between the 
running variable and the IV as second IV), thus, I test for overidentifying restrictions using the 
Sargan-Hansen test59. This tests the null hypothesis that all the instruments are valid. The statistic 
(x2 (1) =0.004, p=0.9514) indicates we do not reject the null hypothesis and therefore the 
overidentifying restriction is valid. 
                                                 
59 The Sargan-Hansen tests, tests the join null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term. 
This involves estimating the 2SLS with one instrument A, computing the residuals of the second stage, and then 
assessing the correlation between the residuals and the other instrument B. If correlated, then B is not a valid 
instrument. This proceeding is repeated with the other instrument. 
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One of the assumptions of the RD is that the cutoff score(s) that determine treatment is 
exogenous60. Although the school classification may incentivize schools to raise their 
classification scores or decrease the SES of the school prior to the classification of the schools, it 
is unlikely there was manipulation of the scores around the eligibility thresholds for three 
reasons. First, at the time of the administration of the tests, schools had no knowledge of the 
median test scores of their SES group (reference threshold). Second, tests are centrally scored. 
Third, as mentioned earlier, classification formulas are not easily interpretable.  
There is no direct way of testing whether schools can manipulate the running variable. 
However, McCrary (2008) proposes to plot the number of observations in bins and assess 
whether there is a discontinuity in the distribution of observations of the running variable at the 
threshold. A discontinuity would suggest there is some manipulation. If the incentive of the 
“autonomous” classification is really desirable, then perhaps we would find a big density of 
schools right above the threshold of the ICE index. Figure 4 presents the histogram. There 
appears to be a slightly lower density of schools with ICE index above the threshold of their SES 
group. McCrary (2008) density test61 suggests there might be weak evidence of a change in the 
density of the running variable on either side of the discontinuity (log difference in height: -0.14; 
p=.08). Because the running variable in this test is stacking all the schools’ ICE scores by SES 
centered at their specific thresholds, it could be hiding different density shapes in different SES 
groups. To be sure there is no manipulation I analyze the density of the running variable for the 
                                                 
60 Any evidence of manipulation of the running scores near the cutoff would question the RD design (Urquiola & 
Verhoogen, 2009). 
61 McCrary’s (2008) density test, tests the null hypothesis of continuity of the density of the running variable at the 
threshold. It entails two steps. In the first step it partitions the running variable into bins (where no bin includes 
points on both sides of the threshold) and calculates the number of observations per bin. The second step consists of 
a weighted local linear regression at each side of the threshold where the height of the bins is regressed on the 
midpoints of the bins. Then the parameter of interest is the log difference of the coefficients on the intercepts. 
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schools in different SES groups separately.  In Figure C.1. I show the estimated densities by SES 
group separately.  Although the figures for schools of mid-low SES and mid-SES show some 
discontinuities at the threshold favoring the lower SES, they are not statistically significant. In 
principle then, the regression discontinuity analysis conditional on school’s SES should reduce 
any effect of changes in SES levels. 
Another assumption of the RD is that the relationship between the outcome and running 
variable is modeled correctly. Two concerns arise on this matter. One is that the choice of 
bandwidth influences the results62. I use a bandwidth of 0.706 points on the ICE index from each 
side of the median of each SES group63 64. As a specification check, in the different columns of  
Table 23, I present the estimates run on samples with different bandwidths, i.e., including 
schools as far from the threshold as 1.2 points above the median of the SES group of reference 
and as close to the eligibility threshold as 0.5 points. When we compare the models horizontally 
in this table, the estimates illustrate the trade-off between precision and comparability. As the 
bandwidth of the sample narrows, the standard errors tend to grow. As the sample expands 
further away from the cutoff, the less comparable are the groups above and below the cutoff. 
However, the estimated effects do not differ much across the columns. A second concern is the 
polynomial choice. I use two strategies to select the polynomial order.  First, as suggested by Lee 
                                                 
62 The standard approach is to choose a bandwidth that minimizes the mean squared error of the RD point estimator 
(Skovron & Titiunik, 2015). This depends on the density, variance and curvature of the data near the cutoff (Scott-
Clayton, 2008). 
63 Following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) optimal bandwidth calculations of the first stage leads to bandwidths 
close to 0.3 for several outcomes, bandwidth that is too small to generate estimates.  Following Calonico, Cattaneo 
and Titiunik (2014), the bandwidth for several high-stakes outcomes are close to the bandwidth estimated for math 
test scores on year t of 0.706 (plus/minus 0.1). For simplicity, I use this bandwidth for all outcomes of the cohort of 
2012. I test whether the results are sensitive to the size of the bandwidth. Results do not vary much. 




and Lemieux (2009), I use the Akaike information criterion (AIC) of model selection65. Second, I 
assess the significance of the F-statistic as I add higher order polynomials into the models. I use a 
linear model66 as it presents the lowest AIC statistic, and adding higher order polynomials 
present F-statistics that are not significant.  As a specification check in the different rows of 
Table 23, I report a number of specifications to illustrate the robustness of the results.  
A third assumption is that there are no other factors confounded with the forcing variable 
(Schochet et al., 2010). This implies no other covariates should present a discontinuity at the 
threshold. This assumption is checked by examining the continuity of observable pre-treatment 
variables that could be related to potential outcomes. Table 24 presents the estimates of 𝛽1 from 
Equation 6 for several outcomes which are pre-treatment variables. None of them present a jump 
in the threshold. 
What is the impact of accountability pressure on high-stakes outcomes? 
I begin with the analysis of the impact of being classified as “autonomous” on high-stakes 
outcomes. Before proceeding to the regression results, it is useful to examine graphical 
representations of the effects of school classification. Figure 5 plots high-stakes outcomes, 
specifically the average math (panels A and D), language (panels B and E), and science (C and 
F) SIMCE scores on year t and t+1 by the ICE scores in reference to the median of the SES 
group of the school (represented by the vertical line). On either side of the threshold I added a 
line representing a local linear regression but without any covariates. Overall, the six panels 
show a positive association between test scores and the ICE score. However, none of the panels 
                                                 
65 The Akaike information criterion measures the relative goodness of fit of a model. Is the estimated residual 
variance for the model (Jacob, Zhu, Somers & Bloom, 2012). 
66 According to Angrist and Pischke (2009), as the sample gets smaller by trimming it closer to the threshold, the 




show discontinuities at the threshold and no significant changes in the slopes of the linear 
predictions on the two sides of the threshold. 
Before proceeding to the regression results I will explain the main format of the following 
tables. Tables 25 through 29 follow the same format. Each row focuses on a different outcome, 
with each cell containing the estimated parameter 𝛽1 of Equation 6, the robust standard error on 
parenthesis and the sample size. The first column contains the linear model presented in 
Equation 6 without covariates. Covariates are included in the second column. The covariates 
included are the type of school, whether the school is urban or not, enrollment rates in 4th grade 
and the SES level of the school. The first two columns consider the full sample, whereas any 
other added column to the right considers sub-samples detailed by the column heading. All the 
models in the columns that contain subsample analysis control for covariates. The models for all 
outcomes were calculated using OLS.   
Table 25 lists a set of high-stakes outcomes for the year the school received the classification 
of “autonomous” (t) and a year after (t+1)67.  The models in columns (1) show positive effects of 
receiving a classification of “autonomous” on math, language and science test scores, both the 
year of the classification and one year later. In column (2) I add covariates. The inclusion of 
covariates does not change the point estimates significantly, but decrease the standard errors. 
Point estimates for schools on the margin of the threshold range between 0.25 to 2.72, which is 
an effect size between 0.005 and 0.05. However, the effect is never statistically different from 
zero (with or without covariates). I found that the smallest impact that would be statistically 
                                                 
67 Schools receive the 2012 classifications on November 2011. The academic year for 2012 goes from March to 
December. On October 2012 SIMCE tests are passed to 4th grade students.  
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significant in this regression discontinuity analysis ranged from 0.12 to 0.16 (see Panel A in 
Table C.6.).  
I performed robustness checks with other cohorts of data. In Table C.3., columns (1) and (2) 
in the upper panel, we find similar results for the cohort of 2013. Although the estimates are 
sometimes positive and other negative for high-stakes outcomes the year the school received the 
classification, the effect is not statistically different from zero. To further increase power I 
pooled together the cohort of 2012 and 2013 and added fixed effects per year to account per any 
cohort trend on SIMCE scores. The resulting estimates are presented in Table C.4. The effects 
for all SIMCE scores the same year the school received the classification are positive, with point 
estimates ranging from 0.18 to 1.69. These estimates are not statistically different from zero68. 
The lack of evidence of impact on academic outcomes is consistent with studies of 
accountability pressure where, overall, schools receiving good accountability grades are not 
responsive to accountability pressure (Rockoff & Turner, 2008; Weiner, Donaldson & 
Dougherty, 2016). This apparent lack of response is quite different from schools receiving failing 
grades, where the literature shows threatened schools seem to positively respond to those grades. 
                                                 
68 I also did the exercise of estimating the models using as an instrumental variable the other rating scores that 
determine the school classification. Of course the estimates of these models affect schools that are close to those 
specific frontiers, and therefore they are not directly comparable. Nevertheless, if there was a frontier that for 
repeated years showed an impact on outcomes, then we could think  that there is a specific subsample of schools 
(defined by those induced by the compliance of that specific rating score to be classified as “autonomous”) for 
which accountability pressure has an effect. The results of this exercise are presented in Table C.5.  On the top of 
each column the rating score used as IV is displayed. Each cell contains the coefficient of interest of the second 
stage equation for all the outcomes listed in each row. The bandwidth used for the estimation of each IV is listed at 
the bottom of the column. The estimates suggest none of the types of rating scores consistently generates an impact 
on the outcomes. Only the models that use the IV of column (6), which is whether the proportion of students scoring 
above 250 points is above the median of the schools’ SES group on year t-4 (which corresponds to year 2008), 
shows impacts on the outcomes. The other IV’s that also use to the proportion of students scoring above 250, but for 
other years, shows no impact on high-stakes outcomes. 
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Different responses may be driven by the stakes associated with the grades, i.e., by how much 
schools value the associated rewards or how much they fear the associated sanctions. 
The lack of evidence of impact of receiving a good grade on academic outcomes is similar to 
the evidence found for another incentive program set in place in Chile. The SNED program is a 
collective incentive for teachers if the school where they work achieves good results in 
comparison to schools with similar SES -similar to how schools are classified in the SEP 
accountability scheme-69. An evaluation of this program by Rau and Contreras (2009) shows 
schools winning the SNED recognition does not have a consistent impact on schools’ academic 
outcomes; however there is some impact on one of the tested cohorts70.  
Heterogeneous effects of receiving the classification of “autonomous” 
I examine not only the local average effect of accountability pressure, but also explore potential 
heterogeneous effects for groups where there is some suspicion they may react differently to the 
pressure. First, I assess whether the effect of school classification differs depending on the 
classification the school received the year prior. Schools that are just below the classification 
threshold the year before may have more incentives to perform better than the schools that are 
just above the threshold. Second, I divide schools according to the average socioeconomic levels 
of the families. There is evidence that the introduction of the SEP law had a greater impact on 
                                                 
69 The SNED and the SEP incentive schemes for high achieving schools differ in that (i) the beneficiary of the 
reward in the case of the SNED are individual teachers whereas in the SEP, the beneficiary is the school as an 
organization, (ii) the SNED’s incentive is offering an annual bonus to teachers of almost 70 percent of a monthly 
salary, and the SEP does not offer more resources to the school, but more autonomy to allocate those resources, (iii) 
schools are also classified as ‘winning’ the SNED or receiving the classification of “autonomous” differently. 
70 Rau and Contreras (2009) use a regression discontinuity approach to assess the impact of winning a SNED award. 
They found a positive and significant impact only in one of the five cohorts tested (2005/2006). 
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schools that enroll students from lower SES; for schools that enroll students from higher SES the 
impact was negligible (Mizala & Torche, 2013).  
Third, I assess whether private voucher schools that are for-profit behave differently than 
private voucher schools that are not-for-profit when they face accountability pressure. Schools 
that are for profit may face different incentives than non-for-profit schools (Peterson, 1974; 
Fernandez, 2009); and there is evidence in Chile that for-profit and non-for-profit schools impact 
differently the outcomes of the students study (Zubizarreta, Paredes & Rosenbaum, 2014)71. For 
example, for-profit schools may have stronger incentives to improve their test scores, as being 
classified as “autonomous” gives schools more discretion to allocate resources.  Although all 
extra resources have to be reported as being allocated in activities associated with curriculum 
management, leadership, school climate and resource management, the law does not forbids 
schools to substitute other funds allocated into those areas.  This means schools could substitute 
the funding source for those areas. For-profit schools could then be able to make more profits if 
they receive the classification of “autonomous” rather than “emergent” or “in recovery”. 
Finally, I assess whether the effect of school classification differs depending on the 
classification other schools receive within the same municipality. Some suggest that 
accountability systems may be more effective in education markets that are least competitive 
(Deming & Figlio, 2016). However, this may not be the case in a context where there is school 
choice. There is evidence that in such contexts the impact of school classification may be 
                                                 
71 The authors compare the academic outcomes of students that switch from a public school to a private voucher 
school for-profit to those students that switched to a private voucher school not-for-profit. They use SIMCE data 
from Santiago of students who attended 8th grade on the public school and their SIMCE scores on 10th grade in the 
new private voucher school. They found students that switched to a private voucher school that is not-for-profit 
performed 0.1 and 0.2 standard deviations (on language and math tests respectively) above the group of students that 
attended a for-profit school. 
 84 
 
moderated by the level of competence among the schools, with higher impacts on more 
competitive markets (Weiner, Donaldson & Dougherty, 2016). 
To examine heterogeneity in the effect of receiving a classification of “autonomous” I run 
separate regressions for different subsamples. Table 25 in columns (3) and (4) show the 
estimates of two subsamples of schools, those that received an “autonomous” classification the 
year prior, and those that did not receive a classification of “autonomous” the prior year, as these 
two sets of schools may face different incentives to improve. The estimated coefficients on both 
these samples are again positive, but not statistically significant. 
In Table 25, columns (5) to (8) restrict the sample to homogeneous groups by SES. Overall 
none of the estimates is statistically different from zero. However, it is worth looking at the signs 
of the effects. High SES schools show consistently negative coefficients. When looking at the 
impact on math test scores the year of the classification, the point estimate suggests that on 
average, schools that received a classification of “autonomous” achieved five points less than 
those schools that just missed the classification of “autonomous”. Similar results suggest the 
estimates of language and science test scores. The magnitude of the effect seems to slightly 
decrease for the following year in all the subject areas. These results could indicate high SES 
schools take a rest once they are classified as “autonomous” or perhaps that there is some 
regression to the mean. The impact on mid-low SES and mid-SES subsamples seems to be 
consistently positive, although quite small, and again nothing statistically different from zero. 




Finally, the columns (9) and (10) of Table 25 show the estimates for schools in highly 
competitive municipalities and in less competitive municipalities. As Weiner, Donaldson and 
Dougherty (2016) suggest, schools in more competitive local contexts may put more effort in 
earning a distinction. These distinctions may help schools attract more students to enroll. 
Following Weiner and colleagues (2016), I consider a municipality to be highly competitive if 
the share of schools classified as “autonomous” in the municipality is equal or greater than 0.272.  
The estimates suggest the impact of receiving the classification of “autonomous” in a highly 
competitive context is small and positive, but not statistically different from zero. The impact of 
an “autonomous” classification on a less competitive context is close to zero, but again not 
statistically significant. These findings are contrary to what Weiner and colleagues (2016) found 
for schools on highly competitive contexts in Rhode Island, where schools that just missed the 
good qualification increased their test scores. 
Using the 2013 cohort, I also estimate the impact of school classification on high-stakes 
outcomes on private voucher schools that are for-profit and those that are not-for-profit.  The 
evidence is presented on Table C.3. in columns (3) and (4). The estimates indicate the response 
of both types of schools to accountability pressure is not statistically different from zero. 
What is the impact of accountability pressure on low-stakes outcomes? 
I next assess whether there is any impact on low-stakes grades. I consider 8th grade as a low-
stakes grade because there are no consequences for the school enacted by the government. This 
does not mean that the achievement of the school in 8th grade may not be considered as high-
                                                 
72 Figure C.2. presents a scatterplot of the share of schools in a municipality that receive the classification of 
“autonomous”. The horizontal line divides the plot between those municipalities that have a share of 20% or more of 
schools classified as “autonomous”. The plot shows there is enough variation of the share of schools classified as 
“autonomous” within the municipalities. 
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stakes for other purposes. In fact, 8th grade achievement may be high-stakes for parental decision 
to choose schools.  Furthermore, it seems likely that any impact on 4th grade outcomes may, in 
the long term, be reflected in 8th grade test scores, as student learning is more or less cumulative 
(Gilraine, 2016). 
Table 26 presents the estimates of the impact of accountability pressure on math, language 
and science test scores on 8th grade, in all the schools within the 0.706 bandwidth. The impact of 
being classified as “autonomous” on math, language and science tests scores the year after the 
classification73 is no different from zero.  The minimum detectable effect size ranged between 
0.14 and 0.15 (see Panel B, Table C.6.). As robustness check the impact of accountability 
pressure on low-stakes outcomes using data from the 2013 cohort. The estimates are presented in 
the lower panel of Table C.3. The estimates in column (1) show there are some positive and 
significant effects favoring schools classified as “autonomous”, those differences disappear when 
I control for covariates in column (2). 
These results are consistent with the theory of incentives, as it predicts that schools may put 
effort on rewarded outcomes and not in other outcomes unless they are complementary to the 
rewarded outcomes (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991). In comparison with the accumulated 
empirical evidence where mixed results are found, the results found in this study are not 
surprising.  
If school accountability increases incentivized or non-incentivized outcomes, what 
mechanisms drive those improvements?  
                                                 
73 8th grade was not tested on 2012, and therefore there are no low-stakes test scores for year t. 
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Making a mechanism evaluation could seem irrelevant if the previous results have shown the 
policy had no impact on the expected outcomes. However, understanding the policy’s 
mechanisms can help better understand the impacts of its design or the moderators of its impact 
(Ludwig, Kling & Mullainathan, 2011).  
The accountability policy in Chile had clear mechanisms through which it wanted to affect 
the outcomes. The spirit of the policy was that schools would improve their results by defining 
and implementing clear guidelines and actions to improve curriculum management, school 
leadership, school climate and educational resource management. Data on these areas is not 
available.  However, as discussed earlier in Chapter 2, the empirical evidence on other countries 
shows there are several other potential mechanisms through which schools can improve their 
outcomes. In this section I explore several of those mechanisms. Because I have already shown 
there is no impact on high- or low-stakes test scores, the purpose of this section is not to explain 
why those test scores could have significantly improved. But the purpose of this section is to 
assess whether schools facing accountability pressure may have activated some mechanisms to 
improve the high-stakes test scores (even if that did not have an impact on test scores). 
There are several changes schools can make to deal with the accountability pressure. They 
can improve school quality as they improve the performance measure, or they can simply affect 
the performance measure without really impacting learning. Some of the strategies identified in 
the literature in Chapter 2 include removing low-achieving students from the pool of test takers, 
narrowing of the curriculum, focusing on marginal students, and increasing instructional 
expenditures. There is also some evidence of teacher and student mobility across schools. In this 
section I perform an exploratory analysis of some of these mechanisms. 
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School behavioral response.  Under accountability pressure schools have an incentive to prevent 
low-achieving students to take the tests or to classify more students as having special needs so 
that their tests scores do not count against the school. I assess whether the classification of the 
school affects the number of students that take the SIMCE test in 4th grade. If schools that just 
missed the cutoff were trying to leave low performing students without tests, then we would find 
a positive coefficient favoring the schools classified as “autonomous”. The first two rows of 
Table 27 show the actual estimates of the impact of receiving a classification of “autonomous” 
the year of the classification and the year after on the number of students taking the tests in 4th 
grade. Column (1) shows the estimated effects without controlling for covariates, column (2) 
shows the effects controlling for covariates. The difference in outcomes between schools 
receiving the “autonomous” classification and the other classifications is positive as expected, 
but not statistically significant. When assessing whether there is any differential impact due to 
the different levels of pressure the school may face by the classification the school got the 
previous year, shown in columns (3) and (4), there also does not seem to be a significant 
difference between schools receiving the classification of “autonomous”, and the other schools. 
I also assess whether there is an impact on the number of students considered to have special 
needs. If schools right below the cutoff wanted to remove from the pool of tested students those 
with special needs, then we would expect to find a negative coefficient for the “autonomous” 
schools. Rows 3 and 4 on Table 27 show the estimated effects of this measure. The effect 
displayed in columns (1) and (2) shows the number of students classified as having special needs 
varies from differences that are one year negative and one year positive and nothing consistently 
and statistically different from zero. However, these findings should be considered carefully, as 
the number of students with special needs is measured for the whole school and not 4th grade in 
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particular. Therefore, it is possible the overall measure hides imbalances in different grades. The 
estimates in columns (3) and (4) also show there is no impact on the number of students 
classified as having special needs between schools above and below the threshold facing 
different pressure. 
Just as schools may have an incentive to prevent low-achieving students to take the test or to 
classify more students as having special needs, schools may also have an incentive to retain low-
achieving students the year prior to the grade the high-stakes test is applied. Therefore I assess 
the impact of school classification on the number of students retained in 3th grade. If schools that 
just missed the “autonomous” classification were retaining more students in third grade, then we 
would expect to find a negative coefficient for the “autonomous” schools. Rows 5 and 6 in Table 
27 show the estimated effects. The estimated coefficients are negative but not statistically 
significant. Because some low-achieving students may not be retained in 3th grade, but may 
drop-out instead, I also assess the impact of the classification on the number of students 
approved in 3th grade. This measure represents the total enrollment in 3th grade minus the 
retained students and those that dropped out. If schools that just missed the classification 
threshold were trying to achieve their test scores by pushing away low-achieving students or 
retaining them in 3th grade, then we may see that they decreased the number of approved 
students. Thus, we would expect a positive and significant effect for the “autonomous” schools. 
However, the estimated effects shown in rows 7 and 8 in Table 27 show a negative impact, but 
not statistically different from zero.  
Following the same rationale as explained earlier, schools may face the pressure of pushing 
out of high-stakes grades low-achieving students. This may be reflected in a greater number of 
students switching schools the year prior to 4th grade, altering the distribution of students across 
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schools. I assess whether there are differences between schools classified as “autonomous” and 
the other schools regarding the number of students that switch schools in 3th grade the year the 
school received the classification and the year after. Rows 9 and 10 of Table 27 show the 
estimated impacts. None of the differences are significantly different from zero.  
Under accountability pressure schools also have a strong incentive of allocating their efforts 
on students who are near proficiency thresholds. I assess the impact of school classification on 
the percentage of students scoring above 250 and 300 test scores relative to the median of the 
school’s SES group. This outcome may also be considered as high-stakes considering it is also a 
determinant of the classification the schools get. A school that just missed the classification of 
“autonomous” may try to get such classification the following year by increasing the percentage 
of students scoring above 250 or 300 SIMCE points. Rows 11 to 14 of Table 27 show the impact 
of accountability pressure on the percentage of students scoring above 250 and 300 test scores 
relative to the median of the school’s SES group. The estimates show the difference between 
school above and below the threshold are not statistically different from zero, for all schools and 
differentially for schools that may face more or less pressure given their prior year classification.  
Under pressure, schools may also work in improving school practices. I assess the impact of 
school classification on several indicators of school improvement. One measure of school 
improvement is the ICE index. This measure should be considered carefully, because it is also a 
high-stakes measure, as it determines the classification the school gets the following year. 
Schools may have the incentive to improve the ICE index without actually improving the school 
practices. This could be particularly the case for one sub-scale of the index that is not a measure 
of the outcomes of the school (such as SIMCE scores, approval rates, retention rates), but a 
measure of the perception of school processes (such as the SNED initiative subscale), which 
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come from the responses of the ‘school principal’ to a survey. Thus, I assess the impact of the 
classifications of the school in all the sub-scales of the ICE index separately. Results are in Table 
27, rows 15 to 26. Receiving a classification of “autonomous” does not affect the ICE scores 
significantly, and none of the sub-scores of the ICE index are significantly different from zero.  
Lastly, I assess the subscale of teacher evaluations which is an index of the balance 
between teachers that where considered excellent or competent and those that are considered 
incompetent by the teacher evaluation system. Note that the sample size of the models assessing 
these outcomes decreases around a 40%. This happens because only public schools have teacher 
evaluations. The estimated effect of receiving the classification of “autonomous” on teacher 
evaluations is in the last two rows of Table 27. The effect is not different from zero. 
Student body composition. In an accountability system the classifications or grades schools get 
can affect the way parents choose schools for their children and it also may affect the way 
schools choose their students. There are three ways in which parents can respond (Hart & Figlio, 
2015). First, they could not respond to new information about the quality of the school. Second, 
new information about the quality of the schools may affect the choice of parents from low-SES 
backgrounds who did not have much information prior to the provision of this new information. 
Third, parents from high-SES backgrounds could have more capacity to respond to the provision 
of new information.  
There are also different ways in which a school can react to accountability pressure. It is 
possible schools receiving better qualifications are in higher demand. This could mean the school 
enrolls more students, or gets more selective in terms of the academic background of incoming 
students, or starts charging more fees, or a combination of all these. In the particular case of the 
Chilean context, it is possible that schools who are receiving lower classifications enroll students 
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with lower SES background, as this will potentially increase their classification  for the 
following year (because the classification formulas are relative to the median of schools with 
similar SES). 
Table 28 shows the estimates of the impact of receiving a classification of “autonomous” on 
a series of outcomes that reflect student mobility between schools. The first two rows of the table 
shows the impact on the total enrollment of the school the year the school was classified, and the 
year after. Changes in enrollment levels may mirror both changes in parental decisions to choose 
schools as well as differences in schools’ capacity to attract students. Column (2) shows there is 
a minor positive difference favoring “autonomous” schools; however this difference is not 
statistically significant. Now if we look at columns (3) and (4) of Table 28, I estimated the 
impact separately for schools were “autonomous” the previous year and those that were not. The 
estimates indicate that schools that face more pressure because they were not “autonomous” the 
previous year have a positive impact on the number of students enrolled, whereas schools that 
face less pressure have a negative impact. Nonetheless, none of these estimates is statistically 
significant. This pattern is also present in enrollment in 1st and 7th grade, which are the grades in 
primary education where we see greater movement of students between schools.  
Schools receiving good classifications may become more selective by increasing their price74 
or by becoming more selective in terms of the socioeconomic level of their students. I assess the 
impact of receiving a classification of “autonomous” on enrollment- and monthly-fees for the 
year after the school received the classification (there is no data available for the fees charged on 
                                                 
74 Schools in the SEP law are not allowed to charge fees to priority students. Therefore, it is possible schools 
increase the enrollment- and monthly-fees to all the other students not only to be more selective, but to compensate 
for such restriction. 
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2012). Only private voucher schools are allowed to ask parents for additional fees since 1993. 
For this reason I restrict the sample to only private voucher schools. The impact of school 
classification on these outcomes is estimated using OLS, and the estimates are presented in rows 
9 and 10 of Table 28. I find no evidence of differences in the amount of enrollment- or monthly-
fees charged to parents a year after the school received the classification of “autonomous”.  
The four bottom lines of Table 28 show the impact of receiving a classification of 
“autonomous” on the socioeconomic composition of the schools, as measured by changes on 
students’ SES at 4th grade and the number of beneficiary students on the whole school. Row 11 
and 12 from Table 28 shows the impact of receiving a classification of “autonomous” on changes 
in the SES level of the school the year the school is classified as “autonomous” and changes 
towards the year after. These models do not control for the baseline level of SES of the school to 
avoid a spurious correlation. The point estimates are negative the year of the classification and 
positive the year right after, however they are not statistically different from zero. 
The last two rows of Table 28 show the effect of receiving the classification of 
“autonomous” on the number of beneficiary students. There is no evidence of changes in the 
number of beneficiary students the year the school gets the classification of “autonomous” or the 
year after.  
Overall, the evidence shows there is no evidence of impact on student mobility between 
schools and composition of the schools. These results are consistent with the recent work of 
Mizala and Urquiola (2013), who show that rewarding schools for their good performance with 
the SNED program has no impact on subsequent schools’ market outcomes such as enrollment 
rates and tuition.  
 94 
 
Teacher body composition. The way teachers move between schools can be affected by the 
classification schools get. These movements can be driven by changes in the demand for teachers 
and/or changes in the supply of teachers. Low performing schools may want to hire more 
teachers or the same teachers for more hours. Teachers may prefer to migrate to high performing 
schools as there they may be required to put less effort into teaching.  
Table 29 presents estimates of the impact of receiving a classification of “autonomous” on 
the number of teachers who are teaching in the school the year the school receives the 
classification and the year after, and also the number of hours those teachers are teaching. I find 
no evidence that receiving a classification of ‘autonomous” is associated with differences in the 
number of teachers teaching in a school, nor in the number of hours taught. Nevertheless, this 
exploratory analysis should be considered carefully. These only assess the quantity of teachers, 
but not their quality. There are several other ways in which schools can respond to school 
classification regarding their teachers. For example, low performing schools could have decided 
to offer more teacher training without altering the number of hours teachers are hired.  
While the literature mentioned above indicates that schools and families may respond in 
several different ways to incentives, I find no evidence of any type of reaction to schools 
receiving a good classification. However, this exploratory analysis of potential mechanisms 
should be considered carefully. The administrative data used is very gross. Educational 
improvement may require more sensitive strategies not captured by these administrative data. 
In the following section I present the results of schools receiving a classification of “in 
recovery”. 
5.2. Impact of receiving the classification of “in recovery” 
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Specification choice and assumption check 
Following the same rationale as in the previous section, here I test assumptions of the 
instrumental variable and regression discontinuity approaches. I first start with the assumptions 
of the IV design. Table 30 presents evidence that the instrument has a strong association with the 
treatment variable. The table shows estimates for equation 7 estimated with a linear probability 
model. Column (1) shows the estimates without controlling for covariates. When covariates are 
added on column (2) the estimates do not change much. The estimates indicate that having an 
ICE index below zero –the centered cutoff score in schools’ in 2012 and 2013- increases the 
probability of being classified as “in recovery” by 0.9. This is consistent with Figure 6 showing 
the ICE index generates almost a sharp discontinuity at the threshold. The exogeneity of the 
instrument is tested using the Sargan-Hansen test. The statistic (x2 (1) =0.085, p=0.7703) 
indicates we do not reject the null hypothesis and therefore the overidentifying restriction is 
valid. 
Some of the assumptions of the RD design are that the cutoff score that determines the 
treatment is exogenous, that there are no confounded factors with the running variable, and that 
the relationship between the running variable and the outcomes is modelled correctly. There are 
several reasons to believe there is no manipulation of the running variable, i.e., that the treatment 
is exogenous. First, 2012 is the first year in which schools were classified as “in recovery”, so 
schools may have just a broad sense of the relative position they have from the cutoff, but not an 
exact knowledge of their position. It is also not likely that schools manipulated the running score 
for the 2013 classification, because the classification considers multiple scores collected before 
the school received the classification of 2012. Second, tests are centrally scores. Third, unless the 
schools were able to see the technical reports about how schools are classified (which are only 
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available through the Transparency Law requests), they did not know how the ICE was index 
used to determine the “in recovery” classification. To complement these arguments, Figure 7 
shows the density of schools around the threshold of the ICE index. There is no evidence of a 
discontinuity that would suggest some manipulation. 
To assess whether the relationship between the running variable and the outcomes is 
modelled correctly I follow the same procedures as in the previous section. I perform robustness 
checks for bandwidth selection and for polynomial choice. Table 31 present alternative 
specifications for the outcome of test scores at the end of the year the school received the 
classifications. Different columns present samples with different bandwidths, as narrow as ±0.3, 
and as width as ±1. Different rows show the results for models with the addition of higher order 
polynomials of the running variable. The cells present the estimated coefficient 𝜗1 of Equation 8 
and its robust standard errors. The cells also contain the F-statistic (and corresponding p-value) 
for the addition of higher order polynomials and AIC to test for model selection. Overall, the 
estimated coefficients do not differ much horizontally or vertically, and almost none of them are 
statistically significant. The first cell in column (1) shows a slightly significant impact, but this 
seems to be drawn by the undue influence of observations far away from the cutoff (as seen in 
the left side of Figure 6). Regarding the order of the polynomial, I decide to use a linear model as 
it presents the lowest AIC statistic for all the samples with different bandwidths, and adding 
higher order polynomials have F-statistics that are not statistically significant for any of the 
samples. 
I test whether there could be any other factor confounded with the forcing variable, which 
implies that no covariate should jump at the threshold. In Table 32 I present estimates of 𝜗1 from 
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Equation 8 pre-treatment variables. There is no evidence that any of the pre-treatment variables 
present a discontinuity at the threshold. 
What is the impact of accountability pressure on high-stakes outcomes? 
Figure 8 plot the raw means of schools’ SIMCE scores on math, language and science at the end 
of the year the schools received the school classification by the ICE index, upon linear 
predictions (without any covariate). Overall the three panels show a positive association between 
test scores and the ICE index. The linear prediction of Panel A shows a small jump at the 
threshold; however, the dispersion of the observations is quite large. The other two panels do not 
show jumps at the thresholds or changes in the slopes of the linear predictions.  
The regression results are presented in Table 33. This table and the following have similar 
formats. Each row focuses on a different outcome. Within each cell is the estimated parameter 𝜗1 
from Equation 8, the robust standard error and the sample size. For outcomes in year t, the 
models include data from years 2012 and 2013 with a fixed effect per year. For outcomes in year 
t+1, the models include only data from the 2012. The models for all outcomes are calculated 
using OLS.  
Table 33 shows the estimates of the impact of receiving the classification of “in recovery” on 
math, language and science test scores in 4th grade. Column (1) shows baseline estimates, 
whereas column (2) adds covariates. The estimated coefficients are positive for the year of the 
classification, ranging between 4.75 and 1.52.  However, none of these estimates are 
significantly different from zero. The estimates for test scores the year after the school received 
the classification are larger; however, the standard errors are also larger. There are no effects 
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statistically different from zero. The minimum detectable effect size values varied between 0.13 
and 0.21 (see Panel A, Table C.7.). 
This evidence is not consistent with what has been found on the literature of accountability 
pressure, where schools classified as low achieving show a positive and significant response 
reflected on high-stakes outcomes (Figlio & Rouse, 2006; Rockoff & Turner, 2008; Chiang, 
2009; Allen & Burgess, 2012; Deming et al., 2013; Hussain, 2015). However, it seems such 
evidence is a result of more radical treatments than receiving the “in recovery” classification in 
Chile. Here are some examples. In New York City and Texas, low performing schools face the 
threat of leadership change and/or possible closure of the schools (Rockoff & Turner, 2008; 
Deming et al., 2013). In England, low performing schools are subject to the stigma of the public 
judgement and more intense interventions like changes in the leadership team, school governing 
board, as well as increased oversight from the inspectors (Allen & Burgess, 2012; Hussain, 
2015). These same threats built into the accountability policies from New York City, Texas and 
England were designed into the SEP law in Chile; however the actual enactment of these threats 
was postponed by the creation of the Quality Agency of Education until 2020.  
Another example comes from Florida. Low performing schools in Florida not only face the 
stigma of receiving a low classification, and the fear of replacement of the ‘school principal’, but 
also faced the fear that students may leave as they were offered vouchers to attend other schools 
(Figlio & Rouse, 2006; Chiang, 2009). In Chile, low performing schools also face the threat of 
students leaving because we also have a voucher system. However, the difference between 
Florida and Chile is on how widely available was the information on schools’ classifications to 
the parents. In Florida, the grading system is quite simple to understand, and the grades schools 
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received were widely published. In Chile the information on school classifications is not clear 
what it means and is not widely available to parents.  
 
What is the impact of accountability pressure on low-stakes outcomes? 
I next assess whether receiving the classification of “in recovery” affects academic performance 
of grades which results are not attached to consequences in this accountability policy. These are 
the results of 8th grade on the SIMCE test. Due to the peculiarities of the evaluation calendar for 
8th grade there is no data on their test scores on 2012. For this reason I do not use the 2012 and 
2013 cross-sections pooled together.  I assess the impact of receiving the classification of “in 
recovery” on 2012 on the outcomes of 2013, and the impact of receiving the classification of “in 
recovery” on 2013 on the outcomes of the same year. 
Table 34 presents the estimates of 𝜗1 of Equation 8.  The estimates of receiving a 
classification of “in recovery” on 2012 indicate there is some positive and significant impact on 
8th grade test scores on math the year after the classification. The point estimate for schools on 
the margin of the threshold is 7.04, which is equivalent to an effect size of 0.14.  The impact on 
other subject scores is always positive, but not statistically different from zero. The minimum 
detectable effect size values varied between 0.12 and 0.21 (see Panel B, Table C.7.). 
The estimates of the impact of receiving the “in recovery” classification in 2013 on test 
scores on that same year are presented on columns (3) and (4) of Table 34. All the estimated 
coefficients are negative; however none of them is statistically significant.  
Overall, these estimates are consistent with the theory of incentives, as effort may not be put 
into outcomes that are not rewarded.  
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Regarding the small impact found on 8th grade math scores should be considered carefully. 
The presence of one significant coefficient among hundreds estimated does not necessarily mean 
there is a relationship between accountability pressure and school outcomes. The criterion of 
95% confidence suggests that if the relationship between accountability pressure and school 
outcomes was truly unrelated, we would still expect to find a 5% of the estimated coefficients to 
be statistically significant due to chance alone. The coefficient found to be significant most likely 
is within this 5% of chance. 
If school accountability increases incentivized or non-incentivized outcomes, what 
mechanisms drive those improvements?  
Following the same rationale as in the previous section, I explore potential impact on school 
behavior, student and teacher mobility across schools. The same hypothesis and explanations of 
the outcomes apply.  I only assess the impact on outcomes the year of the school classification 
because I have data for the outcomes of both the round of 2012 and 2013. 
School behavioral response. Schools classified as “in recovery” may find more pressure to 
prevent low achieving students to take the 4th grade SIMCE test. If that was the case, then we 
would expect a positive coefficient favoring schools “in recovery” in the number of students 
classified as having special needs, the number of students retained in 3th grade, the number of 
students switching schools in 3th grade, and a negative coefficient in the number of test taken 
and the number of students approved in 3th grade. In Table 35 I show the estimated coefficients. 
For all of the outcomes the sign of the coefficients has the expected sign; however, none of them 
are statistically different from zero. 
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Under pressure, low achieving schools may face pressure to focus on the students who are 
near the proficiency thresholds as defined by the classification rules. In the SEP law, not only 
average scores matters, but also the proportion of students scoring above 250 and 300 points in 
4th grade SIMCE. Rows 7 and 8 in Table 35 show the estimated impact of receiving the 
classification of “in recovery” on these outcomes. There is no evidence of a significant 
difference between schools “in recovery” and schools receiving other classifications. 
Low performing schools may also consider focusing on increasing the scores in the 
classification rules so that would help them classify in a higher category the following years. I 
assess the impact on the ICE index and all it sub-scores: SNED initiative, SNED improvement, 
SNED integration, approval rates, retention rates and teacher evaluations. Table 35 in rows 8 to 
14 show no evidence that receiving the classification of “in recovery” impacted any of the 
subscales the year of the classification. There is some statistically significant impact on retention 
rates; however, the difference is not very meaningful in practice. 
Student body composition. Schools may see the mobility of the students affected by the 
classification they get. Table 36 shows estimates of the impact of receiving a classification of “in 
recovery” on total school enrollment, and 1st and 7th grade enrollment. The impact on total 
enrollment is positive, and negative in 1st and 7th grade. However, none of the coefficients is 
statistically different from zero. 
I also assess whether the socioeconomic composition of the school may be altered by the 
classification of the school. The last two rows of Table 36 show “in recovery” schools slightly 
decrease the SES level of the school and slight increase the number of poor (beneficiary) 
students enrolled. None of the coefficients are statistically significant. 
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Teacher body composition. School classified “in recovery” may invest in more teachers or in 
hiring the same teachers for more hours to improve the results of the students. Table 37 presents 
estimates for the impact on those outcomes. The evidence shows there is a positive impact on the 
number of teachers teaching, and the number of hours they are hired to teach. However, the 
impacts are not statistically significant. 
Overall, I find no evidence of schools modifying their behavior, composition of their students 
or teachers to improve their results. The same caveats expressed in the previous section apply. 




 Chapter 6 - Summary and discussion  
Summary 
In the last two decades, school accountability policies seem to be the leading proposed solution 
to improve school quality.  The idea is that the presence of standards, test-based information, and 
performance-based consequences will generate a strong incentive for schools to improve their 
performance. However, the accumulated evidence of the effectiveness of school accountability 
policies is discouraging. The effectiveness evidence shows a positive but mild impact on 
students’ high-stakes outcomes, with effect sizes ranging from 0.04 to 0.33. The impact on low-
stakes outcomes is not conclusive, suggesting school accountability may not be impacting true 
learning. Studies about the mechanisms that drive the impact on high-stakes outcomes mostly 
focus on changes in the school behavioral response. Fewer studies have examined teacher and 
student mobility across schools as an effect of the school accountability programs. The evidence 
from other studies show the increases in high-stakes outcomes may be due to non-desired 
behavior of the schools such as narrowing of the curriculum, manipulation of the pool of test-
takers, increased student retention, increased number of special education placements, and focus 
on marginal students.  
A major gap in our understanding of school accountability concerns whether there is any 
impact on students’ performance in a context where parents are free to choose schools for their 
offspring, and what mechanisms drive those impacts (if any). This dissertation addressed some 
of these concerns. I assessed the impact of accountability pressure in a context where there is 
school choice, particularly, the accountability pressure introduced by the SEP law in Chile. This 
law offers extra funding for schools enrolling economically disadvantaged students, and the 
management of that extra funding, and the support for the development of improvement plans is 
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conditional on school’s performance. Under this law, schools are classified in different 
performance categories according to a combination of rules that refer to test scores and other 
school quality indicators. Schools need to comply with certain thresholds in each of these rules to 
be classified as a low-, mid- or high-performing. This fact allowed me to use a regression 
discontinuity in a context where there are multiple rating of schools to assess the effect of 
receiving one classification versus the others.  I used the binding score as instrumental variable 
to help me tackle the complexity of the formulas used to classify schools.   
I fail to find systematic evidence that the accountability pressure on schools affects high-
stakes outcomes or low-stakes outcomes. Furthermore, there is also not enough evidence to 
suggest there was any impact on school behavior, student and teacher mobility across schools. 
The lack of impact on the lowest performing schools is not consistent with the accumulated 
evidence of other studies that find a positive impact on high-stakes outcomes (Figlio & Rouse, 
2006; Rockoff & Turner, 2008; Chiang, 2009; Allen & Burgess, 2012; Deming et al., 2013; 
Hussain, 2015).  The lack of impact of better school classifications is not surprising. The 
accumulated evidence of other studies also fails to find an impact in those schools that just 
missed the best school classifications in New York City (Rockoff & Turner, 2008), Rhode Island 
(Weiner, Donaldson & Dougherty, 2016), or from another incentive policy in Chile (Rau & 
Contreras, 2009; Mizala & Urquiola, 2013), where schools receiving good accountability grades 
do not increase high-stakes test scores, and parents are also not responsive to the information on 
school quality. 
In contrast to other research assessing the impact of the SEP law where its impact is assessed 
as a black box, this dissertation focused on the assessment of one of the components of the law, 
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that of school accountability. Particularly, it contributes to assessment of the impact of the 
pressure schools face as they are classified in different achievement categories. 
Limitations 
There are some caveats about these results. First, the conclusions of this study are limited to 
specific samples of schools. The estimated effects are local effects valid for schools that are close 
to the thresholds, and are valid for schools that comply with the rule of the ICE score. Another 
limitation of this study is that I cannot disentangle the effect of schools receiving certain 
classification (reputation), having the schools done themselves or with help the PME of the 
school, and the schools receiving more or less autonomy to manage the extra resources they 
receive per disadvantaged student. The only way these effects could be separated is if there were 
schools receiving different aspects of the treatment. For example, if there were schools receiving 
the classification of “autonomous”, but where not given the autonomy to manage their resources 
or the Ministry gave them help to construct the PME. Or if there were schools classified as “in 
recovery” that were given autonomy to allocate the resources. Also the effect could be separated 
if schools classified as “emergent” were given autonomy to fully manage their resources or 
where not helped to construct the PME. By regulation, none of these situations should be 
happening.  It is possible that the effect of these different components of the treatment may have 
cancelled each other out. It could be that schools positively benefit from the reputation of 
receiving a bad classification, but schools receive a negative impact of having less flexibility to 
allocate their resources. Another limitation of this study is that the time span between the year in 
which the schools receive the classifications and the year of the outcomes may not be enough to 
perceive any attempt of the schools to improve.  
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Another limitation of the study is that the SEP law had a clear mechanism through which it 
wanted to improve schools’ performance, i.e., improving curriculum management, school 
leadership, school climate and educational resource management. Unfortunately the data 
available does not allow me to assess whether the policy in fact impacted any of these processes, 
nor if any impact on those processes may have affected students’ test scores. I tested some 
potential mechanisms such as school responses, mobility of students and teacher employment. 
Nevertheless, the administrative data used for this purpose is very crude and may not capture 
improvement strategies used by the schools such as more training, or better curriculum. 
These findings should be interpreted carefully. The lack of evidence of impact does not mean 
that the accountability component of the SEP does not impact schools’ quality. This study does 
not assess the systemic effect of school accountability on the Chilean system, but the impact of 
consequences associated with the classification schools get. Therefore, this study does not 
disentangle the school accountability effect from the effect of extra resources found by other 
researchers about the impact of the introduction of the SEP law (Villarroel, 2012; MINEDUC, 
2012; Correa et al., 2013; Mizala & Torche, 2013; Neilson, 2013; Navarro-Palau, 2015). Another 
precaution that should be taken when interpreting these results is that the impact of 
accountability pressure has been assessed four years after the law was first implemented. It is 
possible that accountability pressure had some impact the first years of the implementation and 
not years after.  
Discussion of findings 
There are several possible explanations of why there is no evidence of impact of 
accountability pressure. One possible but unlikely explanation is that all schools close to the 
thresholds felt the pressure of accountability –both that scored right above and right below, 
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pushing them all to improve. The other possibility is that the opposite happened: that no school 
felt any pressure to improve. My sense is that this is what happened, and I can think of several 
explanations. There could be problems with the assumptions behind school accountability, in its 
design, and/or implementation.   
In terms of assumptions, it could be that schools did not work towards improving schools’ 
academic outcomes because some of the basic assumptions discussed earlier in Chapter 2 did not 
hold.  The fact that the classification formulas are so complex could make it hard for school 
personnel to correctly interpret the information about their students’ achievement (assumption 4). 
It is possible the incentive offered was not desirable enough for school personnel, either in terms 
of form or magnitude or both (assumption 5), as the incentive targets “the school” as an 
organization and not individuals. It is also possible that the school had a weak leadership with a 
lack of knowledge on what to do and/or school personnel did not know alternative actions to 
improve school quality (assumption 6); or if they know such actions, its implementation did not 
lead to higher levels of performance (assumption 7). If with the accountability component of the 
SEP law the government wants to improve the quality of the schools, perhaps the government 
should look into the interventions implemented in Chile that have shown a positive impact on 
schools’ performance (particularly in low-performing schools). For example, in the 1990s  Chile 
introduced the P900 program. This program supplied low-performing schools with educational 
material and training for teachers, with no cash being transferred to schools. The evidence shows 
that this program had a positive and significant impact on students’ outcomes (Tokman, 2002; 
Chay, McEwan & Urquiola, 2005). It may be worth assessing whether it may be more effective 
to expand or strengthen this type of program. 
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In terms of design, it is possible the incentives were not strong enough, or not clear enough, 
not driving schools to better allocate resources into what the Ministry thought were priority 
areas. It is clear the Ministry expected more resources to be allocated into the areas of curriculum 
management, leadership, school climate and resource management. And all extra resources had 
to be reported as being allocated in those areas. However, there are several difficulties when 
tracing the use of funds and their efficacy. First, schools were not restricted to substitute other 
funds allocated into the educational areas the SEP law aimed to improve. Therefore, it is possible 
that the resulting outcome is that schools did not allocate more resources into those areas, but 
simply substituted the funding source75. Furthermore, the fact that schools cannot charge extra 
fees to priority students, could have even decreased the expenditure on the priority areas or other 
educational areas. Second, the use of resources has been a matter of controversy, as almost 38% 
of resources incoming to schools are not properly accounted for or they are simply missing 
(Contraloria General de la Republica, 2014). Third, both government and schools face costs in 
tracing the money allocated into schools through the SEP law.  The government has to monitor 
how the money is spent. The schools have to report and document how they are spending the 
money. It is worth thinking whether all these costs are worth the benefits schools are getting out 
the extra resources. Perhaps it would be cheaper and more efficient not to monitor the inputs the 
schools are getting, but the goals they are expected to achieve. 
                                                 
75 Tsang and Levin (1983) discuss three major responses made by local governments to utilize intergovernmental 
grants. One response is that the local government uses the grants for the intended purposes. A second response is 
that local governments use the grant to substitute for local funding that would have been provided to support other 
educational services. A third response is that the grant is used to reduce local taxes or tuition fees to parents. 
Certainly, all three responses could have happened in the context of the SEP law. Unfortunately, I have no access to 
data in Chile about the allocation of resources to test these mechanisms.  
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In terms of implementation, there are at least four reasons why the pressure for a school 
classification may have debilitated the strength of incentives. First, sanctions for low-performers 
and low-performing classifications were postponed. One of the main incentives the law provided 
to low-performing schools (i.e., losing official recognition after four years of poor performance) 
was postponed by 12 years with the creation of the Quality Agency of Education. The first 
classifications of low-performing schools were not done two years after the implementation of 
the law as it was prescribed, but was delayed for four years, for no apparent reason. Such 
enforcement challenges, may compromise the credibility of the accountability system (Mintrop 
& Sunderman, 2009). If the government really wants to make schools accountable, then the 
government itself must do what is promised. If the government itself does not follow the rules 
they have created, how would it be expected for schools to follow those rules. One reason why 
the government seems to have postponed the punishment for low performing schools is because 
they were not clear on what would have happened with the students attending less-endowed 
schools. But clearly that is something the government should have thought of before even 
creating the law. This should serve as a lesson for the designers of the Quality Agency of 
Education and the Educational Superintendence. 
Second, schools in all classifications were required to construct improvement plans (PME), 
but no clear consequences were attached to the compliance or not of the goals specified in such 
plans. The implementations of the plans were monitored, but not in accordance with the 
achievement of the goals described on the plan. What was monitored was whether the school was 
doing the “actions” committed to achieve those goals. This drives the focus away from the 
performance of the schools towards the input/processes of the school, which is just the opposite 
purpose of a performance-based program (Bush, Hough & Kirst, 2017). If the government had 
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really wanted schools to focus on the academic goals, then those are the ones that need to be 
monitored. Although just monitoring SIMCE test scores may be a little short sighted, they could 
monitor the attainment of other educational indicators in agreement with schools. 
Third, the complexities of the formulas used to classify schools, and the weak 
communication of such formulas to the schools seems to undermine the capacity of schools to 
focus on such criteria. This could be seen as a positive or negative thing. If schools do not know 
the formulas in detail, then they may be less able to try to game the system. However, if they do 
not understand why they are classified the way they are, then how could they focus on improving 
those things. Furthermore, it does not seem necessary to make the rules so complex when there is 
clearly one rule that is binding for each type of classification. If the government wants schools to 
focus on improving specific indicators, then they may want to think in simplifying the indicators 
and explain them in simple terms.  
Fourth, the information about the classification the school received was mainly 
communicated to school owners (“sostenedores”). School owners had to provide such 
information to parents, but it is hard to know whether they did or not. Although parents can have 
access to the school classifications through MINEDUC’s website, it is hard to find, and it is not 
clear what it means (what an “emergent” school is, is not explained in the website where parents 
can get the data). Perhaps parents would have responded to information if it had been widely 
available, clear and informed by the Ministry directly and not just posted in a hard-to-find 
section of a website. Although there is evidence parents may not respond to information about 
high performing schools in Chile (Mizala & Urquiola, 2013). If the government had actually 
wanted to put pressure on schools to improve their quality by labelling the schools in different 
classifications they might have wanted to make information widely, easily and meaningfully 
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available to parents. The government may want to explore some strategies to inform schools and 
parents by exploring the accountability policy in Florida or California (Bush, Hough & Kirst, 
2017). 
Future research 
The results suggest at least four avenues for future research. First, it would be interesting to 
disentangle the effect of reputation, support to create improvement plan and flexibility to allocate 
resources. It may be informative for the accountability scheme the Quality Agency of Education 
is building. Second, are the benefits of classifying schools worth the costs it carries for schools? 
Third, has the SEP law affected the intended school processes to improve? If so, has 
improvement in curriculum management or school leadership impacted students’ achievement? 
Four, how has the SEP law impacted educational expenditures, overall and per school 
classification? 
Considering how many countries are adopting school accountability programs, it is important 
for policymakers and practitioners to weigh the evidence into policy deliberations and program 
design. This dissertation suggests that it is hard for an accountability policy to have impact when 
the incentives are not precise, or when the actions prompted by the policy are not consistent 











Table 1. Impact of school accountability on high-stakes outcomes. 










(based on Readiness, 
BSAP and CTBS tests) 
South Carolina, USA /1986-
1988/ 1st to 11th 
grade/School-level 
Analysis of trends 
years after 
introduction of policy 
Modest improvements in student achievement (1% - 1.08% 
improvement), with large differences between schools’ SES 
(lowest SES 2.45% and 1% improvement, whereas high SES 




Introduction of school 
accountability 
TAAS math & reading Texas, USA/1994-1998/4th & 
8th grade/Student-level 
Pre-post comparison Increasing results in 4th grade (effect sizes ranging from 0.31 
to 0.49) and 8th grade (ranging from 0.28 to 0.45).  
Jacob, 2005 Introduction of 
accountability system 
ITBS math & reading Chicago, USA/1990-




Math and reading achievement increased after the 
introduction of the policy in comparison to prior trends. 
Reading increased somewhere between 0.026 and 0.24 sd, 
and math somewhere between -0.081 and 0.485.  





Math and reading achievement increased after the 
introduction of the policy in comparison to other large urban 
districts. Math increased by 0.33 sd and reading 0.24 sd. 
Figlio & Rouse, 
2006 
Accountability pressure 
to low performing 
schools 
FCAT-SSS reading & 
math 
Florida, USA / 1998-




There is a small but significant increase in reading 
achievement (0.04), and a larger increase in mathematics 
(0.24). 
Rockoff & Turner, 
2008 
Accountability pressure Some NYC standardized 
test76. 
NYC, USA / 2006-




There are significantly higher test scores for F (0.12277 
relative to a D grade) and D (0.122 sd relative to a C grade) 
schools in math and F schools in English (0.085 in reference 
to D schools). 
Chiang, 2009 Imposition of school 
sanction threats 
FCAT Florida, USA/ 2002-




There is a significant impact on 4th grade results in math and 
reading (0.118 sd and 0.122 sd respectively). The results do 
not seem to remain in 5th and 6th grade (only the impact in 
math in 6th grade remained 0.109 sd) 
                                                 
76 Test not specified on paper. 
77 Effect size calculated taking the difference from the effect of F-D (to have D as a reference) and then dividing by the standard deviation of the achievement 






























Increase reading and math scores among the students in the middle of the 
achievement distribution and not among the students at the left tail of the 
achievement distribution (from 3th to 9th decile increases between 0.053 and 
0.134 in math, and from 3th to 9th decile increases between 0.038 and 0.09 in 
reading78).  





 Increase reading and math scores among the students in the middle of the 
achievement distribution and not among the students at the left tail of the 
achievement distribution (from second to 9th decile increases between 0.003 and 
0.006 in mean test scores in math, and from 4th to 8th decile increases between 
0.004 and 0.005 in reading79). There is even a negative impact on students from 
the first decile of the achievement distribution (-0.11 sd). 
Allen and Burgess, 
2012 
Accountability 






2011/Students age 16 
Fuzzy regression 
discontinuity 
Just-failing schools improve scores over the following two to three years. The 
effect size is moderate at around 0.1 standard deviations. The impact is mainly on 





Just-failing schools improve scores over the following two to three years. The 











2010/8th grade students 





High schools that face the possibility of being rated as low performing schools 
increase the probability that students pass high stakes exams on time (0.7%). 
The impact is greater on low achieving students (students that failed the year 
previous to the test). They increase the passing rates of the high-stakes test by 
1.5%. 
                                                 
78 Effect size calculated dividing the reported difference in mean scores by the standard deviation of the ISAT (15 sd). 
79 Standard deviation of the test not reported in paper. Effect size calculated dividing the reported mean difference by 21.06, the standard deviation of ITBS 







Hussain, 2015 Accountability 
pressure on schools 
failing inspection  







Students from failing schools improve their test scores around 0.1 standard 
deviations. The largest gains are for students in the bottom quartile of the age-7 
test scores distribution with gains climbing up to a 0.2 sd. 
 
Table 1, Continued. 










Accountability pressure to 
schools that just missed 












There is no evidence just missing high-performance status improves students’ 
performance. However, when the level of competence with other high-performing 
schools is assessed, then the study finds that schools that just missed being classified as 
high-performing and are in a context with several other high performing schools, then 
there is an improvement in the school’s outcomes. This does not happen in schools in a 








Table 2. Impact of school accountability on low-stakes outcomes. 










NAEP math & 
reading 




Small increase in 4th grade scores (0.13 to 0.15). No increase in 8th grade 
scores. 
Jacob, 2005 Introduction of 
accountability system 
IGAP math Chicago, USA/1990-2000/3th, 
6th & 8th grades/Student-level 
Interrupted time 
series 
Decline in low stakes scores among third graders of roughly 0.13 
standard deviations, had no effect on scores among sixth graders, and 
increased eight grade scores by roughly 0.26 standard deviations. 






No effect on low stakes performance among 3th and 6th graders, but did 
increase the low stakes scores in 8th grade for reading (0.211 standard 
deviations) as well as for math (0.164 sd). 
Figlio & Rouse, 
2006 
Introduction of 
accountability pressure to 
low performing schools 
NRT reading & 
math 
Florida, USA / 1998-2000/4th 
& 5th grades / Student-level 
Difference-in-
differences  
Impact in low stakes tests is positive and statistically significant (0.106 in 
math 5th grade and 0.03 in reading 4th grade80), but considerably smaller 
than those found on the high stakes tests. 
Chiang, 2009 Imposition of school 
sanction threats 
Stanford test 
math & reading 
 
Florida, USA/ 2002-2003/3th 
& 4th grade/Student-level 
Sharp regression 
discontinuity 
Impact of sanction threats on low stakes tests are negligible for both math 





Accountability pressure Graduated high 
school (%), 
Total math 
credits in high 
school (#) 
Texas, USA/1994-2010/8th 
grade students followed until 




High schools that face the possibility of being rated as low performing 
schools increase the percentage of high school graduates (0.9%) and 
increase total math credits taken in high schools (0.06) .  High-
performing schools had a negative impact on high school graduation rates 
(0.9%). 
The impact is greater on low achieving students (students that failed the 
year previous to the test). They increase the percentage of high school 
graduates (1%) and increase the number of credits taken in math in high 
school (0.073). 
Schools that will probably be ranked as recognized may even show 
negative effects on students who failed the exam the previous year 
(probably because they re-categorized these students as having special 
needs). 
Source: Author.
                                                 







Table 3 Impact of school accountability on long-run outcomes. 
Study Independent 
variable 











test on time (%), 
Graduated high school 
(%), 
Total math credits in 
high school (#), 
Attended college (%),  
Attended 4 year 
college (%),  
BA degree (%),  




grade students followed until 





Students in school cohorts at risk of being graded low performing were about 1% 
more likely to attend college than high performing cohorts and 12% more likely to 
enroll in 4 year colleges. 
Students in school cohorts at risk of being graded low performing earned between 
23 and 25 years old about $459 USD more than high performing cohorts. 
Increases in postsecondary attainment are much larger for lower scoring students 
(those who have failed in 8th grade math tests) in low performing cohorts. Low 
achieving students in low performing schools attended 4 year college about 14% 
more than low performing students in an acceptable performance school. 
Low achieving students in low performing schools earned about $518 USD more 
than low achieving students in schools with acceptable performance. 
Low achieving students in high performing schools earned about $1200 USD less 







Table 4. Impact of school accountability on school behavioral response. 
Study Independent 
variable 









Number of students in special education, 
Number of scores reported, 
Number of students taking the test, 
Retention rates in grades prior to high-stakes 
grades 
Chicago, USA/1990-




The introduction of the policy increased proportion of 
students in special education (1%), decreased number of 
students tested (0.6%), increased the grade retention among 
students in 1st and 2nd grade by 2.3% (64% more than the 
baseline 3.6%), and by 1.7 in 4th, 5th and 7th grade (130% 
more than the baseline 1.3%). 
There is no evidence the introduction of the policy affected 








Exemption rates Texas, USA/1993-




Campuses target exemptions toward student subgroups 
when they are likely to prevent the campus from earning a 
higher rating.  Exemptions increase between a 0.6 and 1.7 
percent. The exemptions can be larger in Hispanic and Black 
subgroups (between 1.2 to 2.1 percent, and between 1.3 to 
3.7 percent respectively). 
Jacob, 
2007 
Tests gap by year Item response (correct or wrong) on NAEP 
(low stakes test) and TAAS (high stakes test) 
Texas/1996-2000/4th and 




Differential improvement in state test cannot be explained 
by changes in demographics of test-takers, or format of the 
tests (open response vs. multiple choice items; use of 
calculators; timing of the test). Different skills assessed may 






Percentage of students tested in math and 
English 







There is no evidence between the accountability grade the 







School expenditures (Total school costs per 
pupil, Total instructional costs pp, Total non-
instructional costs pp, Share of costs devoted to 
instruction, Ratio of FTE students to FTE staff 
units),  
Instructional costs (Teacher salaries and 
benefits pp, Contracted service costs pp, 
Instructional materials costs pp, Instructional 
equipment costs pp), 
Non-instructional costs (Pupil support costs pp, 
Media center costs pp, Instructional and 
curricular development costs pp, Teacher 
training costs pp, School administration costs 
pp, Plant operation costs pp, Plant maintenance  
costs pp) 
Florida, USA/ 2002-





Schools increase expenditure on instructional equipment 
costs ($151 USD per pupil) and instructional and curricular 
development costs ($189 USD per pupil). 







Table 4, Continued. 







Face rating reduction 
of the school due to 
changes in the 
accountability tests 
Total expenditures per student, 
Resources per student: categorical expenditures 
(instruction, leadership/curriculum/staff 
development, counseling and social work 






Rating shock The authors find that school districts increase instructional 
budgets (increase total expenditures per student by 
$73USD, increase in instructional budget by $66 USD, 
student-teacher ratios decreased by 0.3%) for teachers if 
there was an increase likelihood of a lower accountability 
grade (not in the lowest level, but in the second lowest 
level of rating.  






pressure to low 
performing schools 
 
Policy changes in several domains to:  improve 
low performing students,  
lengthen the instructional time,  
reduce class size for math, reading and writing,  
narrow the curriculum,  
change scheduling system,  
improve low performing teachers, 
improve teacher resources,  
improve teacher incentives, 









Schools that face pressure focus on low-performing 
students, increase the amount of time devoted to instruction 
organize learning differently, increase resources available 
to teachers, and decrease principal control. 
 
Hussain, 2015 Accountability 
pressure on schools 
failing inspection  































Average years of completed 
education of  mothers, Average 
maternal age, Share of kindergarten 
class with married parents at birth, 
share of class that are low income 







High SES parents were particularly responsive to the introduction of 
schools grades (greater increases in the average maternal education of 
schools post reform for A and B schools, and less for D and F schools; 
similar patterns found in maternal age; but no evidence was found in 
whether the mother was married at time of birth, or whether the child 
received free or reduced lunch). High performing schools had an increase 
in the SES of the families among the Kindergarten students. The effect is 
stronger when there are nearby alternatives for the school (when there is 








Table 6. Impact of school accountability on teacher body composition. 










accountability pressure to 
low performing schools 
Teacher retention rates, 
Hiring rates, 
Proportion of low quality teachers 
(measured as teachers with no 
experience, and as teachers ho 







Labeling of schools as low-performing increases the 
probability of departure for an experienced teacher by about 
25%. For a new teacher, the changes in the probabilities of 
departure are around the same, although the baseline level 
of departure was higher than for experienced teachers. 
There is no evidence that the introduction of accountability 
has decreased the quality of the teachers in the low-
performing schools. 
Feng, Figlio & 
Sass, 2010 
Whether the school was 
upward or downward 
shocked after a change in 
grading formula of schools 
Likelihood that a teacher leaves 
his or her school before the end of 








The effect of schools being classified lower than expected 
affects teacher mobility increasing it by 11-12% in 
comparison to those schools that were not shocked. 
The effect of schools being classified higher than expected 
does not significantly affect teacher mobility, although the 




Table 7. Construction of the Education Quality Index (ICE). 






Average of three last scores of SIMCE in 4th grade 





  30% 
Approval rates Proportion of students approved. 25% 25% 
Retention 
rates 





Improvement on working conditions and functioning of 
the school. Count of sanctions to the school weighted by 




Schools’ activities and initiatives and commit external 
actors in its educational practices. Data from survey 




Participation of teachers and parents in the construction 
of the educational project of the school. Data from 
survey filled by ‘school principal’ and parental 




Teacher evaluation of public school teachers. Index: 
(Number of excellent teachers + Number of competent 
teachers – Number of incompetent teachers) / (Total 
number of teachers assessed). Data from system of 
teacher evaluation. 
- 7% 





Table 8. Adoption of SEP law through the years. 
Schools  Years 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Public  # 4964 5013 4937 4823 4801 5058 5001 4960 
% from 
total 
96.75 96.14 99.00 94.9 87.35 93.46 94.13 94.42 
Total public 5131 5214 4987 5082 5496 5412 5313 5253 
Private 
Voucher 
# 1635 2063 2182 2455 2658 2909 2950 3008 
% from 
total 
42.30 45.4 54.6 50.86 44.85 48.52 48.82 49.69 
Total PV 3865 4544 3996 4827 5927 5995 6042 6053 
Note: Data from SEP database of Centro de Estudios MINEDUC (2008-2015).  Total schools are those that have at 
least 1 priority student and have elementary education.
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Table 9. Number of priority students throughout the years. 
Schools  Years 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Public  # of priority 
students 
258886 425956 447950 483560 769331 889695 839350 754055 
% of priority 
students from total 
enrollment 
35.58 51.31 58.91 57.71 66.46 76.34 73.56 67.43 
Private 
Voucher 
# of priority 
students 
128044 323530 361556 421746 768811 935204 922939 859640 
% of priority 
students from total 
enrollment 
17.24 28.78 36.06 32.17 48.48 57.51 56.86 52.05 
Note: Data from SEP database of Centro de Estudios MINEDUC (2008-2015).  Total schools are those that have at 
least 1 priority student, and have elementary education. The number of priority students and the percentage of 
priority students per school is calculated regardless of whether the school adopted or not the SEP law. Note that 
throughout the years the number of priority students is rolling upwards because each extra year includes new grades 
into the SEP law. 
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Table 10. Schools classified or not by formula. 
 Years 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Uses formula (%) 2901 (38.89) 2867 (35.99) 2859 (36.00) 2888 (36.25) 
Less than 2 SIMCE measures 3012 3528 3195 2335 
20 students or less take the test 1546 1568 1880 2741 
Do not present PME . 4 7 2 
Total 7459 7967 7941 7966 
Note: Data from SEP classification (2012-2015). Data about schools that do not present PME for 2012 is not 
available. “Uses formula” means the schools use the formula to get the classification they have. “Less than 2 SIMCE 
measures” means that the school has less than 2 years of valid SIMCE scores. This includes all schools that do not 
have 4th grade, and all new schools. “Less than 20 students take the test” means that during the 3 years for which 
SIMCE scores are considered and for the three different tests, on average the schools have no more than 20 students 
taking the tests. This includes all schools that are multiple-grade schools, geographically isolated schools and 
schools with three teachers or less. “Do not present PME” means the school was once classified using the formula, 
but as the school did not present the PME on time, the school was re-classified as “In recovery”, regardless of the 




Table 11. School classifications through the years. 
 Years 
Classification 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Autonomous 1069 1071 1142 1155 
Emergent 1644 1621 1663 1662 
In recovery 188 175 54 71 
Total 2901 2867 2859 2888 
Note: Data from SEP classification (2012-2015). All SEP schools that have elementary education that are classified 






Table 12. School classification changes. 
 Classification on year t+1 
2013 
 Classification on year t+1 
2014 
 Classification on year t+1 
2015 
Classification 










Autonomous 809 243   848 209   895 241  
Emergent 210 1350 62  241 1358 7  202 1423 31 
In recovery  82 103  1 123 45   21 33 
Note: Data from SEP classification (2012-2015). All SEP schools that have elementary education that are classified 




























The law increases language and math scores. The effect sizes range between 0.11 and 
0.18 in math and 0.07 and 0.11 in language. The impact is larger for schools with more 
proportion of priority students and for schools that have implemented improvement 
plans for longer time. 








After 4 years of implementation the SEP law has had a positive and significant effect 
on math and language in private voucher schools . With effect sizes ranging from 0.08 
to 0.11 in and 0.05 to 0.07 respectively81. 
Each extra year participating in the SEP law increases the achievement by 0.03 in math 
and 0.02 in language. 
Correa, Inostroza, 










After 4 years of implementation the SEP law has had a positive and significant effect 




Each extra year participating in the SEP law increases the achievement by 0.05 in math 
and 0.02 in language. 








School fixed effects Private voucher schools increase their average test scores once they adhere to the SEP 
Law. The effect sizes in math range from 0.08 to 0.1 and from 0.07 to 0.08 in 
language34. Each extra year of participation in the SEP law impacted positively on the 
outcomes.  
The effect of the SEP law is heterogeneous for schools with different average 
socioeconomic levels of the families. Schools that enroll students from lower SES have 
a greater impact of the law than other schools. In higher SES schools the impact of the 
law is negligible. 
Neilson, 2013 Introduction of 
SEP law 
Average 






The policy impact of the targeted voucher program was to increase test scores of the 















There are no effects on average test scores for students with mother that completed 
high school (which show higher tendency to switch schools to a private voucher school 
due to the introduction of the SEP law). In contrast, the average test scores of students 
with low educated mothers (students that mostly stay in public schools), increased 
(0.08 sd). 
                                                 














Table 14. Determinants of “autonomous” classification in 2012. 






























































Observations 2888 2799 2867 2888 2798 2867 2888 2799 2867 2901 
R2 0.445 0.479 0.450 0.434 0.461 0.455 0.422 0.438 0.415 0.677 
F 463.07 513.78 467.71 442.72 477.09 478.62 420.52 434.90 406.61 1211.30 
Note: The models are all linear probability models of whether the school is classified as “autonomous” or not on year 2012 (equation 5 without the interaction 
term). The independent variables “Above threshold” are dummy variables that indicate whether the school scores above (1) or below (0) the median of the SES 
group of reference in the rule mentioned at the top of the column. All models control for the type of school, SES level of the school, whether the school is urban, 
and for the enrollment rates in 4th grade. Each cell contains the coefficients and standard error on parenthesis.  The schools included are those SEP schools that 
are classified according to the classification formula for the full sample. 







Table 15. Determinants of school classification as “in recovery” in 2012 & 2013 rounds pooled.  












































Observations 5722 5647 5611 5732 5646 5611 5763 
F 309.47 279.72 253.48 276.27 244.66 280.82 9348.24 
Note: The models are all linear probability models of whether the school is classified as “in recovery” or not on year 2012 and 2013 (equation 7 without the 
interaction term). The independent variables “Below threshold” are dummy variables that indicate whether the school scores above (0) or below (1) the threshold 
in the rule mentioned at the top of the column. All models control for the type of school, SES level of the school, whether the school is urban, and for the 
enrollment rates in 4th grade. Each model also contains a fixed effect per round. Each cell contains the coefficients and standard error on parenthesis.  The schools 
included are those SEP schools that are classified according to the classification formula for the full sample in both years. 




Table 16. Descriptive statistics of schools around the cutoff of the “autonomous” 
classification in 2012. 
 (1) (2) 
 Below the cutoff Above the cutoff 
Number of schools 1149 1063 
SEP classification   
Autonomous  0.000 0.704 
Emergent 0.980 0.296 
In recovery 0.020 0.000 
Urbanicity   
Urban schools 0.932 0.877 
Rural schools 0.068 0.123 
Type of school   
Municipal 0.645 0.564 
Private voucher 0.355 0.437 
SEP participation   
Average years in SEP until 2012 3.676 3.673 
Enrollment   
Average enrollment 533.831 583.232 
% of enrollment in grade 4 0.095 0.096 
% of enrollment in grade 8 0.104 0.100 
Student characteristics   
Low SES (%) 0.094 0.116 
Mid-low SES (%) 0.484 0.463 
Mid SES (%) 0.350 0.355 
Mid-High, High SES (%) 0.072 0.062 
% of beneficiary students 0.496 0.502 
% of priority students 0.543 0.545 
% of students with special needs 0.066 0.050 
School classification scores for 2012’s classification 
SIMCE score t-2 242.37 257.32 
% scoring above 250 on t-2 0.447 0.572 
% scoring above 300 on t-2 0.129 0.195 
SIMCE score t-3 238.33 255.32 
% scoring above 250 on t-3 0.413 0.551 
% scoring above 300 on t-3 0.117 0.189 
SIMCE score t-4 235.68 251.19 
% scoring above 250 on t-4 0.396 0.519 
% scoring above 300 on t-4 0.108 0.168 
ICE index on t-1 -0.221 0.371 
Note: Descriptive statistics are presented for schools above and below the ICE index cutoff. The schools included 
are those SEP schools that are classified using the classification formula, and that are within the 0.706 bandwidth.   
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Table 17. Descriptive statistics of schools around the cutoff of the “in recovery” 
classification in 2012 & 2013 rounds pooled. 
 (1) (2) 
 Below the cutoff Above the cutoff 
Number of observations 276 787 
SEP classification   
Autonomous  0.000 0.000 
Emergent 0.004 0.977 
In recovery 0.996 0.002 
Urbanicity   
Urban schools 0.964 0.916 
Rural schools 0.036 0.084 
Type of school   
Municipal 0.649 0.710 
Private voucher 0.351 0.290 
SEP participation   
Average years in SEP until 2012 3.830 3.753 
Enrollment   
Average enrollment 414.181 462.653 
% of enrollment in grade 4 0.094 0.093 
% of enrollment in grade 8 0.104 0.106 
Student characteristics   
Low SES (%) 0.304 0.188 
Mid-low SES (%) 0.623 0.658 
Mid SES (%) 0.073 0.153 
Mid-High, High SES (%) 0.000 0.001 
% of beneficiary students 0.621 0.614 
% of priority students 0.685 0.664 
% of students with special needs 0.111 0.103 
Average school classification scores for 2012 and 2013 rounds of classification  
SIMCE score t-2 218.38 230.30 
% scoring above 250 on t-2 0.253 0.343 
SIMCE score t-3 215.82 225.77 
% scoring above 250 on t-3 0.241 0.312 
SIMCE score t-4 211.57 222.84 
% scoring above 250 on t-4 0.213 0.291 
ICE index on t-1 -1.240 -0.774 
Note: Descriptive statistics are presented for schools above and below the ICE index cutoff. The schools included 
are those SEP schools that are classified using the classification formula, and that are within the 0.467 bandwidth.   
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Table 18. Mean of high- and low- stake outcome variables above and below the ICE 
index threshold of the “autonomous” classification in 2012. 
 (1) (2) 
 Below the cutoff Above the cutoff 
Panel A: High stakes outcomes   
4th grade Math scores on year t 245.71 259.20 
4th grade Math scores on year t+1 240.55 252.66 
4th grade Language scores on year t 253.27 264.45 
4th grade Language scores on year t+1 249.57 259.85 
4th grade Science scores on year t 242.26 254.48 
4th grade Science scores on year t+1 239.87 250.23 
Panel B: Low stakes outcomes   
8th grade Math scores on year t+1 242.47 253.89 
8th grade Language scores on year t+1 238.66 250.84 
8th grade Science scores on year t+1 254.44 265.39 
Note: Mean outcomes are presented for schools above and below the ICE index cutoff. The schools included are 





Table 19. Mean of high- and low- stake outcome variables above and below the ICE 
index threshold of the “in recovery” classification in 2012 & 2013 rounds pooled.  
 (1) (2) 
 Below the cutoff Above the cutoff 
Panel A: High stakes outcomes   
4th grade Math scores on year t 227.40 232.69 
4th grade Math scores on year t+1# 228.88 232.07 
4th grade Language scores on year t 235.86 241.55 
4th grade Language scores on year t+1# 236.61 239.92 
4th grade Science scores on year t 224.88 230.53 
4th grade Science scores on year t+1# 228.27 231.37 
Panel B: Low stakes outcomes   
8th grade Math scores on year t* 228.06 232.37 
8th grade Math scores on year t+1# 228.80 232.95 
8th grade Language scores on year t* 223.36 227.73 
8th grade Language scores on year t+1# 224.36 228.65 
8th grade Science scores on year t* 239.05 244.26 
8th grade Science scores on year t+1# 240.01 244.02 
Note: Mean outcomes are presented for schools above and below the ICE index cutoff. The schools included are 
those SEP schools that are classified using the classification formula, and that are within the 0.467 bandwidth. 





Table 20. Mean of school behavioral response, student and teacher body composition 
outcome variables above and below the ICE index threshold of the “autonomous” 
classification in 2012. 
 (1) (2) 
 Below the cutoff Above the cutoff 
Panel A: School behavioral response   
Tests taken on year t in 4 th grade 131.80 146.15 
Tests taken on year t+1 in 4th grade 126.32 141.87 
Students with special needs on year t  34.71 28.03 
Students with special needs on year t+1  53.42 52.15 
Students retained in 3th grade on year t 1.91 1.87 
Students retained in 3th grade on year t+1 1.70 1.622 
Students approved in 3th grade on year t 44.67 50.30 
Students approved in 3th grade on year t+1 43.68 49.79 
Students switching schools in 3th grade on year t  3.39 2.87 
Students switching schools in 3th grade on year t+1 3.32 2.81 
Proportion of students scoring above 250 on year t  0.482 0.581 
Proportion of students scoring above 250 on year t+1 0.449 0.541 
Proportion of students scoring above 300 on year t  0.147 0.207 
Proportion of students scoring above 300 on year t+1 0.117 0.165 
ICE index on year t -0.234 0.337 
ICE index on year t+1 -0.072 0.342 
Teacher evaluation t 0.679 0.754 
Teacher evaluation t+1 0.681 0.750 
SNED initiative on t 79.21 85.57 
SNED initiative on t+1 79.29 85.62 
SNED improvement on t 92.67 92.02 
SNED improvement on t+1 92.65 91.97 
SNED integration on t 69.07 78.04 
SNED integration on t+1 69.09 78.04 
Approval rates on t 0.940 0.952 
Approval rates on t+1 0.944 0.953 
Retention rates on t 0.979 0.987 
Retention rates on t+1 0.978 0.987 
Panel B: Student body composition   
Total school enrollment on year t  533.83 583.23 
Total school enrollment on year t+1 525.18 582.15 
School enrollment in 1st grade on year t 45.91 51.60 
School enrollment in 1st grade on year t+1 46.20 53.09 
School enrollment in 7 th grade on year t 52.42 55.44 




Table 20, Continued. 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Below the cutoff Above the cutoff 
4th grade SES level on year t: Low SES (%) 0.094 0.116 
4th grade SES level on year t+1: Low SES (%) 0.117 0.114 
4th grade SES level on year t: Mid-low SES (%) 0.484 0.463 
4th grade SES level on year t+1: Mid-low SES (%) 0.513 0.469 
4th grade SES level on year t: Mid SES (%) 0.350 0.359 
4th grade SES level on year t+1: Mid SES (%) 0.323 0.370 
4th grade SES level on year t: Mid-High, High SES (%) 0.072 0.062 
4th grade SES level on year t+1: Mid-High, High SES (%) 0.046 0.047 
% of sch with enrollment fees on year t+1: free 0.90 0.89 
% of sch with enrollment fees on year t+1: 1 to 10 thds pesos 0.09 0.09 
% of sch with enrollment fees on year t+1: 10 to 25 0.005 0.009 
% of sch with enrollment fees on year t+1: 25 to 50 0.004 0.002 
% of sch with enrollment fees on year t+1: 50 to 100* 0.000 0.001 
% of sch with monthly fees on year t+1: free 0.77 0.71 
% of sch with monthly fees on year t+1: 1 to 10 thds pesos 0.06 0.07 
% of sch with monthly fees on year t+1: 10 to 25 0.11 0.14 
% of sch with monthly fees on year t+1: 25 to 50 0.04 0.07 
% of sch with monthly fees on year t+1: 50 to 100** 0.001 0.002 
Beneficiary students enrolled on year t 239.22 261.81 
Beneficiary students enrolled on year t+1 289.26 323.14 
Panel C: Teacher body composition   
Teachers teaching on year t 25.51 26.76 
Teachers teaching on year t+1  26.33 28.08 
Teaching hours on year t 838.14 893.66 
Teaching hours on year t+1  872.07 946.82 
Note: Mean outcomes are presented for schools above and below the ICE index cutoff. The schools included are 
those SEP schools that are classified using the classification formula, and that are within the 0.706 bandwidth. 
*Although schools could have reported enrollment fees greater than 100, there were no observations on this level on 
this sample. **Although schools could have reported monthly fees greater than 100, there were no observations on 
this level on this sample.
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Table 21. Mean of school behavioral response, student and teacher body composition 
outcome variables above and below the ICE index threshold of the “in recovery” 
classification. 2012 & 2013 classification rounds pooled. 
 (1) (2) 
 Below the cutoff Above the cutoff 
Panel A: School behavioral response   
Tests taken on year t in 4 th grade 95.66 108.27 
Students with special needs on year t  44.47 44.72 
Students retained in 3th grade on year t 2.14 1.94 
Students approved in 3th grade on year t 32.50 37.70 
Students switching schools in 3th grade on year t  4.13 3.62 
Proportion of students scoring above 250 on year t 0.333 0.377 
Proportion of students scoring above 300 on year t  0.072 0.091 
ICE index on year t -0.623 -0.984 
Teacher evaluation t 0.584 0.646 
SNED initiative on t 68.01 72.53 
SNED improvement on t 91.77 91.61 
SNED integration on t 55.34 61.45 
Approval rates on t 0.917 0.928 
Retention rates on t 0.951 0.968 
Panel B: Student body composition   
Total school enrollment on year t 414.18 462.65 
School enrollment in 1st grade on year t 35.29 40.44 
School enrollment in 7th grade on year t 42.21 48.33 
4th grade SES level on year t: Low SES (%) 0.304 0.188 
4th grade SES level on year t: Mid-low SES (%) 0.623 0.658 
4th grade SES level on year t: Mid SES (%) 0.073 0.153 
4th grade SES level on year t: Mid-High, High SES (%) 0.000 0.001 
Beneficiary students enrolled on year t 247.48 270.26 
Panel C: Teacher body composition   
Teachers teaching on year t 22.33 24.08 
Teaching hours on year t 727.86 792.44 
Note: Mean outcomes are presented for schools above and below the ICE index cutoff. The schools included are 
those SEP schools that are classified using the classification formula, and that are within the 0.467 bandwidth. 
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Table 22. First stage models for schools being classified or not as “autonomous”. Year 
2012. 
 (1) (2) 
 Baseline With controls 















Observations 2209 2209 
F  2885.91 2528.86 
Notes: The table shows resulting coefficients from equation 5 estimated with a linear probability model. The cells 
contain the main coefficients and the robust standard errors in parenthesis. The schools included are those SEP 
schools that are classified according to the classification formula, and that are within the 0.706 bandwidth. 
Covariates control for whether the school is in an urban area, the type of school, schools SES level, and the 
enrollment rates in 4th grade. 






Table 23. Specification check of RD estimate of receiving a school classification of “autonomous” on mathematics 
outcomes in 4th grade on year t. Year 2012. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Bandwidth: [-1.2 ; 1.2] [-.9 ; .9] [-.706 ; .706] [-.5 ; .5] 
Polynomial of 
order: 




























































 15366.69  
Observations 2760 2532 2209 1760 
Note: The cells contain the coefficient B1 (robust standard errors) of equation 6 with controls, F test for the addition of polynomials of the running variable (p-
value) -considering the first order polynomial the baseline-, and AIC. The bandwidth of 0.706 is the optimal bandwidth suggested by the bandwidth selector 
proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). Models include both an additional higher order polynomial and the interaction term between the 
instrumental variable and the running score at a higher order.  




Table 24. Covariate balance above and below the ICE index threshold of the 
“autonomous” classification in 2012. 
 (1) (2) 
Outcomes Baseline With controls 
















































Note: Demographic variables listed in the first column are used as outcomes. The cells show resulting coefficient B1 
from equation 6 with and without covariates correspondingly (the outcome variable is removed from the list of 
covariates controlled for on column 2). The cells contain the main coefficient, the robust standard error on 
parenthesis, and the sample size. All outcomes are estimated using ordinary least squares. The schools included in 
the sample are those SEP schools that are classified using the classification formula, and that are within the 0.706 
bandwidth.  






Table 25. Impact of “autonomous” classification in 2012 on high-stakes outcomes. 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) 
























4th grade Math 


































4th grade Math 































4th grade Lang. 































4th grade Lang. 































4th grade Science 































4th grade Science 































Note: The table shows resulting coefficient B1 from equation 6. Columns (2) to (10) include controls. The cells contain the main coefficient, the robust standard 
error on parenthesis, and the sample size. All outcomes are estimated using OLS. The schools included in the sample are those SEP schools that are classified 
using the classification formula, and that are within the 0.706 bandwidth. Columns (3) to (10) are estimations for subsamples according to level of pressure due 
to previous year classification, to SES level and to level of competition within the municipality of the school. A school is considered to be in a highly competitive 
municipality (High comp.) if the share of autonomous schools in a municipality is equal or greater than .2. Schools in low competitive municipalities (Low 
comp.) are all the other schools. 
* p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 26. Impact of “autonomous” classification in 2012 on low-stakes outcomes. 
 (1) (2) 
Outcomes Baseline With controls 


















Note: The table shows resulting coefficient B1from equation 6 with and without controls correspondingly. The cells 
contain the main coefficient, the robust standard error on parenthesis, and the sample size. Models are estimated 
using OLS. The schools included in the sample are those SEP schools that are classified using the classification 
formula, and that are within the 0.706 bandwidth.  
* p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 27. Impact of “autonomous” classification in 2012 on school behavioral response. 





the prior year 
 Schools not-
autonomous  
the prior year 
Outcomes Baseline With 
controls 
 With controls  With controls 






































































































Students switching schools in 3th grade 













Students switching schools in 3th grade 













Proportion of students scoring above 













Proportion of students scoring above 















Table 27, Continued. 





the prior year 
 Schools not-
autonomous  
the prior year 
Outcomes Baseline With 
controls 
 With controls  With controls 
Proportion of students scoring above 













Proportion of students scoring above 

















































































































Table 27, Continued. 





the prior year 
 Schools not-
autonomous  
the prior year 
Outcomes Baseline With 
controls 
 With controls  With controls 








































































Note: The table shows resulting coefficient B1 from equation 6 with and without covariates correspondingly. The 
cells contain the main coefficient, the robust standard error on parenthesis, and the sample size. All outcomes are 
estimated using OLS. The schools included in the sample are those SEP schools that are classified using the 
classification formula, and that are within the 0.706 bandwidth. The two columns at the right divide the sample on 
whether the school was classified as autonomous the previous year or not. #These models do not include enrollment 
rates as a control variable because it is also a denominator of the outcome. @ Sample restricted to only public 






Table 28. Impact of “autonomous” classification in 2012 on student body composition. 





the prior year 
 Schools not-
autonomous 




 With controls  With controls 
































































































Changes in SES level of 4th grade from year 













Changes in SES level of 4th grade from year 





































Note: The table shows resulting coefficient B1 from equation 6 with and without covariates correspondingly. Cells contain the 
main coefficient (robust standard error) and the sample size. All outcomes are estimated using OLS. Schools included in the 
sample are those SEP schools that are classified using the classification formula, and that are within the 0.706 bandwidth. 
Column (3) and (4) divide the sample on whether the school was classified as autonomous the previous year or not. @ Sample 
restricted to only private voucher schools, because primary public schools are not allowed to charge fees on top of the voucher. # 
These models do not control for the SES level at the baseline to avoid a spurious correlation. * p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 29. Impact of “autonomous” classification in 2012 on teacher body composition. 





 the prior year 
 Schools not-
autonomous 


























































Note: The table shows resulting coefficient B1 from equation 6 with and without covariates correspondingly. The 
cells contain the main coefficient, the robust standard error on parenthesis, and the sample size. All outcomes are 
estimated using OLS. The schools included in the sample are those SEP schools that are classified using the 
classification formula, and that are within the 0.706 bandwidth. The two columns at the right divide the sample on 
whether the school was classified as autonomous the previous year or not. 
* p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 30. First stage models for schools being classified or not “in recovery” 
classification in 2012 & 2013 rounds pooled. 
 (1) (2) 
 Baseline With controls 















Observations 1054 1054 
R2 0.903 0.905 
F  1121.89 1075.12 
Notes: The table shows resulting coefficients from equation 7 estimated with a linear probability model. The cells 
contain the main coefficients and the robust standard errors in parenthesis. The schools included are those SEP 
schools that are classified according to the classification formula, and that are within the 0.467 bandwidth. 
Covariates control for whether the school is in an urban area, the type of school, schools SES level, and the 
enrollment rates in 4th grade. The models also include fixed effects per year. 






Table 31. Specification check of RD estimate of receiving a school classification of “in recovery” on mathematics 
outcomes in 4th grade on year t. Rounds 2012 & 2013 pooled. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Bandwidth: [-1 ; 1] [-.7 ; .7] [-.467 ; .467] [-.3 ; .3] 
Polynomial of 
order: 





























































Observations 2693 1741 1054 613 
Note: The cells contain the coefficient 𝜗1 (robust standard errors) of equation 8 with controls and year fixed effects, F test for the addition of polynomials of the 
running variable (p-value) -considering the first order polynomial the baseline-, and AIC. The bandwidth of 0.467 is the optimal bandwidth suggested by the 
bandwidth selector proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). Models include both an additional higher order polynomial and the interaction term 
between the instrumental variable and the running score at a higher order.  
* p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 32. Covariate balance above and below the ICE index threshold of the “in 
recovery” classification. Rounds 2012 & 2013 pooled. 
 (1) (2) 
Outcomes Baseline With controls 
















































Note: Demographic variables listed in the first column are used as outcomes. The cells show resulting coefficient 𝜗1 
from equation 8 with and without covariates correspondingly (the outcome variable is removed from the list of 
covariates controlled for on column 2). The cells contain the main coefficient, the robust standard error on 
parenthesis, and the sample size. All outcomes are estimated using ordinary least squares. The schools included in 
the sample are those SEP schools that are classified using the classification formula, and that are within the 0.467 
bandwidth.  
* p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 33. Impact of “in recovery” classification on high-stakes outcomes. Rounds 2012 
& 2013 pooled. 
 (1) (2) 
Outcomes Baseline With controls 




































Note: The table shows resulting coefficient 𝜗1 from equation 8. Column (2) includes controls. The cells contain the 
main coefficient, the robust standard error on parenthesis, and the sample size. All outcomes are estimated using 
OLS. The schools included in the sample are those SEP schools that are classified using the classification formula, 
and that are within the 0.467 bandwidth. #Only considers outcomes for the classification of year 2012, those are of 
the test in 2013. That is why the sample size is half the size.  







Table 34. Impact of “in recovery” classification on low-stakes outcomes. Rounds 2012 & 2013 separate.  
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 2012 classification  2013 classification 
Outcomes Baseline With controls  Baseline With controls 
























 - - 






 - - 






 - - 
Note: The table shows resulting coefficient 𝜗1from equation 8 with and without controls correspondingly. The cells contain the main coefficient, the robust 
standard error on parenthesis, and the sample size. Models are estimated using OLS. The schools included in the sample are those SEP schools that are classified 
using the classification formula, and that are within the 0.467 bandwidth.  Given the peculiarities of the evaluation calendar, there are no test scores for 8th grade 
on year 2012. For this reason, the analysis could not be performed for both rounds pooled. 
* p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 154 
 
Table 35. Impact of “in recovery” classification on school behavioral response. Rounds 
2012 & 2013 pooled. 
 (1) (2) 
Outcomes Baseline With controls 











































































Table 35, Continued. 
 (1) (2) 
Outcomes Baseline With controls 












Note: The table shows resulting coefficient 𝜗1 from equation 8 with and without covariates correspondingly. The cells contain 
the main coefficient, the robust standard error on parenthesis, and the sample size. All outcomes are estimated using OLS. The 
schools included in the sample are those SEP schools that are classified using the classification formula, and that are within the 
0.467 bandwidth. #These models do not include enrollment rates as a control variable because it is also a denominator of the 
outcome. @ Sample restricted to only public schools, because private voucher schools do not have teacher evaluations.   
* p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 36. Impact of “in recovery” classification on student body  composition. Rounds 
2012 & 2013 pooled.  
 (1) (2) 
Outcomes Baseline With controls 






























Note: The table shows resulting coefficient 𝜗1 from equation 8 with and without covariates correspondingly. The 
cells contain the main coefficient, the robust standard error on parenthesis, and the sample size. All outcomes are 
estimated using OLS. The schools included in the sample are those SEP schools that are classified using the 
classification formula, and that are within the 0.467 bandwidth. # This model does not control for the SES level at 
the baseline to avoid a spurious correlation. 
* p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 37. Impact of “in recovery” classification on teacher body composition. Rounds 
2012 & 2013 pooled. 
 (1) (2) 
Outcomes Baseline With controls 












Note: The table shows resulting coefficient 𝜗1 from equation 8 with and without covariates correspondingly. The 
cells contain the main coefficient, the robust standard error on parenthesis, and the sample size. All outcomes are 
estimated using OLS. The schools included in the sample are those SEP schools that are classified using the 
classification formula, and that are within the 0.467 bandwidth.  







Figure 1. Monthly voucher values per grade and concentration levels. 
Note: Data from the Law 20550 (from 2011), Law 20501 (from 2011), and value of the vouchers 















































































































































Figure 2. 4th grade national math and language test scores from 2006 to 2013.  
Note: Data from Agencia de Calidad de la Educación. Schools included are those that have 4th 
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Figure 3. Proportion of schools classified as “autonomous” on 2012 by ICE index 
relative to median of the SES group. 
Note: Each circle represents the proportion of schools classified as “autonomous” within equal-
sized ICE-index bins relative to the median of the SES group (the dotted line). The fitted line 




























Log difference in height=-0.14; p=.08; n=2901 
Figure 4. McCrary density test. Density of ICE index for schools in 2012 at the 
“autonomous” threshold centered at the median of the SES groups. 
Note: Schools included are all those elementary schools that have adopted the SEP law, that are 
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Panel A. Math on year t 
 
 
Panel B. Language on year t 
 
 
Panel C. Science on year t 
 
Panel D. Math on year t+1 
 
Panel E. Language on year t+1 
 
Panel F. Science on year t+1 
 
Figure 5. Selected outcomes by ICE index at the “autonomous” cutoff. 
Note: Each circle represents the SIMCE scores of the schools by the ICE index relative to the 
median of the SES group. Schools are binned into 100 equal-sized bins. Fitted lines do not 




















































































































































































Figure 6. Proportion of schools classified as “in recovery” on 2012 and 2013 by ICE 
index. 
Note: Each circle represents the proportion of schools classified as “in recovery” within equal-
sized ICE-index bins relative to the median of the SES group (the dotted line). The fitted line 




























Log difference in height=0.247; p=.13; n=5763 
 
Figure 7. McCrary density test. Density of ICE index for schools in 2012 and 2013 at 
the “in recovery” threshold. 
Note: Schools included are all those elementary schools that have adopted the SEP law, that are 
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Panel A. Math on year t 
 
 
Panel B. Language on year t 
 
 
Panel C. Science on year t 
 
Figure 8. Selected outcomes by ICE index at the “in recovery” cutoff. Rounds 2012 & 
2013 pooled. 
Note: Each circle represents the SIMCE scores of the schools by the ICE index relative to the 
cutoff. Schools are binned into 100 equal-sized bins. Fitted lines do not control for covariates. 
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Appendix A. School classification process 
According to the Decree 293 and the Technical Report of Proceso de Clasificacion SEP, the 
process to classify schools is as follows. 
Data needed: 
a. School ID  
b. Type of school 
c. Average number of students who take SIMCE test for the last three years available 
(average of math, language and sciences).82 
d. Average SIMCE scores for last three years available (average of math, language and 
sciences) 
e. Proportion of students who score above 250 points on SIMCE for the last three years 
available (average of math, language and sciences). 
f. Proportion of students who score above 300 points on SIMCE for the last three years 
available (average of math, language and sciences). 
g. Socioeconomic group in which the school is classified according to data from SIMCE for 
the last three years. 
h. Approval rate for last year.83 
i. Retention rate for last year. 
j. SNED Improvement index for last year. 
k. SNED Integration index for last year. 
l. SNED Initiative index for last year. 
m. Teacher evaluation scores for last year. 
Step 0: Prepare data 
i. Calculate median of average SIMCE scores for each socioeconomic group using all 
the schools. 
ii. Calculate median of proportion of students scoring above 250 points on SIMCE for 
each socioeconomic group using all the schools. 
iii. Calculate median of proportion of students scoring above 300 points on SIMCE for 
each socioeconomic group using all the schools. 
iv. Standardize all the complementary indicators (approval rate, retention rate, 
improvement, initiative, integration, teacher evaluation) using the data for all the 
schools. 
v. Standardize average SIMCE score for years available in the last three years. 
Step 1: Check which schools can be classified according to the classification formulae. 
                                                 
82 The last three years of available SIMCE scores skips the year prior to the one of the classification. For example, if 
the classification of schools for year 2012 is done in 2011, then the SIMCE scores considered are from years 2010, 
2009 and 2008.  
83 Approval rates, retention rates, SNED improvement, integration and initiative indices and Teacher evaluation 
scores are all available for the year prior to the classification year. For example, if the classification of schools for 
year 2012 is done in 2011, then these indices are from year 2011 (reported numbers from the previous year). 
 176 
 
i. Does the school have at least two SIMCE measure in the last three years? If the 
school does not have at least two measures, then the school is classified as 
“emergent”.  
ii. Does the school have less than 20 students taking the test on the average of the last 3 
years of SIMCE?  If the school has an average of students taking the test of 20 or 
lower, then the school is classified as “emergent”. 
iii. If the school has two or more SIMCE measures AND has an average of students 
taking the test greater than 20, then the school can be classified using the formula. 
Step 2: Apply classification formula only for schools that can be classified. 
i. Does the average SIMCE score per year is less than 220 points? 
ii. Does the average SIMCE score per year is greater than the median of the 
socioeconomic group? 
iii. Does the proportion of students scoring above 250 points is less than 20%? 
iv. Does the proportion of students scoring above 250 points is greater than the median 
of the socioeconomic group? 
v. Does the proportion of students scoring above 300 points is greater than the median 
of the socioeconomic group? 
vi. Does rule i and iii happen simultaneously in at least 2 years of SIMCE scores? If yes, 
then school is preliminarily classified as “in recovery”. 
vii. Do rules ii, iv and v happen simultaneously in at least 2 years of SIMCE scores? If 
yes, then school is preliminarily classified as “autonomous”. 
viii. Schools that are not classified as “in recovery” by rule vi or “autonomous” by rule vii, 
are preliminarily classified as “emergent”. 
ix. Construct Complementary Index of School Quality (IIC). 
a. For public schools: Weighted average of standardized quality indices (Approval 
rate* 0.25, Retention rate*0.25, Improvement*0.17, Initiative*0.13, 
Integration*0.13, Teacher evaluation*0.07) 
b. For private voucher schools: Weighted average of standardized quality indices 
(Approval rate* 0.25, Retention rate*0.25, Improvement*0.20, Initiative*0.15, 
Integration*0.15) 
x. Construct Index of Educational Quality (ICE): Weighted average of standardized 
average of SIMCE score * 0.7 and IIC*0.3 
xi. Calculate the 10th percentile of the ICE scores. 
xii. Calculate the median of the ICE scores for each socioeconomic group only for 
schools that can be classified. 
xiii. Does the school has an ICE score lower than the 10th percentile? If yes, then a school 
preliminarily classified as “emergent” becomes “in recovery”. 
xiv.  Does the school has an ICE score less than the median of the socioeconomic group? 




Appendix B. SIMCE evaluation calendar 
Table B.1. SIMCE evaluation calendar. 
Grade Subject 
Years 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
4th grade Math X X X X X X X X 
Language X X X X X X X X 
Social sciences X  X  X  X  
Natural sciences  X  X  X  X 
8th grade Math  X  X  X X X 
Language  X  X  X X X 
Social sciences  X  X   X  




Appendix C. Additional tables and figures 
 





2012 2013 2014 2015 
In recovery 92.15 95.43 98.21 100 
Emergent 89.23 89.7 83.59 84.48 
Autonomous 96.44 94.96 95.44 94.98 
Total coincidence 92.07 92.01 88.61 89.06 
Note: I have calculated which category corresponds to each school according to the rules specified in the law, the 
decree and the technical document. Each percentage specified here indicates that the classifications I have made 
correspond to the ones defined by MINEDUC. E.g., from all schools MINEDUC classified as emergent on 2014, I 






Table C.2. First stage models for schools being classified or not as “autonomous”. Year 
2013 and pooled rounds. 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 2013 round  Pooled rounds: 2012 & 2013 



























Controls No Yes  No Yes 
Observations 2396 2396  4620 4620 
F  1996.90 1535.63  4736.13 4102.17 
Bandwidth 0.857 0.857  0.779 0.779 
Notes: The table shows resulting coefficients from equation 5 estimated with a linear probability model. The cells 
contain the main coefficients and the robust standard errors on parenthesis. The schools included are those SEP 
schools that are classified according to the classification formula. Covariates included in columns (2) and (4) control 
for whether the school is in an urban area, the type of school, schools SES level, and the enrollment rates in 4 th 
grade. Columns (3) and (4) include a year fixed effect to account per any cohort trend. 




Table C.3. Impact of “autonomous” classification on 2013 round on high- and low-
stakes grades. 
 (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 




 For-profit  Not for-profit 
Panel A: High stakes outcomes       




































Panel B: Low stakes outcomes       




































Note: The table shows resulting coefficients from equation 6 with covariates. The cells contain the main coefficient, 
the robust standard error on parenthesis, and the sample size. Models are estimated using OLS. The schools included 
in the sample are those SEP schools that are classified using the classification formula, and that are within a 0.857 
bandwidth. The two columns at the right only consider private voucher schools, and divides the sample on whether 
the school are for-profit or not. 




Table C.4. Impact of “autonomous” classification on pooled rounds of 2012 and 2013 
on high-stake outcomes. 
Outcomes Pooled rounds: 2012 & 2013 
4th grade Math scores on year t 1.69 
(1.88) 
4620 
4th grade Language scores on year t 0.18 
(1.62) 
4618 
4th grade Science scores on year t 0.45 
(1.47) 
4616 
Note: The table shows resulting coefficients from equation 6 with covariates and year fixed effect to account per 
any cohort trend on SIMCE scores. The cells contain the main coefficient, the robust standard error on parenthesis, 
and the sample size. Models are estimated using OLS. The schools included in the sample are those SEP schools that 
are classified using the classification formula, and that are within a 0.779 bandwidth.  







Table C.5. Impact of “autonomous” classification on 2012 on high-stakes outcomes using other IVs. 






















































































































































































Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bandwidth 1.175 1.152 1.042 1.191 1.071 1.238 .921 .975 1.256 
Note: The table shows resulting coefficient B1 from equation 6 with covariates, but with the instrumental variables specified on the top of the column. The cells 
contain the main coefficient, the robust standard error on parenthesis, and the sample size. All outcomes are estimated using OLS. The schools included in the 
sample are those SEP schools that are classified using the classification formula, and that are within the bandwidth specified on the bottom row. At the end of 
each column there is the specified bandwidth used for the analysis of all the outcomes of the column. This bandwidth is the optimal bandwidth following 
Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) for the 4th grade math scores on year t. I have used the same bandwidth for all the outcomes for convenience. However 
the bandwidths estimated for the other outcomes do not vary much. 
* p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01  
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Table C.6. Minimum detectable effects for the threshold of the “autonomous” 
classification in 2012. 
Outcome MDE MDES 
Panel A: High stakes outcomes 
4th grade Math scores on year t 7.73 0.15 
4th grade Math scores on year t+1 7.92 0.16 
4th grade Language scores on year t 6.68 0.13 
4th grade Language scores on year t+1 6.68 0.13 
4th grade Science scores on year t 6.28 0.13 
4th grade Science scores on year t+1 6.08 0.12 
Panel B: Low stakes outcomes 
8th grade Math scores on year t+1 7.47 0.15 
8th grade Language scores on year t+1 7.50 0.15 
8th grade Science scores on year t+1 7.13 0.14 
Note: Following Schochet (2009), I calculate the minimum detectable effect (MDE) values using the formula  
𝑀𝐷𝐸 = 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 (∝, 𝛽, 𝑑𝑓) ∗  √𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡) 
Where, 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡) is the variance of the impact estimate controlling for covariates (Table 25, column 2; Table 
26, column 2), and 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 (. ) is a constant that is a function of the significance level (∝), statistical power (𝛽), and 
the number of degrees of freedom (𝑑𝑓). I use a significance level of 0.05, a power of 0.80, for a two-tailed test, as it 
is commonly used. The constant is 2.83.  I also report MDES which is the MDE in effect size units, i.e., as a 
percentage of the standard deviation of the outcome measure. 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑆 =  𝑀𝐷𝐸 / 𝜎 , where 𝜎 is the standard 





Table C.7. Minimum detectable effects for the threshold of the “in recovery” 
classification in 2012 and 2013 rounds pooled. 
Outcome MDE MDES 
Panel A: High stakes outcomes 
4th grade Math scores on year t 7.92 0.16 
4th grade Math scores on year t+1# 12.17 0.24 
4th grade Language scores on year t 7.16 0.14 
4th grade Language scores on year t+1# 10.56 0.21 
4th grade Science scores on year t 6.45 0.13 
4th grade Science scores on year t+1# 8.57 0.17 
Panel B: Low stakes outcomes 
8th grade Math scores on year t* 6.96 0.14 
8th grade Math scores on year t+1# 8.32 0.17 
8th grade Language scores on year t* 6.23 0.12 
8th grade Language scores on year t+1# 7.61 0.15 
8th grade Science scores on year t* 10.33 0.21 
8th grade Science scores on year t+1# 7.10 0.14 
Note: Following Schochet (2009), I calculate the minimum detectable effect (MDE) values using the formula  
𝑀𝐷𝐸 = 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 (∝, 𝛽, 𝑑𝑓) ∗  √𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡) 
Where, 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡) is the variance of the impact estimate controlling for covariates (Table 33, column 2; Table 34 
columns 2 and 4 ), and 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 (. ) is a constant that is a function of the significance level (∝), statistical power (𝛽), 
and the number of degrees of freedom (𝑑𝑓). I use a significance level of 0.05, a power of 0.80, for a two-tailed test, 
as it is commonly used. The constant is 2.83.  I also report MDES which is the MDE in effect size units, i.e., as a 
percentage of the standard deviation of the outcome measure. 𝑀𝐷𝐸𝑆 =  𝑀𝐷𝐸 / 𝜎 , where 𝜎 is the standard 
deviation of the outcome measure for all the population. 





Panel A. Low SES schools 
 




Panel B. Mid Low SES schools 
 





Panel C. Mid SES schools 
 




Panel D. Mid-High and High SES schools 
 
Log difference in height=0.076; p=.30; n=199 
 
 
Figure C.1. McCrary density test. Density of ICE of schools by SES group close to the 
“autonomous” cutoff. 
Note: Schools included are all those elementary schools that have adopted the SEP law, that are 



























Figure C.2. Share of "autonomous" schools by municipality size. 
Note: Schools included in the sample are those SEP schools that are classified using the classification formula, and 
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